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Abstract 
This thesis examines the intersection between the socio-economic marginalisation of 
protracted South Sudanese refugees living in Kakuma refugee camp and their transnational 
relationships with family members living in the global north. In the attempt to fully 
understand the complexity of these 21st century transnational family networks, this thesis 
explores these relationships and their influence on refugee participants from two primary 
perspectives: 1) remittances senders living in both the UK and US, and 2) remittance 
recipients who have been living in Kakuma as protracted refugees. 
 
Separated into four empirical chapters, this thesis explores the dynamics of these refugee 
transnational networks, the social and economic processes undergone to send/receive 
remittances, the ways in which refugees use remittances to combat their insecurity in the 
refugee camp, and finally the ways in which the participants in this study used remittances 
and the pursuit of education to challenge the marginalisation associated with their refugee 
status. 
 
Throughout this thesis, I argue that the transnational networks developed by the participants 
in this study have enabled the members of the South Sudanese diaspora to develop a strong 
sense of community solidarity and a mutual sense of responsibility to all those they consider 
family. These influences have been utilised as tools for the refugee members of this diaspora 
to challenge their insecurity, vulnerability and socio-economic marginalisation in Kenya, a 
by-product of their refugee status, protracted state of exile, and dependency on the 
humanitarian aid system. 
 
 5 
As explicitly stated in the conclusion, this thesis makes an original contribution to the 
theoretical development on the sustainability of transnational communities, the relationship 
between degree of integration and remittance sending patterns over time, the influence of 
remittances on refugee welfare, and the intersection between transnational participation and a 
population’s “refugeeness”. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
With its central location to the majority of the South Sudanese community in Kakuma 
refugee camp in Northern Kenya, Franco’s restaurant was an ideal meeting place when the 
heat outside was intolerable. Built, like most of the camp, out of sheets of metal and planks of 
wood, this forest-green painted oasis always had a reliable source of generator-fuelled 
electricity to operate their large TVs playing Ethiopian music videos and fans to keep the 
inside at a bearable temperature. It was an escape from the realities of Kakuma, both physical 
and mental, for refugees, aid workers, missionaries, and researchers alike. 
This restaurant was where I originally sat down to talk with the majority of the 
community leaders that were willing to help me with my research project, always sharing a 
plate of injera, a traditional Ethiopian flatbread meal, and a cup of coffee. As we sat down, 
eating from the same source of sustenance, we discussed anything from international politics, 
differences in culture, relationships with family, and our aspirations for the future. My 
relationships with the gatekeepers of Kakuma’s South Sudanese community became one of 
mutual interest, a desire to create change, and to give a voice to the members of their 
community who have been silenced for decades. 
I met one man named Peter (a pseudonym) outside a Safaricom shop (Kenya’s largest 
cell phone provider) within my first week of arrival. He immediately noticed my American 
accent, and as he towered over me smiling, showed me his American passport. He had 
recently got married in South Sudan and had been settling his new wife and extended family 
into Kakuma for the past several months. As much as he enjoyed spending time with his 
family, Kakuma was a difficult environment in which to become comfortable. Peter later told 
me that I reminded him that there was a world outside of the walls of the refugee camp, a 
reality that becomes easy to forget due to its geographical remoteness. 
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Peter, a former refugee who came to Kakuma when he was nine years old in 1992 and 
was resettled to the US in 2001 at the age of 18, strove to maintain an attachment to the 
refugee camp which raised him into the man he became. During the nine months that I was in 
Kakuma, Peter visited the camp twice, overlapping with my stay by three months. Peter’s 
family in South Sudan had recently arranged his marriage with his new bride, and he decided 
to bring the majority of his family to Kakuma for their safety due to the rising insecurity in 
their home nation. During his second visit, he came to meet his new-born son who was born 
in the camp hospital and to further bond with his family. Peter was one of several participants 
in this study who had participated in a transnational marriage, further explored in a previous 
research project of mine (Patterson 2016), in which men who had been resettled to the US 
had partaken in arranged marriages with South Sudanese women as a means to reconnect 
with their traditional culture. These couples were typically separated between the US and 
East Africa for an average of five years due to the high cost of living in the US and the costly 
visa process that these men and women were required to undergo to permanently settle in the 
US. 
Peter loved just sitting in Franco’s, listening to the sound of the blaring music, and 
escaping from the heat outside. During the many hours that we sat in this restaurant talking 
about life, he would bring his nephews and niece to meet me, to talk to me about their 
relationships, their lives, and their dreams. Together we would try to brainstorm ideas to 
improve his community, to better support their needs, and to help facilitate the dreams of the 
young adults and children of his family to become doctors and lawyers. Peter strongly 
believed in the ability of this generation to make a significant change in the future of Kakuma 
and post-war South Sudan. He also believed that it was his duty as a family leader and the 
primary funder of his family’s children’s education, to assist these dreams and to help raise 
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the next generation of his family to become strong responsible leaders within the South 
Sudanese diaspora. 
Peter was one of many active transnational participants and remittance senders 
represented in this study who fought to provide for their families, who fought their 
dependence on the refugee system almost three decades after their arrival in Kakuma refugee 
camp, and who fought the inadequacy associated with their family’s “refugeeness.” As an 
individual who both grew up within the refugee system and who supported family members 
still struggling with the same issues of marginalisation, dependency, deprivation, and 
insecurity, Peter understood the virtually inescapable trap that is Kakuma and the Kenyan 
refugee system. This system, designed to protect victims of persecution and conflict, has told 
tens of thousands of South Sudanese refugees in Kakuma to “just wait” until they can achieve 
a solution to their displacement. Decades of waiting later, the members of this population 
continue to live in a state of limbo in which their freedom of movement is highly restricted, 
they are denied legal access to employment, are incapable of voicing their political 
discontent, and are denied the ability to provide for their families outside of the refugee camp 
(Crisp 2002; Jacobsen 2016; Refugee Consortium of Kenya 2012; Turner 2010). 
The legal definition of a refugee set out by the 1951 United Nations Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees states that a refugee is a person who flees across an 
international border because of a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for his or her 
political, social, or religious beliefs or activities” (Loescher 2001; Nyers 2006, United 
Nations General Assembly 1951: 1; UNHCR 1992). This definition was written in the 
aftermath of two World Wars in which much of the world was plagued by “mass expulsions, 
compulsory transfers of populations, mass exits, and arbitrary denial of return” (Loescher 
2001:21). The 1951 definition is extremely broad and simplifies the quality of life and 
experiences of being a refugee, particularly for those living in protracted exile, contributing 
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to an ignorance and inability to develop effective policy solutions (Crisp 2002; Jansen 2013; 
Milner 2014; Zetter 1991).  
In Kenya, as in much of Africa, the majority of refugees are protected by the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the 1951 Convention under ‘prima 
facie’ rather than ‘de jure’ status, i.e. there has been no formal, individual assessment of a 
right to asylum. The ‘prima facie’ status is used to justify encampment policies until a 
solution to their displacement can be found because it ensures that those living in camps are 
unable to benefit from the full rights enjoyed by formally recognised refugees (Hyndman and 
Nylund 1998). For the former South Sudanese refugees who have lived in Kakuma in the 
past, some have returned to South Sudan, others were able to integrate in urban centres in 
Kenya and Uganda, some were given university scholarships to study somewhere outside of 
Kakuma, some have managed to become economic migrants, and some were beneficiaries of 
UNHCR resettlement programmes to places like the US, Canada, or Australia (Chanoff 2005; 
Harris 2010; Johnson and Stoll 2008; Marlowe 2018; McKinnon 2008). These were the lucky 
ones, the fraction of this refugee population who were able to achieve a solution to their 
displacement. The majority of Kakuma’s South Sudanese community, however, continue to 
live inside the walls of this camp. Although some have only been inhabitants since 2013 as a 
result of South Sudan’s most recent civil war, many have lived in Kakuma since it was 
originally opened in 1992, and almost all are trapped in a protracted state of exile built on 
insecurity, violence, dependency, and marginalisation. 
I have chosen to incorporate the concept of “refugeeness” into the title of this thesis, 
representing a central theme to its analysis, for one primary reason: despite the lack of an 
established theoretical definition, I have found this concept to be a reoccurring theme in both 
the experiences of the refugees represented in this thesis as well as other ethnographic studies 
written by the leading experts on refugee dependency and welfare.  
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Various experts on refugee studies have defined refugeeness in a variety of ways 
beyond legal characterisations, including as an identity, a stereotype, a stigma, and a state of 
being, which has been imposed on protracted refugee populations in order to qualify for 
continued aid and protection (Harrell-Bond 1986; Jansen 2013; Malkki 1995; Mann 2012; 
Napier-Moore 2005; Zetter 1991).1 According to these authors, refugeeness is a by-product 
of the refugee system’s inability to 1) find a durable solution for the millions of refugees 
currently living in a protracted state of exile (UNHCR 2015), and 2) a reluctance on the part 
of UNHCR to promote the agency and rights of refugees when their home and host nations 
are unwilling or incapable of doing so themselves. These authors suggest that refugeeness is a 
state of helplessness and of dependency in which one is deprived of agency. Refugeeness is, 
therefore, a “pathological ill[ness]” rooted in violence (Malkki 1995: 31). It is an 
“overwhelming sense of abjection,” loss, marginalisation, and hardship (Mann 2012: 451). 
Finally, given the lack of agency, refugeeness implies an inability of refugees to contribute to 
a solution to their displacement.  
Although refugeeness as a state of being was significant among the South Sudanese 
community of Kakuma, there were several resources that they did utilise in an attempt to 
combat their lack of agency within the Kenyan refugee system. The most significant of these 
resources were the social support systems provided by their family and community, both 
locally within the camp and transnationally elsewhere in the world. These social networks, 
when combined with other attachments, such as their strong faith in Christianity and the 
belief that education was the key to their future, facilitated a strong sense of motivation and 
belief that their lives and the lives of their children could be improved in the future. 
                                                     
1 It is important to note that all of these authors’ assumptions made about the characteristics of being a 
refugee are derived from Sub-Saharan African refugee populations, the majority of whom were 
identified as protracted. The exception to this was Zetter (1991), who based his analysis on both 
refugees from Cyprus in addition to several African populations. 
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 With this introductory background in mind, this thesis is an attempt to observe 1) the 
effect of Kenyan encampment policies on the welfare of Kakuma’s South Sudanese 
community, and 2) the varied efforts that the members of this population have undertaken to 
transcend the social and economic limitations imposed on their lives through community 
solidarity and a mutual sense of responsibility on both a transnational and local scale. In 
order to gain an accurate depiction of the community and family influences on this 
population, transnational participants were specifically sought out for this research project, 
both remittance recipients currently living in Kakuma and remittance senders living in the US 
and the UK. 
This thesis, therefore, examines the bonds between family and community, people 
who share similar histories, but who have different experiences within the refugee system and 
with the state of refugeeness. Many of Kakuma refugee camp’s protracted South Sudanese 
population had been living as refugees elsewhere since the mid-1980s and arrived in Kakuma 
in 1992 as children having been torn away from their parents, culture, and any sense of 
future. Their children, many now adults, have lived their entire lives in Kakuma, a lifetime of 
decreasing food rations, inaccessible medical treatment, of living behind camp walls in 
cramped and insecure conditions; lives which have been defined by handouts by the UNHCR 
and aid organisations and by barriers erected by the Kenyan government. Members of this 
population continue to be victims of violence, starvation, and disease, and have very little 
choice or opportunity to pursue a more stable, independent, and secure future. 
In contrast, their family members living in the US and UK, and elsewhere in the 
global north, represent hope and opportunity for the refugee family members that they strive 
to support. Many of the remittance senders represented in this study were former refugees, 
beneficiaries of refugee resettlement programmes, while others were economic migrants. 
Many of the members of this population are highly educated and have worked hard to 
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develop a means by which they can provide for their families in both their nation of residence 
as well as in their homeland of South Sudan, and in Kenya and Uganda where many of their 
relatives have sought refuge from a civil war. Within their transnational communities, they 
are leaders, mediators, and mentors. For their refugee family members currently living in 
camps like Kakuma, the maintenance of these relationships represents a means to hold onto 
the belief that they can break free from the trap of their refugeeness, and a tool that can be 
used to reduce and eventually eliminate their dependence on the refugee system.  
In the context of these South Sudanese transnational communities, remittance senders 
have freedom of movement, the right to be legally employed, and the ability to make choices 
for the betterment of themselves and their families without being subjected to restrictive 
policies designed to “control and contain” (Turner 2010). These two sides of the same 
diaspora, made up of family members committed towards each other’s welfare, represent two 
extremes of a population displaced by war and turmoil for multiple generations: those who 
were able to move on from their traumatic past and those who continue to be victims.  
The following research questions were designed to explore the nature of these refugee 
transnational relationships and the extent to which these social networks enable Kakuma’s 
South Sudanese population to combat their refugeeness: 
1. Does the exchange of economic resources help separated South Sudanese family 
members build transnational communities?  
2. What do both remittance senders and recipients hope to achieve through the transfer 
of transnational remittances?  
3. Do remittances help refugee recipients and their surrounding community members 
challenge insecurity within the refugee camp? 
4. How do these transnational relationships influence research participants’ perception 
of future opportunities? 
  It is important to note that these research questions have been modified since the 
beginning of this project in order to reflect the themes that had emerged in the data. Due to 
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my previous research on South Sudanese transnational communities, I knew that members of 
this refugee diaspora maintained a strong attachment to Kakuma, had developed strong 
transnational communities, and were genuinely committed to the welfare advancement of 
their refugee family members living in Kenya and Uganda. However, I had underestimated 
the restrictive impact that the refugee system had on the members of this population who 
continue to live inside a refugee camp. I had expected to see a significant influence of 
increased livelihood development for the remittance recipients of Kakuma’s South Sudanese 
population, an assumption that did not reflect the reality experienced by the participants in 
this study. Instead, the men and women represented in this thesis expressed experiences of 
inescapable insecurity, which was marginally alleviated by the remittances sent by their 
family abroad who were committed to their welfare.  
  Since insecurity was a primary theme expressed by virtually all of my participants in 
Kakuma, I chose to redesign somewhat these research questions to reflect the standard of 
living experienced by these men and women, in addition to examining how and why they 
managed their transnational relationships. I found that in general, these transnational 
relationships and the remittances introduced into the South Sudanese population of Kakuma 
acted as a coping mechanism in which refugee participants were able to survive their regular 
states of insecurity in addition to motivating them that life could one day be better. 
 
1.1 Kakuma Refugee Camp 
 
Kakuma refugee camp lies at the heart of South Sudan’s protracted refugee 
population and has been the epicentre from which South Sudanese refugees have been 
resettled all over the world, making a significant contribution to the diaspora and their 
 18 
transnational activities. Kakuma is a remote camp in the arid desert of north-west Kenya, 
lying within 100 km of the South Sudan-Kenya border.  
 
Figure 1.1 Map of Kenya and Location of Kakuma Refugee Camp  
 
 
 
As of 2018, this camp was host to approximately 147,000 refugees from several East 
and Central African nations including South Sudan, Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Rwanda, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, and Burundi (UNHCR 2018a). Originally established in 
1992 in response to the tens of thousands of southern Sudanese refugee children fleeing over 
the Kenyan border due to the increasing level of insecurity in their home nation of southern 
Sudan and the collapse of the Ethiopian state, their previous nation of refuge, in 1991 
(Chanoff 2005; Jansen 2013; Verdirame 1999), Kakuma is now a bustling city-size 
settlement, home to a wide variety of economic markets and community organisations 
(Jansen 2018). The majority of the camp’s population live in a protracted situation, having 
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been classified as refugees for over five years without the attainment of a durable solution 
outlined by the UNHCR.  
Figure 1.2 Map of Kakuma Refugee Camp 
 
 
 
Kakuma refugee camp has expanded significantly since its opening in 1992 and is 
currently divided into four sub camps, in addition to one experimental settlement called 
Kalobeyei, approximately 30 km north of the rest of the camp, attempting to integrate refugee 
communities with the local Kenyan population (Betts et al. 2018a).2 With the exception of 
                                                     
2 Kalobeyei was originally opened in 2015 in collaboration between the UNHCR and the local 
government of Turkana county, where Kakuma refugee camp is located (Betts et al. 2018a). This 
experimental settlement was expected to promote self-reliance among refugees and economic growth 
in the region; however, according Betts et al. (2018a), management of this settlement continues to be 
reliant on emergency services due to the unanticipated influx of newly arrived South Sudanese 
refugees. It is important to note that unlike Kalobeyei, Kakuma refugee camp is not a legal residence 
of the local population, although many locals do have access to educational and medical services 
available in the camp. 
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seven participants who lived in Kakuma 4, the majority of the remittance recipients 
represented in this study had lived in Kakuma since the 1990s and were therefore based 
throughout Kakuma 1 at the time of their participation this study.  
The environment of Kakuma is extreme, with temperatures regularly reaching 30 to 
40 degrees Celsius year-round. Water, although provided to refugees for free by the UNHCR, 
must be carried in heavy jerry cans over long distances. The air is dry and prone to dust 
storms. Furthermore, Kakuma lies on a flood plain, which means that many neighbourhoods 
are under water for three or four months out of the year.3 As a consequence of this 
environment, coupled with a lack of infrastructure for sanitation, health is a daily concern for 
many refugee families living in the camp. Malaria and cholera are commonplace, and 
although the UNHCR provides healthcare services, their resources are extremely limited. 
Kakuma-town, neighbouring the camp, has several clinics and pharmacies that are adequately 
equipped to treat all common ailments in the region; however, these services are often 
inaccessible to refugees due to their cost. 
Owing to the presence of several charity organisations within Kakuma, refugees have 
access to a wide variety of education and livelihood development resources, training 
participants to not only think creatively, but also to acquire skills to support their families. 
However, in reality, due to strict policies that severely limit the rights of refugees within 
Kenya, the individuals benefiting from these services are unable to gain legal employment, 
legally own a business, or live and work outside of the camp.4 As a consequence of these 
                                                     
3 During the height of the rainy season, much of the camp was inaccessible by motorcycle taxis, 
stalling the progress of this research project. For refugees, as the camp was their only legal residence, 
flooding just became a part of daily life in which the participants in this research study were forced to 
manage. During this period, it was not uncommon for mud houses to collapse from the rainfall, 
forcing community members to work together to rebuild what they could. 
4 While rights such as employment, business ownership, and freedom of movement are restricted by 
Kenyan refugee policies, many refugees continue to work, start businesses, and live outside the camp. 
This means that they are often harassed by the police, earn a fraction of what Kenyan nationals would 
for the same job, and risk detainment and possible deportation to their home nation. 
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limitations on refugee life, there is often a gap between the camp inhabitants and aid 
organisations’ aspirations and their actual ability to significantly change the conditions of 
their exile (see Chapters 2, 7, and 8 for further discussion). After over twenty-five years of 
living in the camp at the time the data for this thesis was collected in Kakuma, often the only 
reliable resource a refugee might have is the bond between their family and other community 
members, specifically those who live in the camp, in their homeland, and elsewhere in the 
world. 
 Since 1992 the South Sudanese community has represented at least half of the refugee 
population of Kakuma.5 The geographic region now recognised as South Sudan has been in 
an almost continuous state of civil war or civil unrest since the 1950s, continuing after its 
independence from Sudan in 2011 (see Chapter 2 section 2.1 for a full discussion). Kakuma’s 
South Sudanese population represents two main waves of refuge. The original wave became 
refugees when they fled to Ethiopia in the 1980s and were forced to return home in 1991 after 
the collapse of the Ethiopian state under the Mengistu regime, and then fled to Kenya in 
1992. The second wave of refugees began to arrive in 2013 and 2014 after civil war once 
more broke out in the newly independent state. The South Sudanese population within 
Kakuma, approximately 90,000 people as of 2018, can be seperated into three distinct 
communities: the Dinka, the Nuer, and the Equatorians (UNHCR 2018a).6 Over the past few 
decades each of these communities have developed community organisations, a variety of 
religious institutions, educational programmes, and a basic market economy.  
                                                     
5 Other nationalities represented in the camp population during my time in Kakuma between 2017 and 
2018 included Somalian, Ethiopian, Congolese, Burundians, Sudanese, Rwandans, Eritreans, and 
Ugandans (UNHCR 2018a). 
6 The Dinka and Nuer make up the majority of the population of South Sudan. The Equatorians, from 
Western, Central, and Eastern Equatoria in southern South Sudan, make up several small tribes but 
share similar cultural values and traditions when compared to the Dinka and Nuer. It is important to 
note that these ethnic groups are very broad generalisations; however, they were also the primary 
identifiers used by the UNHCR and other aid organisations to organise camp residents after their 
nationality. 
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 Kakuma’s most long-staying South Sudanese inhabitants primarily lived in subcamp 
Kakuma 1. I found that most of my participants lived in close proximity to their extended 
family members, those they identified as clan members, and other community members with 
whom they identified as being ‘like family’.7 These relationships of both family and ‘like 
family’ were contained within the three groups and affiliated neighbourhoods indicated in 
Figure 1.3. I found that there was also a distinctive effort by the UNHCR to segregate 
members of different tribes/region of origin, in particular between the Dinka and the Nuer. 
According to several of my participants, due to the war crimes being committed by both 
tribes in South Sudan during by time in Kakuma, it was dangerous for either a Dinka or Nuer 
to travel into or through the neighbourhood of the other. Figure 1.3 is a general representation 
(not to scale) of my participants’ neighbourhoods identified based on their tribal affiliation or 
region from which they come in South Sudan. 
Figure 1.3 Map of Kakuma 1 and its Segregated South Sudanese Neighbourhoods  
 
 
                                                     
7 I found that for the most part only the community leaders represented in this study, otherwise 
referred to as gatekeepers, regularly socialised with people outside their tribe/region of origin when 
compared to my other participants. In these cases, these community leaders attempted to pool together 
resources from across the camp and through internationally established social networks in the effort to 
improve their community’s welfare and standard of living.  
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1.2 South Sudanese Transnational Participation 
 
A significant portion of Kakuma’s South Sudanese community have family members 
who have been resettled as refugees to places like the US, Canada, and Australia. Many of 
these South Sudanese refugees from Kakuma were resettled in the early 2000s, a population 
that is often described in the media as the Lost Boys of South Sudan. Other members of the 
South Sudanese transnational community settled in these and other countries as students and 
economic migrants, often fortunate enough to escape the fate of refuge and civil unrest that 
many of their family members continue to experience. Although they might live in separate 
regions of the world, these family members regularly communicate and transfer financial 
resources recognised as remittances.  
  These transnational relationships are often built on mutual responsibility and 
dependency. Family members living in the global north are expected to financially provide 
for their community who live in the camp and elsewhere in East Africa. In exchange they are 
empowered to be active leaders in their family, to maintain a connection to their heritage, and 
to ensure that their family is taken care of and protected in the same way that they were as 
children.  
 As suggested by both the literature on South Sudanese transnational communities as 
well as my participants’ insights, within South Sudanese culture, both social (in the form of 
emotional concern) and economic support are considered to be a duty for the fortunate 
members of the family and a right of the less fortunate (Grabska 2010; Johnson and Stoll 
2008; Lim 2009; Shandy 2007). As long as these responsibilities are upheld to the best of the 
individual’s ability, they are entitled to support from other family members. This system of 
mutual support allows the members of these transnational communities to maintain strong 
connections to one another despite the vast distances between them. 
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 This community represents a unique link between those defined by their refugeeness 
within the Kenyan refugee system, experienced as dependency, marginalisation, and the 
deprivation of agency, with family and community members who share their history and 
culture but who also represent freedom and future opportunities. Their relationships bridge 
the gap between “no solution in sight” to a potential “durable solution” to the global refugee 
crisis through transnational participation (Crisp 2002; Van Hear 2014). Building on Van 
Hear’s (2014) argument that refugee transnational diasporas could be a potential durable 
solution for protracted displacement, this thesis is an exploration of his theory’s practicality 
when applied to a refugee diaspora with a strong cultural sense of commitment and 
responsibility to family. 
 Transnational practices have a profound impact on refugee identity and agency. 
Remittance senders believe in and strive for the active personal development of their refugee 
family based on the assumption that the remittance recipients will eventually become active 
and responsible leaders within their families. Simultaneously, remittance recipients living in 
Kakuma are able to develop and maintain a sense of personal development and potential for 
hope and opportunity through a means which is connected to both their culture and family. 
 I was first introduced to members of the South Sudanese diaspora in 2015 while 
examining the common occurrence of transnational marriages, very similar to Peter’s 
described above, among resettled South Sudanese refugees living in the US. All of the men 
that I interviewed in California identified as members of the Lost Boys of Sudan population, 
a name that they acquired as children in the late 1980s and early 1990s and had become 
ingrained as part of their identity, their history, and the narrative of their community. During 
that year-long research project, I found that this community made extraordinary efforts to 
reconnect with their family and the culture that they lost as children, and when financially 
stable enough, engaged in arranged marriages with South Sudanese women living across East 
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Africa. These efforts to find their family and to reconnect with their history and their identity, 
was the foundation of these transnational communities. 
 During this previous research project, I learned a lot about why members of these 
communities send money and maintain a deep bond with their family living throughout South 
Sudan, Kenya, and Uganda at various stages of displacement and as citizens of a nation at 
war with itself. However, my knowledge was limited to only a portion of these transnational 
communities. I found that refugee transnational communities were a commonly researched 
topic, specifically from the perspective of the remittance senders living in developed nations, 
while few studies focused on the effect that the remittances had on refugee recipients living 
in urban centres outside of refugee camps, and even less on actual camp residents. 
Despite the awareness of remittances being sent to refugee population in camps, and 
the large size and protracted state of this particular refugee community, many of whom have 
family members living abroad, there has been very little research conducted on the effect that 
remittances have on the South Sudanese population living within Kakuma refugee camp. This 
thesis is an attempt to bridge the gap in the literature on protracted refugee populations, 
particularly refugees engaged in transnational communities and the transfers of economic 
remittances from the global north to a refugee camp.  
 
1.3 Review of Chapters 
 
 This thesis explores South Sudanese cultural values, the experiences of South 
Sudanese refugee life, and finally the implications of refugee transnational participation. 
Similar to other transnational communities, these refugee social networks transcend 
international borders and are based on relationships of mutual respect, responsibility, and 
commitment. However, due to the extreme poverty in which members of these communities 
live, coupled with their experiences of trauma, marginalisation, and restricted migration 
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opportunities, I ask whether these refugee transnational communities are orientated more 
towards daily survival rather than economic advancement. 
 Chapter 2, entitled Making of a Refugee, explores the modern history of South Sudan, 
the UNHCR’s general refugee policies and their implications in Kenya, and finally, the 
experiences of South Sudanese refugees in Kakuma since 1992. Since the colonial period and 
continuing until independence from Sudan in 2011, the people of South Sudan (formerly 
southern Sudan) have suffered underdevelopment, political underrepresentation, religious 
oppression, and persecution based on their racial and tribal allegiances (Ahmed 2010; Collins 
2008; Deng 2015; Johnson, D.H. 2016; Jok 2001; LeRiche and Arnold 2012; Young 2017). 
Unfortunately, political oppression and civil unrest still continue today, contributing to one of 
the world’s largest protracted refugee situations. Under the protection of the UNHCR, South 
Sudanese refugees living in Kenya are subjected to numerous restrictions on their lives 
enforced by the Kenyan government. Although the UNHCR aims to achieve one of the three 
durable solutions (repatriation, integration, or resettlement) outlined in the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, due to a lack of resources, weak international support, and ongoing conflict, 
these policy solutions are becoming increasingly unattainable.  
Chapter 3, Transnational Communities and Practices, examines the theory of 
transnational practices, the implications of remittance transfers, and finally the presence and 
significance of refugee transnational communities. Broadly defined, transnationalism refers 
to the economic, social, and political community networks that transcend international 
borders. Transnational relationships are most commonly formed on a kinship level, but are 
more importantly based on relationships of mutual trust and responsibility. As explored in-
depth in Chapter 3, the transfer of financial remittances between a migrant and their 
community members living in poverty can facilitate the maintenance of transnational 
communities. Migrants often experience a sense of duty to provide for their family members 
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in the homeland, and consequently experience significant stress if they are unable to do so 
(Hammond 2011; Ikuomola 2015; Johnson and Stoll 2008, 2013; Lindley 2010; Martone et 
al. 2001; Trapp 2013). In refugee transnational communities, community members not only 
face the issues of extreme poverty but also of war, displacement, and trauma. This chapter 
considers how transnational community members are commonly dispersed between the 
homeland, several countries of first asylum, and a variety of resettlement nations and how 
members of these communities often deal with ongoing war, issues of family reunification, 
and harassment by host-nation government institutions. 
Chapter 4, Methods, Ethics, and Issues Encountered in the Field, explores the 
conceptualisation of the anthropological field in fieldwork, the methods utilised for data 
collection and analysis, my positionality as a researcher, the demographics of the population 
represented in this study, and finally the issues faced during data collection. As demonstrated 
by this chapter, due to the complexity of South Sudanese migration patterns, and of the 
vulnerability experienced by the refugees presented in this study, these methods were 
multilateral, and often messy, a reflection of the familial relationships and social networks 
demonstrated throughout the rest of this thesis.  
The first fieldwork-based chapter, Chapter 5, entitled Foundations of a Transnational 
Community, explores the nature of the relationships between remittance senders living in the 
global north and remittance recipients living as refugees in Kakuma. This includes the means 
by which participants communicated with family members abroad, and their notions of 
family and responsibility informed through a combination of cultural values and experiences 
of displacement/migration. In this chapter, I also discuss the common factors found in what I 
identified as failed or failing transnational relationships, typically those based solely on the 
sending of money rather than a commitment towards the welfare of other family members. 
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Chapter 6, Changing Hands: Remittance Transfers and Investment in Economic and 
Social Capital, investigates the role that remittances play in the facilitation and maintenance 
of these transnational relationships. Since the process of remittance transfers influences two 
distinct groups, the senders and the recipients, this chapter observes the social and emotional 
role of these activities from both perspectives. Remittance senders discuss how they navigate 
their sense of responsibility to provide for the less fortunate members of their family with the 
various financial limitations that they face while living in the US or the UK. Similarly, I 
explore the ways in which remittance recipients were expected to share their transnational 
resources with their friends and neighbours in Kakuma, a social expectation to combat their 
continuous states of insecurity, while simultaneously being responsible for managing their 
remittances responsibly. 
Chapter 7, Surviving Daily Crisis Situations through Transnational Resources, 
explores the most common forms of insecurity experienced by Kakuma’s South Sudanese 
community, and the ways in which the participants in this study utilised remittances sent 
from family abroad to combat this insecurity. This chapter focuses on the nature of the 
community’s refugeeness, providing an ethnographic account of their social and economic 
marginalisation. 
In Chapter 8, entitled Challenging Refugeeness through the Pursuit of Education, I 
examine the perceptions held by both remittance senders and recipients that education would 
contribute to the economic and social advancement of their family as a whole. At the cost of 
their immediate security through the deprivation of basic resources like food and medicine, 
members of this community went through tremendous efforts to give their children hope for a 
future. In this chapter, I argue that due to the young adults’ relationships with their extended 
family living in the global north, education was perceived by the transnational participants of 
Kakuma to be the only solution to their status as refugees.  
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Chapter 9 concludes the thesis by summarising the arguments made in the previous 
empirical chapters and reflecting on the wider significance of transnational participation 
among protracted refugee communities currently living inside camps. This chapter also 
directly summarises how this thesis makes a valuable and original contribution to 
anthropological knowledge and theory, and makes suggestions for further research. 
In this way, this thesis is designed to explore the influence of South Sudanese 
transnational social and financial networks within the refugee system by providing a detailed 
account of this refugee population’s strategies to maintain their transnational family networks 
and how these networks are utilised as a means to cope with their protracted states of 
refugeeness. Throughout this thesis, I argue that the South Sudanese refugee transnational 
participants of Kakuma and their family members abroad have developed a strong sense of 
community solidarity and a mutual sense of responsibility as a method to transcend the 
continuous states of insecurity, vulnerability, and socio-economic marginalisation placed on 
their lives due to their refugee status.  
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Chapter 2: Making of a Refugee 
 
 The conditions which have led to the initial and continued exile of Kakuma’s South 
Sudanese community are complicated, arguably incorporating generations of policy 
interventions, government sanctioned genocidal violence, and oppression in the form of 
social and economic marginalisation. This chapter will provide an overview of the history of 
South Sudan that has resulted in the South Sudanese refugee population in Kakuma and the 
ongoing situation in South Sudan that prevents their return and influences the nature of their 
transnational communities. 
 Section 2.1, History of Conflict in South Sudan, is a condensed historical review of 
South Sudan, previously the southern part of a united Sudan, from Sudan’s independence to 
South Sudan’s current civil war. The influence that three consecutive civil wars within this 
region (1955-1972, 1983-2005, 2013-present) have had on the South Sudanese diaspora 
considered in this thesis has been tremendous. Section 2.2, Defining Refugees and Policy 
Solutions, examines the structure of the current refugee system and the UNHCR’s policy 
solutions and methods of classification. More importantly, this section critically questions the 
treatment of refugees, particularly in protracted situations in which the UNHCR has been 
incapable of achieving one of its three durable solutions for at least five years. Finally, 
section 2.3 entitled The Lost Boys of Sudan and Kakuma, is both a historical examination of 
the specific population represented in this study as well as a brief overview of conditions 
within Kakuma refugee camp. 
 
2.1 History of Conflict in South Sudan 
 
Kakuma’s South Sudanese population’s history is rooted in decades of political and 
economic marginalisation, influenced by their ethnicity, their religious affiliation, their 
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geographic remoteness, as well as their attachment to their traditional culture. In the wake of 
Sudan becoming independent from Great Britain in 1956, the people represented in this 
study, and their ancestors, were presented as outsiders. They were at best ignored by their 
national government, and at worst portrayed as potential enemies of the state. This section 
provides an overview of the social and political historical context which contributed to the 
original displacement of the population examined in this thesis as well as their continued 
exile. It describes the circumstances which contributed to the creation of this refugee 
population and the current political circumstances in the now independent state of South 
Sudan which prevent repatriation for the majority of South Sudanese refugees living in 
Kakuma. 
Between the years of 1956 (when Sudan gained independence from Great Britain) and 
2011, much of Sudan’s civil unrest can be traced to ethnic and religious tensions rooted in the 
geographical divide between those who identified as Arab and Muslim in the north, and those 
in the south who identified as ethnically African and non-Muslim (Ahmed 2010; Jok 2001; 
LeRiche and Arnold 2012; Young 2017). Despite the existence of approximately 400 ethnic 
groups in Sudan before 2011, one-third of whom did not practice Islam, “there has always 
been a persistent and pervasive assumption that Sudan was an Arab nation all of whose 
citizens would eventually adopt Arab culture, language, and religion” (Collins 2008: 137). 
These differences in the perception of cultural identity have justified generations’ worth of 
discrimination, marginalisation, and gross human rights violations (Deng 2015).  
From the perspective of the southern Sudanese, Islam and Arabs are synonymous with 
the slave trade, a practice that was continued during the colonial period and after the 
independence of the Sudanese state (Jok 2001; Natsios 2012; Ryle 2011; Viorst 1995). Due 
to these perceived differences in culture and identity, in addition to centuries worth of 
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exploitation, mutual distrust and hatred have been persistent features of the relationship 
between the Sudanese of the north and south.  
LeRiche and Arnold (2012) suggest that colonial efforts of economic development 
were deterred from the south due to natural geographic barriers, a policy that significantly 
contributed to the disproportionate underdevelopment in the south, and eventual under-
representation of southerners in the government of an independent Sudan.8 British 
colonialists, therefore, employed a “Southern Policy” in the south, a system of "benign 
neglect," aimed at isolating contact between the north and south with the goal of stopping the 
slave trade, isolating ethnic tensions, and containing the expansion of Islam (Natsios 2012; 
Willis 2011).  
Several of the colonial practices established by the British and Egyptians were 
continued after the establishment of an independent Sudanese government, including most of 
the development and infrastructure investment being centred around the Arab Triangle (see 
Figure 2.1) and the development of an Arab elite (LeRiche and Arnold 2012; Natsios 2012; 
Young 2017). 9   Several historians have argued that while the northern population were 
provided with a Western education and trained to be indigenous civil servants, the southern 
Sudanese remained developmentally isolated and were provided with extremely limited 
education and health services by underfunded Christian missionaries (Deng 2015; Johnson, 
D.H. 2016; Willis 2011).  
                                                     
8 The geographic barriers surrounding southern Sudan include the Nuba Mountains to the north, arid 
deserts to the northwest, dense tropical forests to the west and south west, and the foothills of 
Abyssinia to the east (LeRiche and Arnold 2012). 
9 The Arab Triangle is a region in northern Sudan centered on the national capital Khartoum and is 
marked by Port Sudan, Dongola, and Sennar. 
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Figure 2.1 The Arab Triangle 
 
 
This figure is a geographical representation of the Arab Triangle, which several authors 
(LeRiche and Arnold 2012; Natsios 2012; Young 2017) argue was the centre of Sudan’s 
development, both under the colonial rule of the British and Egyptians as well as after the 
independence of Sudan (1956-2011).  
 
On the eve of independence, the leaders of southern Sudan urged the delay of state 
independence and continued colonial guidance until they were given a comparative level of 
education and economic development fearing that they would be unrepresented in the newly 
formed government (Jok 2001). These fears were proved justified as the first national 
administration established in 1956 contained 800 northerners and only eight southerners 
(Natsios 2012). The under-representation of the southern Sudanese people, in addition to 
their systematic ethnic and religious marginalisation, was the core causation of the two civil 
wars (1955-1972 and 1983-2005) fought between the north and south. 
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From 1955 to 1972 a series of revolts and uprisings occurred throughout the southern 
region, a conflict known as the Anyanya revolts.10 Angered by the lack of equal 
representation in what many perceived as a biased national administration, southerners called 
for secession (Jok 2001). Due to the lack of basic resources, military training, or clear 
leadership, these uprisings had little success against the Sudanese national army (Johnson, 
D.H. 2016). By 1964, although these civilian militias totalled approximately 5000 troops and 
succeeded in causing increasing insecurity in the south and in harassing northern 
representatives stationed in the region, they posed little threat to the national government 
(Natsios 2012). Finally, a peace treaty, known as the Addis Ababa Agreement, was signed in 
1972 between Sudanese President Ja'afar Numayri and southern Sudanese representatives.11 
This peace agreement declared a unilateral cease-fire and dictated that the army in the 
southern command would be represented equally by northerners and southerners (Collins 
2008; LeRiche and Arnold 2012; Natsios 2012). One of the causes for the second civil war 
(1983-2005) and the formation of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army/Movement 
(SPLA/M) was the failure of the parties representing the northern and southern regions of 
Sudan to follow this treaty. 
By 1978, Numayri enacted “Republican Order Number One” which was designed to 
further limit the powers and abilities of the southern administrative representatives (Natsios 
2012). In June of 1983, the Addis Ababa Agreement was completely abandoned when the 
President divided the south into three distinct regions with independent capitals as a means to 
undermine southern unity (LeRiche and Arnold 2012). The marginalisation of the southern 
non-Arab and primarily Christian population was intensified when Numayri declared Shari'a 
(Islamic) law nationwide and positioned himself as both the political and religious leader of 
                                                     
10 Anyanya comes from the Madi term “inya nya,” which translates to “snake poison” and the Moru 
term “manya nya” translating to “solider ant” (Natsios 2012: 44). 
11 Also spelled Nimeiri. 
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Sudan (Johnson, D.H. 2016). These policies were based on the perception that “Arabism has 
a superior rank to Africanism … and Islam is not just a religious faith, but also a vehicle for 
their racial promotion” (Jok 2001: 77). Between 1986 and 1988, in response to the escalating 
insecurity in southern Sudan, the government under the authority of Sudanese Prime Minister 
Sadiq al-Mahdi began attacking Dinka civilian communities (Chanoff 2005; Hutchinson 
2001; LeRiche and Arnold 2012). According to Natsios (2012:176),  
they would attack a Dinka village at dawn, kill all the adult males who could 
not escape, rape the women, and enslave the children. The village would be 
burned, wells stuffed with dead Dinka males, schools and clinics destroyed, 
and the huge herds of cattle rounded up as loot. 
 
John Garang, a native Dinka and former officer in the Sudanese national army, led the 
second civil war through the creation and leadership of the SPLA/M, both a militia and 
political party, founded in 1983 on the aspirations of a “new Sudan of inclusivity” (LeRiche 
and Arnold 2012: 17). Unlike the Anyanya revolts, the SPLA was organised under a central 
leadership, which contributed significantly to its success. Garang fought for the belief that 
“Sudan could only exist as a multi-ethnic, secular state and not as an Arab Islamist state 
given its multi-ethnic, racial, and religious composition” (Natsios 2012: 67). The SPLM 
focused many of its resources on tackling the underdevelopment of the southern region of 
Sudan, establishing a progressive movement that aimed to provide jobs, build the economy, 
and develop a fair legal and political system (Johnson, D.H. 2016). Due to their guerrilla 
tactics, the SPLA was labeled as a terrorist group, which halted all peace talks until the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 that was organised and led by the UK, the 
US, and Norway. 
In 1991 the SPLA/M had begun to split into factions due to significant differences in 
political ideologies between the leaders of the party. Young (2003) argues that under 
Garang’s leadership the party’s objectives did not reflect the desires and needs of the general 
population of southern Sudan or other leaders of the party. On the 28th of August 1991, army 
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commanders Riek Machar, Lam Akol, and Gordon Kong launched a coup against Garang in 
the form of the “Naiser Declaration” arguing that the party was Dinka-dominated and that 
Garang was a megalomaniac (Akol 1991; LeRiche and Arnold 2012; Young 2003). The 
leaders argued that “there can be no way for fundamental changes and democratisation of the 
movement as long as Garang retains leadership” (Akol 1991: 3). This divide between the 
leaders and followers of the SPLA/M led to an internal war between the Dinka and Nuer, 
contributing to roughly 300,000 deaths (Hutchinson 2001; LeRiche and Arnold 2012; Young 
2003). Between 1991 and 2005, a period which Garang referred to as the “Dark Years,” 
fighting within the SPLA/M and against the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) continued until 
all sides reached a virtual stalemate and negotiations under the CPA began.  
The CPA was essentially a renegotiation of the failed Addis Ababa Agreement and 
called for a complete ceasefire and equal representation of the south in the national 
government as a unified Sudan, in addition to stipulating a vote for independence after six 
years, a clause known as the Southern Referendum (Johnson, D.H. 2016; LeRiche and 
Arnold 2012). In July of 2005, only seven months after signing the peace agreement ending a 
22-year war and three weeks after he was elected into office as the first southern Vice 
President of Sudan, Garang was killed in a helicopter crash by causes that were never 
determined (Johnson, H. 2016; Natsios 2012). After the death of their leader, riots began to 
take place in the streets of Sudan’s capital city of Khartoum led by angry southerners, setting 
the tone between the SPLM and the National Congress Party (NCP) representing the Arab 
north as many abandoned Garang’s vision of a New Sudan (Grawert 2010; LeRiche and 
Arnold 2012; Young 2005). The entire interim period of the CPA (2005-2011) was focused 
on undermining the SPLM’s policies and leadership by the NCP, and achieving true southern 
self-determination with a Southern Referendum by the SPLM. 
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After Garang’s death in 2005, Salva Kiir, Garang’s second-in-command and a veteran 
of the second civil war, became the interim leader of the SPLA/M and was later elected 
president of South Sudan (Rolandsen 2015). His objective was to create and maintain a 
functioning government in the south, and ensure that the guidelines of the CPA were met. 
Several disagreements between the government in Khartoum and the SPLM prevented the 
enactment of these guidelines, including but not limited to disputed border regions, the 
property rights to several oil fields, equal representation of the south, the disbandment of all 
militias, and the establishment of Joint Integrated Units (Johnson, D.H. 2016; Johnson, H. 
2016). Several authors (Deng 2015; Johnson, D.H. 2016; Johnson, H. 2016; Natsios 2012) 
have attributed the failure to implement the primary guidelines of the CPA to both the SPLM 
and the Sudanese government in Khartoum led by the NCP. It has been suggested that many 
members of the SPLM never wanted a unified Sudan, that the national government never 
intended to adhere to the CPA, and that the history of conflict and oppression in Sudan was 
too significant to establish peace between the north and the south within a single state.  
However, between 2005 and 2011 in preparation for an independent government of 
South Sudan, leaders of the SPLM did manage to establish several national institutions aiding 
in the development of an independent nation. These institutions included the formation of 
government ministries and anti-corruption measures in the administration (Deng 2015). They 
also invested in the stability of the region by mediating a peace treaty between the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA) and the Ugandan government. In January 2011 and in adherence to 
the Southern Referendum of the CPA, 98.8 percent of the population of southern Sudan voted 
for secession and independence from Sudan (Johnson, H. 2016). Salva Kiir, who continued to 
be the leader of the SPLA/M, became the first president of South Sudan.  
Although the process of independence was aided by the United Nations (UN), the 
UK, the US, and Norway, the constitution of the new state of South Sudan centred political 
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power on the executive branch giving significant authority to the president (Rolandsen 2015). 
According to LeRiche and Arnold (2012), the president of South Sudan has the power to 
appoint any chairperson of the national commission, to remove ministers without the consent 
of a national assembly, and to appoint new members of the National Legislative Assembly 
and the Council of States.12 This imbalance of power within the South Sudanese national 
government was publicly criticised by the leaders of the government in opposition to Kiir. 
Between 2011 and 2013, presidential candidates Riek Machar, the Vice President at 
the time, and Rebecca Nyandeng, Garang’s widow, engaged in public debates criticising 
corruption within SPLA/M and the ‘Dinka-Dominance’ in the national government, and 
began to call for constitutional reform (Johnson, D.H. 2016; Rolandsen 2015: 170). In July of 
2013, President Kiir, a Dinka, began to dissolve his cabinet and replace its members with 
people who were ethnically Dinka and supported his ideology (Johnson, H. 2016; De Waal 
2014). These dismissals included Riek Machar, Kiir’s primary opponent in the next election 
scheduled to take place in 2015. According to Douglas H. Johnson (2016: 184), after the 
dismantling of his cabinet and dismissal of several senior party leaders, “public debate on 
political issues was suppressed by the security service harassing journalists and confiscating 
newspapers.” The same evening of these dismissals there was a “shoot-out” between the 
Dinka and Nuer members of the presidential guard, identified by Kiir as an attempted coup 
by Machar and fringe members of the SPLA. 
By December of 2013, South Sudan had entered its third civil war in the last century; 
this time fought between factions of the SPLM, drawn along ethnic lines between the Dinka 
led by Kiir and the Nuer led by Machar (De Waal 2014; Rolandsen 2015; Zifcak 2015). This 
conflict is argued to be “produced by the convergence of parallel conflicts” that had 
                                                     
12 Alex De Waal (2014: 348) argues that the government of South Sudan was developed to be a 
kleptocracy in which the “national leaders use every opportunity to steal national funds” using 
militarised threat of force as an “instrument of bargaining.” 
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developed through various factions in the government and the national army since the early 
1990s (Johnson, D.H. 2016: 183; LeRiche and Arnold 2012). According to Douglas H. 
Johnson (2016), Garang was the architect of the “New Sudan platform,” which had won the 
hearts of the people and inspired them to dream that the southern region of Sudan could one 
day be free from political oppression. Without Garang’s leadership, his dream of a reformed 
and reconstructed nation free from ethnic tensions had collapsed. The SPLM under the 
leadership of Kiir began to deteriorate due to “his lack of political skills…his failure to create 
accountability within either the party or the army, his inability to curb corruption or to 
manage the factions of the government” (Johnson, D.H. 2016: 183). 
The failure of the independent state of South Sudan has been the result of several 
political errors, the deep division within the nation based on tribal affiliation, and the failure 
of the international community to stop genocidal violence. Zifcak (2015) suggests that both 
sides of the conflict are responsible for crimes against humanity contributing to the 
displacement of millions of people and the death of countless more. The current civil war in 
South Sudan is a fallout between the members of the nation’s leading political party 
amplified by the lack of cohesion in the national army and contributed to by a “weak 
patrimonial state, a wartime mentality, and a lack of peaceful mechanisms for political 
contestation and transition” (Rolandsen 2015: 164-165). As a result of the division of South 
Sudan based on tribal lines and political affiliation, hundreds of thousands of South Sudanese 
refugees have fled to or have continued to live in refugee camps like Kakuma.  
 The history of the southern region of the original Sudan and present South Sudan is 
one that is filled with violence, oppression, and bloodshed. Virtually every generation since 
“independence” in 1956 has witnessed some conflict, and hundreds of thousands of South 
Sudanese continue to live in exile due to escalating insecurity in their homeland. The primary 
hurdle that the nation as a whole must overcome is a culture of warfare in which members of 
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different ethnic communities are perceived as enemies, in which all military-aged men are 
potential insurgents, and in which political power is used as a means to oppress the masses. 
As South Sudan continues its internal war, refugees like the inhabitants of Kakuma remain in 
a protracted state of exile, citizens of no nation, and unable to obtain a solution to their 
displacement.  
 
2.2 Defining Refugees and Policy Solutions 
Accompanying their cultural and national identity, the South Sudanese refugees 
considered in this thesis are also defined, at least within the refugee and humanitarian aid 
system, by their refugee status and the social, economic, and political assumptions that are 
attached to it. Particularly in the context of protracted refugees who have been forced to live 
for decades inside of an enclosed camp, with limited civil, political, and economic rights, 
their lived experiences are influenced by policies designed to control and contain these 
populations until a solution to their displacement can be achieved. Refugee policies, designed 
to provide refugees with the basic resources for survival, also have profound limitations on 
the quality of life for the people represented in this study. This section is an overview of the 
UNHCR, its durable solutions for all refugee situations, as well as the primary criticisms on 
the refugee system highlighting its limitations. 
The original Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees was developed in 
1921 by the League of Nations in reaction to the inconsistent international response to the 
“mass expulsions, compulsory transfers of populations, mass exits, and arbitrary denial of 
return” that plagued most of Europe after the First World War (Loescher 2001: 21). In the 
aftermath of the Second World War, the UN created the UNHCR as an institution whose 
purpose was to uphold the internationally recognised laws established in the 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. The Convention defines a refugee as someone 
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who flees across an international border because of a “well-founded fear of being persecuted 
for his or her political, social, or religious beliefs and activities” (Loescher 2001; United 
Nations General Assembly 1951: 1; UNHCR 1992). It ensures that refugees can cross 
international borders and that they are provided with food, medical care, protection, and 
shelter, until the point at which they can be repatriated, integrated into their host country, or 
offered third-country resettlement. 
 Refugees who claim asylum in Africa are entitled to refugee status under both the UN 
1951 Convention definition and the Organisation of African Unity’s (OAU) Convention of 
1969 written in response to African refugees displaced by “racism, colonialism, and 
apartheid” (Edwards 2006: 209).  It has been suggested that the 1951 Convention is 
eurocentric and its definition of a refugee “neither reflect[s] the African experience nor 
adequately encompasses the range of refugees to whom African governments wish to extend 
protection” (Edwards 2006: 209; Napier-Moore 2005). The OAU drafted the Convention 
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa of 1969 in response to what 
many political leaders in the OAU argued were insufficient guidelines to the 1951 
Convention regarding what defines a refugee because the latter Convention was written in 
response to specific conditions in Europe following the Second World War (Edwards 2006; 
Hyndman and Nylund 1998). The 1969 OAU Convention, therefore, extends the UN 
definition of a refugee to include those fleeing “external aggression, occupation, foreign 
domination or events seriously disturbing public order” (OAU 1969: 2). 
Despite the protection promised by these instruments, their content and 
implementation have been the subject of academic criticism. Michael Dillion (1999) and 
Peter Nyers (2006: 46) suggest that the concept of the refugee is a paradoxical social 
construction in which people who are labeled as “refugees” are in a liminal state in which 
they are “included within the realm of humanity by virtue of their exclusion.” While their 
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humanity is acknowledged, because they lack the protection of a nation-state and the rights 
associated with citizenship, they are also simultaneously denied the basic principles of 
humanity such as legal protection and the alleviation of suffering.  
As briefly discussed in Chapter 1, various authors have attempted to define what it 
means to be a refugee beyond their legal classification, commonly referred to as their 
“refugeeness”, and its effect on their social identity and mental health. Nyers (2006) argues 
that the primary issue within the refugee system and the treatment of refugees lies in the 
UNHCR’s definition of who qualifies for refugee status. By being defined by their “fear” of 
persecution, refugees are also subjected to social practices that label them as “social outcasts, 
lacking full reasoning capacity, and incapable of presenting an autonomous, self-governing 
form of personal subjectivity” (Nyers 2006: 45-46). Nyers (2006: 46) suggests that the 
characterisation of the refugee as a “fearful human” is a categorisation which can be used to 
“exclude, to produce difference, and to reinforce social and political hierarchies.” 
By belonging outside of the traditional nation state, outside of the realm of belonging, 
refugees are both represented and treated as if they are continuous outsiders, incapable of 
contributing to the society which they are forced to inhabit, to be defined by both their 
refugee status and their otherness. Nyers (2006:45) argues that being an “authentic refugee” 
involves an expectation by the refugee system, the refugee population’s host society, and the 
international community to display certain qualities, such as speechlessness, placelessness, 
invisibility and victim status, in order to justify continued refugee status and the protection 
associated with it.  
In her book Transnational Nomads, Cindy Horst (2006) argues that Kenyan refugee 
camps, Dadaab in particular, do not naturally provide refugees with economic and physical 
security, but rather facilitate what she identifies as a “refugee dependency syndrome” due to 
refugees’ physical confinement and institutionalised need for humanitarian aid. In this 
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context, dependency syndrome is characterised by the “acceptance of handouts without 
taking any initiative to attain self-sufficiency, accompanied by symptoms of excessive and 
unreasonable demands, frequent complaints, passivity, and lethargy” (Horst 2006: 92). 
Refugees in this context lose the skills to adapt to a restrictive environment, including coping 
mechanisms, organisational and technical skills, further contributing to their lack of agency, 
ability to contribute to a solution to their displacement, and socio-economic marginalisation 
in their host society. 
A refugee’s identity and experiences are significantly influenced by the refugee 
system which theoretically grants them temporary protection, security, food, healthcare, and 
shelter until they can achieve a solution to their displacement. The refugee system operates as 
a pseudo-government, and consists of aid organisations, government agencies, and 
standardised procedures for resource distribution (Jansen 2013). According to Roger Zetter 
(1991: 44), the refugee system is organised by operations of labelling that conceive people as 
"objects of policy [that] are defined in convenient images.” Since the establishment of the 
UNHCR and the 1951 Convention, identification of any exiled population’s “refugeeness” 
has become standardised and stereotyped, arguably as a method to aid in the development of 
policy through the simplification of needs, experiences, and identities in the face of complex 
social crises.  
However, the over-simplification of the refugee experience has contributed to 
inadequacies in establishing effective policy. This system of labelling, often portraying 
refugees as perpetually dependent, is more stigmatising and alienating than helping to design 
effective policy solutions (Harrell-Bond 1986; Jansen 2013; Kaiser 2006; Zetter 1991). As a 
consequence of labelling refugees as "objects" in need of manipulation for policy 
development, the individuals within these populations lose their humanity and are 
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continuously defined by their liminal status rather than their potential contribution to their 
communities. 
 Primarily because their situation is viewed as temporary, the restriction of refugee 
rights and abilities is justified when both the host government and the UNHCR lack the 
resources and infrastructure to accommodate large refugee populations. Simon Turner (2010: 
3) argues that humanitarian agencies represent refugees as “apolitical victims” in order to 
justify continued reliance on the refugee system. 
The UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies needed to produce refugees in 
manageable categories in order to be able to help them. The refugees were 
‘framed’ by the camp that set limits as to how they could act, and they were 
framed by international relief agencies as innocent victims and without 
political identities. 
 
If a person in exile is represented as a powerless victim of violence with no political agenda, 
then the institutions that represent and guarantee the welfare of refugees can justify continued 
dependency. Turner (2010), however, suggests that the humanitarian system’s policy of 
“control and contain” designed to keep refugees alive until a solution to their displacement 
can be found has a deep impact on the identities of the refugees themselves. Not only do 
these strategies of victimisation foster a continued sense of dependency and personal 
inadequacy, but a lack of political agency also ensures that refugees who advocate for their 
rights run the risk of being portrayed as someone who does not qualify for refugee status.  
Despite these negative consequences, the 1951 Convention remains the standard legal 
instrument in international law when dealing with refugee situations. It outlines “three 
durable solutions” which the UNHCR strives to achieve. In order of desirability according to 
the policies of the UNHCR, these solutions are: 1) voluntary repatriation, 2) integration into 
the host-country of first asylum, and 3) third-country resettlement (Harrell-Bond 1986; 
Napier-Moore 2005; Stein 1986: 268). The UNHCR argues that by definition the attainment 
of one of these three solutions “removes the objective need for refugee status by allowing the 
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refugee to acquire or reacquire the full protection of a state” (UNHCR 2015:12). Due to the 
limited availability of resettlement options, repatriation and integration have often been 
treated as the only realistic solutions for the vast majority of refugees (Harrell-Bond 1986; 
Stein 1986). However, in many cases, due to strict refugee policies limiting freedom of 
movement and participation in their host society, as well as continued violence and political 
instability in their homeland, many refugees find themselves in protracted situations without 
a durable solution for decades (Burton Wagacha and Guiney 2008; Loescher and Milner 
2008). 
If repatriation does become a possibility, it can often be much more complicated than 
just returning home and hoping to reinstate a community and livelihood that had existed 
before a refugee went into exile. For example, two case studies, one on South Sudanese 
refugees in Kenya and the other on Liberian refugees in Ghana, examined the UNHCR's role 
in repatriation and the influence that these actions had on refugees (Eidelson and Horn 2008; 
Omata 2014).13 In both of these cases, a recent “peace” agreement had been signed in the 
original country of conflict, and since integration into their country of asylum and third-
country resettlement were unobtainable for the majority of the camp inhabitants for more 
than a decade, repatriation was portrayed by the UNHCR as a simple solution to their 
displacement (Omata 2014). Both studies, however, indicated that many of the refugees 
represented were fearful of returning to their home nation because they anticipated ongoing 
persecution, and had no opportunities for employment, food, or shelter when they got there.14 
                                                     
13 Eidelson and Horn's (2008) study on South Sudanese refugees in Kenyan utilised Likert scale 
surveys on 235 refugees in an attempt to assess the population's feelings of vulnerability, injustice, 
distrust, superiority, and helplessness when discussing potential repatriation. Omata's (2014) study 
was conducted with 100 interviews with Liberian refugees and examined the influence of refugee 
policy implementation from the perspective of the refugee, and the justifications made to repatriate or 
integrate refugees by the UNHCR.  
14 In the case of the Liberian refugees in Ghana, the UNHCR had completely closed the camp, 
incentivised repatriation, and failed to present a reasonable alternative for refugees who perceived this 
solution as impractical (Omata 2014). Of the 11,000 Liberian refugees in Ghana, approximately 7,000 
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In these cases, repatriation was no more of an accessible solution than integration into their 
current host nation, contributing significantly to the continued protracted displacement of 
these refugee populations. 15 
From the perspective of the UNHCR, integration into the host society is viewed as the 
most attainable of the three proposed solutions, particularly for refugees who are victims of 
increasingly complex conflict situations in their home nation (Nakashiba 2013; UNHCR 
2015). Integration, whether it be in a refugee’s host society of first asylum or resettlement, or 
even reintegration in their homeland after repatriation, is a central argument in the rights of 
refugees. If refugees are, as Dillon (1999) and Nyers (2006) suggest, outside the realm of 
humanity and in a liminal state of citizenship, integration into any society beyond the 
identification of their “refugeeness” is essential to bridge the boundary between being a 
refugee and not being a refugee.  
Beversluis et al. (2016) argue that integration can be measured by a person’s access to 
education, vocational training, healthcare services, and social networking opportunities. 
While many of these services are provided to refugees inside camps like Kakuma, recipients 
of these services are restricted from using these skills outside of designated camp boundaries 
(Burton Wagacha and Guiney 2008). Integration can only be achieved if a refugee population 
can contribute to a host community with their “refugee resources” by economically, socially, 
and politically participating in their host society (Jacobsen 2002). The current refugee 
                                                     
opted to stay in Ghana, either as illegal immigrants or as temporary economic migrants. According to 
the UNHCR Handbook on Refugees (1992:20), "if the refugee does not act voluntarily, he will not 
cease to be a refugee. If he is instructed by an authority, e.g. of his country of residence, to perform 
against his will an act that could be interpreted as a re-availment of the protection of the country of his 
nationality, he will not cease to be a refugee merely because he obeys such an instruction." By the 
Refugee Convention's definition of "voluntary repatriation," the closing of the Ghanaian camp was a 
violation of their internationally established policies. 
15 Omata (2014) focuses solely on the perspective of the refugees and failed to acknowledge the 
justifications made by the host government or the UNHCR. In this study, considering that there was a 
clear violation of UNHCR policies concerning repatriation, more effort should have been made to 
understand the efforts made by the UNHCR, and to explore why these efforts were not fully 
understood or accessible to the refugees being forced to leave the camp. 
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policies that many nations have in place, including Kenya, restrict freedom of movement 
prevent integration from ever being achieved. Policies that physically and conceptually 
isolate refugees from their host society ensure, whether intentionally or not, that they remain 
in a liminal state of continuous dependency (Harrell-Bond 1986; Napier-Moore 2005).  One 
of the primary impediments to the integration of a refugee population into their host nation is 
that they are often portrayed as victims who are incapable of supporting themselves, and are 
defined by their fear of persecution and experiences of violence. 
The final of the three durable solutions, resettlement, is often perceived by refugees in 
Kenya as the only realistic solution; however, it is only given to less than one percent of all 
refugees worldwide (Elliot 2012; Jansen 2008). Resettlement opportunities are entirely 
dependent on the willingness of third states to host refugee communities.16 This option is 
expensive and is “only employed in situations of special need or protection …or [in] the 
absence of possibilities for repatriation and local integration in the foreseeable future” 
(Jansen 2008: 571).  The process is also notoriously long and drawn out due to extensive 
security checks, cultural adjustment training, and interview documents that regularly get 
“lost” (Elliot 2012; Jansen 2008).  
When the UNHCR is unable to achieve one of the three durable solutions outlined 
above for five or more years for any given refugee population of at least 25,000 people they 
are declared to be in a protracted state of exile. As of 2005, there were “33 protracted refugee 
situations, totalling 5,691,000 refugees” (Loescher and Milner 2008: 21).  The UNHCR’s 
more recent statistics suggest that by the end of 2015 there were 32 protracted situations 
worldwide, totalling 6.7 million people (UNHCR 2015). The average length of time globally 
                                                     
16 The nations that have resettlement programmes out of Kenya are the US, Canada, Sweden, 
Australia, Netherlands, Norway, and New Zealand (Elliot 2012). 
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that refugee populations have remained in a protracted state of exile has increased from nine 
years in 1993 to over 20 years in 2017 (Betts et al. 2012; Devictor and Do 2017).  
It is important to note that protracted refugee situations are not static, and typically 
experience “chronic or reoccurring” periods of violence (Loescher and Milner 2008: 21). 
South Sudan is a perfect example of shifting political and social instability influencing the 
welfare of a refugee population. Many of the South Sudanese refugees considered in this 
study fled to Ethiopia in the 1980s, were pushed back after Ethiopia’s state collapsed in the 
early 1990s, and then again fled to Uganda and Kenya (discussed further in section 2.3 of this 
chapter). Between 1983 and 2011, many of these refugees were targeted by multiple armed 
groups including Sudanese troops, the SPLA, and the LRA of northern Uganda. After the 
establishment of an independent South Sudan in 2011, many refugees returned home only to 
be displaced again in 2013 due to another civil war (Loescher and Milner 2008; Natsios 
2012). The nature of their exile is extremely complex, further contributing to their protracted 
exile and the inability of the UNHCR to achieve a solution to their displacement. 
Protracted refugee populations are characterised by an inability to adequately develop 
social, economic, and political networks independent from the humanitarian aid system and 
typically find themselves in a “long-lasting and intractable state of limbo” (Abdi 2005; Crisp 
2002; Kaiser 1997; Loescher and Milner 2008: 21).  Due to the UNHCR’s inability to 
achieve a durable solution for the majority of protracted refugee situations, the organisation 
has been criticised as having “no solution” in the twenty-first century (Abdi 2005; Crisp 
2002). 
In the last three decades, it has become a common occurrence for refugees in Africa 
to live in a refugee camp, typically an enclosed space (Loescher and Milner 2005). While 
encampment policies protect refugees in accordance with the 1951 Convention, they also 
restrict their rights and isolate them from the host population (Crisp 2002; Milner and 
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Loescher 2005; Napier-Moore 2005).17 Inside these camps, refugees face limited physical 
security, a restriction of their freedom of movement, limited civil, political, and legal rights, 
and very little freedom of choice (Crisp 2002: 9). Various key characteristics of refugee 
camps give refugees a “sense of dependency” in which they maintain a “liminal status” 
suffering from the loss of identity, agency, and mobility that is meant to be “ameliorated by 
time, language improvement, retraining programmes, hard work, and determination" (Crisp 
2002; Stein 1981: 324).  However, despite the presence of education and training facilities 
inside of refugee camps provided by the UNHCR and various NGOs, these services are futile 
beyond the walls of the camp for refugees living in protracted states of exile due to restrictive 
policies enforced by their host government (Loescher and Milner 2008, Stein 1981: 325-326; 
UNHCR 2015).18  
This has not always been the case. Before the early 1990s, the Kenyan government 
allowed refugees to integrate into the local community and maintained legal access to 
employment, education, and freedom of movement (Milner 2009). However, as a result of 
regional conflicts in neighbouring nations during this period, particularly in Sudan, Ethiopia, 
and Somalia, there was a huge influx of refugee communities fleeing over the Kenyan border 
(Verdirame 1999). Even with the resources provided by the UNHCR, “the high number of 
refugees strained social services, creating competition and conflict between refugees and the 
local population over food, housing, healthcare, and security” (Burton Wagacha and Guiney 
2008: 92; Milner and Loescher 2005). In response to their growing commitments and 
dwindling international aid, in 1991 the Kenyan government established a policy of 
                                                     
17 Although not mandated by the UNHCR, it is typically the policy of the host nation (for example, 
Kenya and Uganda) to isolate refugee populations from the majority of the local population to reduce 
the likeliness of integration and dependence on the host state (Burton Wagacha and Guiney 2008; 
Kaiser 2008). 
18 It should be noted that many refugees are self-settled, that is living outside of refugee camps, often 
illegally when their nation of residence has a refugee encampment policy. While the specific 
populations being studied in this research project are either camp inhabitants or resettled refugees, 
there are many transnational networks of refugees that represent neither of those classifications. 
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“abdication of responsibility for refugees to the UNHCR and the containment of refugee 
populations [to] the periphery of the state” (Kagwanja 2002; Milner 2009: 88; Verdirame 
1999). The adaptation of a containment policy required that the vast majority of refugees in 
Kenya must live inside of a refugee camp to qualify for aid and those who lived outside of 
these camps without permission were labeled as illegal aliens, subject to potential 
deportation.  
In Kenya, legal recognition of refugees is typically given under what is recognised in 
refugee policy as “prima facie” status. This occurs when a refugee population is of significant 
size and the host government and UNHCR have limited resources to process claims to 
asylum on an individual basis, so that an entire population in a region is given refugee status 
(Kagan 2007; Kenyan National Council for Law Reporting 2006).19 However, claims of 
limited resources enable host governments to restrict the rights of prima facie refugee 
populations under the argument that these conditions are temporary pending the acquisition 
of resources to adequately integrate these populations or until their repatriation to their home 
nation. It has been argued that prima facie refugee recognition, which has become common in 
Africa, is “legally insufficient” as it enables host governments to isolate refugees at the 
margins of their society and restrict their access to employment until one of the three durable 
solutions can be achieved (Hyndman and Nylund 1998: 22).  
These restrictions reflect the Kenyan government’s desire to maintain a separation of 
refugee and local communities to prevent local integration (Kaiser 2008; Napier-Moore 
2005). As a consequence of the remoteness in which these camps are located in addition to 
                                                     
19 In 2016, the Kenyan Government released a document entitled “The Refugee Bill” (The Republic 
of Kenya 2016). This new bill, in contrast to past Kenyan refugee policies, encourages integration, 
freedom of movement, and employment for any refugee legally residing within the nation. However, 
this bill is not clear if these new policies include prima facie refugees (who make up the vast majority 
of refugee populations in Kenya). While this bill makes considerable advancements for the treatment 
of refugee populations in theory, it is still too soon to determine whether better practices for the 
treatment of refugees will follow. 
 51 
the restrictions placed on their lives, most refugees are forced to maintain a state of 
dependency on the UNHCR pending their voluntary repatriation or third-country resettlement 
(Crisp 2002). In 2006, the Kenyan government approved the Refugee Act which established 
the Department of Refugee Affairs tasked to handle all administrative affairs and coordinate 
programmes for refugees (Milner 2009). Although the Kenyan government revoked its policy 
of “abdication” of responsibility for refugees to the UNHCR (see above), the government 
continues to maintain a policy of encampment. Like many African nations, the Kenyan 
government argues that refugee populations are too large and would cause too much stress on 
the environment, the economy, and the public services if they were allowed to live outside of 
these camps. 
The current circumstances in which the South Sudanese population of Kakuma finds 
itself is a by-product of both the Kenyan government’s unwillingness to integrate refugees as 
well as the the UNHCR’s inability to design effective policy solutions for protracted refugee 
populations while facilitating the limitations of refugee rights in their host nation. Although 
all refugees have the right to asylum and protection, this right is based on the premise of 
“complying with restrictive conditions” that reduce their human rights (Crisp 2002; Hyndman 
2000; Hyndman and Nylund 1998; Jamal 2000: 7). For example, in camps like Kakuma, 
refugees are confined to live within its walls and are denied the ability to seek legal 
employment outside of its boundaries. These restrictions are justified by both the Kenyan 
government and the UNHCR for two primary reasons: 1) the inhabitants claiming asylum are 
at least protected and their lives are being preserved, and 2) the situation is perceived as being 
only temporary and necessary until a durable solution can be achieved. Several authors have 
suggested that the UNHCR argues that their insistence on the freedom of movement of 
refugees would be “counterproductive,” likely antagonising the host government and 
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increasing the difficulty of accurately assessing the size of caseloads of a given refugee 
population (Harrell-Bond 1986; Jamal 2000; Napier-Moore 2005). 
Newhouse (2015) argues that the Kenyan refugee system, in Kakuma specifically, is 
developed on a system of violence, a by-product of the macro-scale refugee encampment 
policies which have become standard since the early 1990s. The author defines violence as 
brutal acts against people in either physical, symbolic, cultural, or emotional forms. 
Newhouse suggests that the encampment policies present in Kakuma provoke violent efforts 
by all actors (humanitarian organisations, the Kenyan police, the local population, and 
refugees themselves) by actively producing exclusionary practices over space and material, 
environmental, and symbolic resources. The restrictions which are institutionally enforced on 
refugees force them to pursue often illicit activities, such as the selling of food rations, to 
combat their “persistent precarity,” and further risking their insecurity (Newhouse 2015: 
2293). Finally, Newhouse suggests that the rules of governing space and resources through 
violence have become normalised in Kakuma, a system in which humanitarian aid is both 
vital for survival but is also never enough to meet the basic needs of refugees (see Chapter 7). 
The policy of encampment has been criticised as facilitating “wasted human capacity 
and [the] deprivation of human dignity” (Abdi 2005: 7; Kumssa et al. 2014: 146). In her 
study of Somali refugees living in Dadaab refugee camp, Kenya, Awa Abdi (2005) argues 
that, while refugees were initially grateful for the protection under the refugee system, over 
time their reliance on hand-to-mouth donations eventually led to a sense of complete 
dependency on international donations. Abdi reports that many of her participants expressed 
low self-worth as a result of their inability to better their conditions after over a decade of 
living in exile. Likewise, Jeff Crisp (2002:11), in his review of African protracted refugee 
populations, suggests that protracted refugees have been shown to be very poor, and often 
become steadily poorer. He argues that this is typically a result of the lack of development 
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and investment in refugee populated regions, in addition to the various rights that are denied 
to them. These authors argue that such poverty and issues of dependency in protracted 
situations are not due to a lack of personal initiative, but due to the lack of opportunities and 
alternative resources to develop their livelihoods.  
Several authors have suggested that the solution to protracted situations would be 
through the promotion of self-reliance (Aleinikoff 2015; Crisp 2002; Jacobsen and Fratzke 
2016). These authors argue that livelihood development programmes that promote the self-
reliance of refugees stimulate the economy, attract foreign investors, and generate benefits 
for the host population. Crisp (2002: 22), for example, suggests that promoting the self-
reliance of refugees has the potential to benefit all stakeholders involved, enabling refugees 
to achieve a sense of purpose, allowing the UNHCR to reduce investment on costly “care and 
maintenance” programmes, and contributing to a sustainable economy in the remote regions 
of the host country where refugees are often forced to live.  
The lack of civil, legal, and political rights, of freedom of mobility, and of social 
inclusion prevents refugees from achieving a sense of belonging and contributing to their host 
society. The refugee camp creates a physical space of social liminality in which the rights of 
the citizen are suspended until a viable solution to their exile can be achieved, and they can 
successfully integrate into a society that will legally recognise them as citizens. Given that 
the three durable solutions outlined by the UNHCR have substantial limitations that are 
perpetuated in protracted situations by ongoing conflict, restrictive policies, and the lack of 
alternative solutions, it could be argued that there is a need to develop social and economic 
networks that empower refugees to cultivate livelihoods.  
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2.3 The Lost Boys of Sudan and Kakuma 
 
 Kakuma is home to several protracted refugee populations originating from all over 
East and Central Africa. As of 2018, the South Sudanese represent approximately half of 
Kakuma’s entire population and have been the longest occupants since the establishment of 
the camp in 1992 (Jansen 2013; UNHCR 2018a; Verdirame 1999). Due to the camp’s 
connection with the refugee population known as the “Lost Boys of Sudan,” some of whom 
have been resettled to western nations like the US but also many of whom continue to live 
inside Kakuma, it can be argued that this camp is the hub of South Sudanese refugee 
transnational activity. This section aims to explore the specific history of this particular 
refugee population as well as looking beyond the UNHCR policies outlined in the previous 
section by examining the conditions of life as a refugee in Kakuma. 
 The wave of South Sudanese refugees that are most recognisable today was originally 
displaced to Ethiopia during the second civil war that began in 1983. According to Scott-
Villiers et al. (1993), before 1991, there were three refugee camps in Ethiopia dedicated to 
the victims of the war in southern Sudan, totalling approximately 271,000 people. In 1991 the 
Ethiopian Mengistu regime, which supported the efforts of the SPLA/M, collapsed, resulting 
in the forcible expulsion of these refugees back to Sudan (Chanoff 2005; Jansen 2013; 
Verdirame 1999). During this time the media and the SPLM focused their message on the 
suffering of thousands of unaccompanied refugee minors ranging in age from 10 to 17 (Scott-
Villiers et al. 1993; Verdirame 1999).20 Scott-Villiers et al. (1993: 209) argue that: 
The SPLM, encouraged by the international community and the press, directed 
the focus of relief on to the severely malnourished unaccompanied minors 
                                                     
20 Authors cite numbers ranging from 10,000 to 20,000 displaced children (Chanoff 2005; Horn 2010; 
Ossome 2013; Sanghi et al. 2016; Scott-Villiers et al. 1993; Verdirame 1999). These numbers could 
have been inflated by the SPLA/M in order to receive more aid. It is also well known that on their 
journey from Ethiopia to Sudan and then finally to Kenya, many of these children died of starvation, 
exposure, dehydration, and attacks by the local wildlife. There is no accurate documentation of how 
many children died during this period. 
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while ignoring the fitter majority… A fair proportion of the special food 
distributed to the unaccompanied minors never reached their mouths, but 
instead went to feed other more powerful individuals. 
 
Ensuring continued international assistance for the SPLM, these children were left at a state 
of near starvation until the opening of Kakuma refugee camp in 1992. In the early 1990s, 
they became widely recognisable in the international media as the Lost Boys of Sudan, in 
reference to J.M. Barrie’s story of Peter Pan and his gang of children surviving without 
parents (Harris 2010).  
 Due to their significant profile in the media, the US launched a mission to resettle at 
least 3,500 South Sudanese refugees, the majority still unaccompanied minors or young 
adults, between 2000 and 2001 (Chanoff 2005; Luster et al. 2008; McKinnon 2008).21 
Regarding their rates of employment, education level, and English fluency after resettlement, 
McKinnon (2008: 398) argues that Lost Boys of Sudan are recognised as “one of the most 
successful refugee resettlement programmes in US history.” 22 Once they returned to Africa, 
many members of this community boasted of their wealth and success to prove to their family 
and friends that they could be leaders in their communities (Grabska 2010). This perceived 
success by the participants in the transnational communities of the South Sudanese diaspora 
has contributed to beliefs of financial responsibility to family members still displaced by war 
(see Chapters 5, 6, and 8).  
 During their displacement in Kakuma and after their resettlement, many refugees who 
identified as members of the Lost Boys of Sudan made efforts to find and re-establish 
                                                     
21 Chanoff (2005) references 3,500 resettled Lost Boys to the US, Luster et al. (2008) references 
3,800, and McKinnon (2008:498) states that there are “nearly 4,000” Lost Boys in this community. 
These differences in data could be based on who they considered to be members of this population. 
For example, although there were some South Sudanese girls who were resettled during this time, 
they were largely ignored in the media and far fewer were given the opportunity of resettlement when 
compared to their male counterparts due to strict cultural expectations (Harris 2010). Other 
considerations might be marital status, age, or date of resettlement. 
22 It is important to note that the vast majority of those resettled in this refugee population were young 
single men, and thus significantly more likely to pursue higher education and employment outside the 
household when compared to other refugee populations. 
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relationships with the family members with whom they had lost contact as children (Luster et 
al. 2008). In the attempt to locate these lost relatives, resettled Lost Boys often utilised 
communication technology such as cell phones and email to create a network of community 
members in an attempt to connect family members trying to find one another. Luster et al. 
(2008) suggest that once family reunification was achieved, many resettled refugees of this 
population took on financial responsibilities within their families due to their higher financial 
status. These remittances sent to southern Sudan and refugee camps in Kenya and Uganda 
were meant to fund their families’ access to medicine, food, transportation, housing, and 
education. The reunification of these displaced families was the foundation of these 
transnational communities, contributing to strong communication networks, financial 
exchange relationships, and the development of a deep-seated sense of responsibility 
(Johnson and Stoll 2008, 2013; Patterson 2016; Shandy 2007). 
 Kenya is home to approximately half a million displaced people, most of whom are 
living in either Dadaab or Kakuma refugee camps (Sanghi et al. 2016; UNHCR 2017a; 
UNHCR 2017b; UNHCR 2018a; UNHCR 2018b).23 Although Kakuma was originally 
opened for the Lost Boys of Sudan population, it is now also home to refugees from northern 
Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea 
(Jansen 2008, 2013). Due to the extremely arid environment and severe droughts, it is 
difficult for either the refugees or members of the host community to engage in agricultural 
activities (Sanghi et al. 2016; Verdirame 1999). Similarly, although many South Sudanese are 
pastoralists, animal husbandry is strongly discouraged due to disputes with the local 
population over land use and property ownership (Horn 2010; Sanghi et al. 2016; Verdirame 
1999). As a result, refugees in Kakuma are forced to remain dependent on aid for their 
                                                     
23 Dadaab is Kenya’s largest refugee camp, with a camp population of approximately 225,000 as of 
2018 (UNHCR 2018b). Dadaab is located in eastern Kenya along the Kenya-Somalia border. 
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survival unless they have enough capital to start a small business in the camp. Despite this 
dependency, in the last 27 years, Kakuma has developed into a vibrant economy with non-
profit organisations and refugee-run businesses providing most of the employment 
opportunities for both refugees and members of the host community (Sanghi et al. 2016).24 
 Kakuma is administered by a combination of the local county administration and 
police in collaboration with several international aid organisations led by the UNHCR. Bram 
Jansen (2013:116) argues that the UNHCR and their implementing partners in Kakuma can 
be classified as a “pseudo-government” attempting to uphold laws based on international 
human rights. Their role in Kakuma is to supervise and coordinate refugee services and 
policy enforcement (Verdirame 1999). Their implementing partners include organisations 
like the International Rescue Committee (IRC), Lutheran World Federation (LWF), the Jesuit 
Refugee Services (JRS), the World Food Programme (WFP), and the Norwegian Refugee 
Council (NRC), which are responsible for providing services such as education, medical 
treatment, food distribution, and skills training. Security is enforced through a combination of 
Kenyan private security officers, UNHCR protection officers, the local police force, and 
refugee-led security teams. 
 Physical security for refugees in Kakuma is a daily struggle. There are significantly 
high rates of undernutrition, particularly for those who do not have the economic capital or 
family support to buy food to supplement their allotted rations which were approximately 
70% of their required nutritional intake at the time of this study (Pittaway and Bartolomei 
2002; Verdirame 1999; World Food Programme 2017). Many inhabitants of Kakuma also 
suffer from serious mental health issues stemming from the lack of opportunities for 
                                                     
24 Refugees in Kenya are not legally allowed to work. Most adults who find employment in the camp 
volunteer for an “incentive.” Incentives are often a fraction of what a Kenyan national would earn for 
the same position. This system is justified because refugees receive free housing, water, food, and 
education whereas members of the host community do not (Verdirame 1999). 
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refugees, lack of resources, extreme poverty, and from experiences of violence (Horn 2010). 
Women and girls are often victims of sexual assault, domestic violence, abduction, and 
forced early marriages (Bartolomei et al. 2003; Napier-Moore 2005; Ossome 2013). 
Furthermore, these acts of violence against women and children are often dismissed by the 
Kenyan police and development agencies because they are perceived to be caused by cultural 
values or simply consequences of poverty. The victims of these crimes are most often the 
poorest people in the camp with no or very limited family support, thus creating significant 
inequalities in the camp.  
The vast majority of refugees remain completely dependent on rations that have 
depleted over time, contributing to widespread poverty and an ingrained sense of helplessness 
(Bartolomei et al. 2003; Crisp 2002; Ossome 2013; Verdirame 1999; World Food Programme 
2017).25 The establishment of a strong family network is, therefore, essential for daily 
survival, especially for those without capital to protect themselves from abuse. The majority 
of disputes are handled among the refugee communities and are settled by leaders within that 
community (Jansen 2013; Napier-Moore 2005; Verdirame 1999). Without a solid family 
support system to argue your case to the community leaders or to pay a bribe to the local 
police, victims of abuse rarely receive justice. 
 Prejudice and corruption by the police, local offices of government, and in the legal 
system are some of the most significant problems that refugees in Kakuma face. Being a 
refugee in Kenya means that you are often subjected to arbitrary arrest and detainment unless 
you have money to bribe the police (Rogers 2017; Verdirame 1999). When traveling outside 
of designated camp areas, refugees are required to carry “protection letters,” also known as 
                                                     
25 According to the World Food Programme (2017), beginning November 2017 their organisation was 
forced to reduce the food rations allotted to refugees in Kakuma and Dadaab camps in Kenya to 70 
percent of their daily intake requirement due to a $28.5 million USD deficit in their budget. The 
article suggests that this was only a short-term measure for six months. 
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movement passes. These passes are provided by the Kenyan Refugee Affairs Secretariat and 
are legally valid for travel within Kenya. Refugees often perceive these documents as 
worthless when confronted with the police and typically believe that they do not protect them 
from harassment and bribe requests (Napier-Moore 2005; Verdirame 1999). Similarly, 
disputes between refugees in the camp that are brought to the local police are often settled by 
which side can pay more money (Rogers 2017). Consequently, poor refugees in Kenya are 
particularly vulnerable to harassment, while others can use their financial stability to act 
freely and manipulate law enforcement to act in their favour. 
 Law enforcement, financial security, and even identities within Kakuma are often 
perceived as arbitrary, and therefore are open to manipulation (Jansen 2008, 2013).26 Well-
connected refugees, often recognised as “small big men” due to their level of authority, 
become “skilful in manoeuvring the camp environment, understanding and bridging, or 
evading, because of understanding the different institutional arrangements” (Jansen 2013: 
124; Turner 2006). For example, during resettlement interviews, a slow and prolonged 
process that determines whether a refugee qualifies for resettlement to places like the US, 
refugees sometimes overstate their insecurity in the camp by identifying with a more at-risk 
tribe or even stealing another person’s identity. Regarding resettlement opportunities, “need 
and vulnerability become intertwined with opportunity, and thus subject to negotiation” 
(Jansen 2008: 573). The refugees who benefit the most from manipulating the refugee 
system, whether it be in resettlement or law enforcement, are the people with the most 
money.  
                                                     
26 According to Jansen (2008), during his fieldwork in Kakuma his participants told him stories in 
which approved resettlement case files were sold to the highest bidder who would then take on the 
identity of the applicant. Similarly, within the refugee system various tribes are perceived to be more 
vulnerable than others, and consequently presenting an opportunity to declare a different tribal 
identity than they were born with in the attempt to be move higher on the resettlement list. 
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 The economy of Kakuma is made up of people who are employed by various NGOs, 
people who own or are employed by businesses in the camp, and people who receive 
remittances, many utilising several of these economic domains (Jansen 2013). Despite the 
poverty of Kakuma’s population, many refugees have managed to invest in small businesses 
or fund the building of churches, education centres, radio stations, and health clinics, 
completely independent from humanitarian assistance. Kakuma is unique when compared to 
other refugee camps globally in that many of the refugees have a higher standard of living 
when compared to members of the local population, the Turkana (Aukot 2003; Pérouse de 
Montclos and Kagwanja 2000; Sanghi et al. 2016). In fact, many refugees employ Turkana 
community members to work as domestic servants delivering firewood, water, and washing 
clothes (Sanghi et al. 2016). The development of the camp economy has become a method 
for refugees to break away from dependency on the refugee system that dominates their lives 
and to become active agents in their communities. 
 And yet, life for most refugees in Kakuma is often filled with insecurity and 
restrictive agency (see Chapter 7). Due to the limited resources and disproportionate balance 
of power and dependency, security is often negotiable and manipulated to overcome barriers 
within the refugee system. The Lost Boys of Sudan are one of the most recognisable refugee 
populations to come from Kakuma, and often symbolise success and prosperity to both their 
host community and their families that continue to live in Africa. Therefore, the bond 
between refugees who continue to live inside Kakuma and their family living outside of 
Africa represents an entanglement of poverty and financial stability, insecurity and agency, 
all developed on strong personal relationships and commitment to family.  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 With the rise of increasingly complicated conflict situations worldwide, protracted 
refugee populations in which victims of violence lack agency are becoming commonplace. In 
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the effort to simplify the process of refugee identification and resource distribution, the 
refugee system has reduced refugees to a state which might be called less than human; 
marginalised and perceived as socially and economically dependent until one of the 
UNHCR’s solutions can be achieved. After decades of living in exile, these perceptions are 
crippling, having a significant impact on a population’s mental health and economic 
sustainability, fostering a sense of helplessness, dependency, voicelessness, and invisibility.  
And yet, refugees who have managed to develop economic and social networks have, 
however, found creative means to manipulate the refugee system and develop sustainable 
lives in a system that otherwise inhibits personal advancement. 
 The establishment of transnational networks within refugee communities enables 
displaced populations to access otherwise unobtainable resources. Resettlement and other 
migration opportunities, although only accessible to a small percentage of all refugees 
worldwide, help in the development of transnational networks in which resources gained in 
places like the US and UK can be shared with their marginalised community members who 
continue to live in refugee camps like Kakuma. These resources can range from simply 
having a little more food or having the ability to pay police bribes to gaining enough 
economic capital to start a small business or to pay for the education of the next generation of 
their family. These networks have become much-needed vehicles for refugees to make 
progress within a system that stifles their humanity. These issues will be pursued in the next 
chapter through an exploration of the concept of transnationalism, the social and economic 
impact of remittances sent to developing countries, and the literature on refugee transnational 
communities, in particular their potential to develop an alternative durable solution to 
protracted refugee situations.  
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Chapter 3: Transnational Communities and Practices 
 
 The study of transnational communities aims to address the social and financial 
networks that transcend international boundaries between individuals bonded by kinship ties, 
community attachments, and a strong connection to their cultural values. However, most of 
the current literature on transnationalism implies a physical attachment to the homeland, in 
this case South Sudan, thus largely ignoring the experiences and practices of the forcibly 
displaced and stateless.27 As will be shown in section 3.3 of this chapter, refugee 
communities can also actively engage in transnational practices with their family and 
community members, sometimes in their homeland, but often in refugee camps and urban 
centres in neighbouring nations. In order to address this gap in the literature on 
transnationalism in which the experiences of refugees are significantly underrepresented, I 
am defining a transnational community as sustained social and financial networks based on 
kinship networks or a system of shared cultural values that transcend the boundaries between 
nations.  
In section 3.1, I argue that whether a participant in a transnational community is an 
economic migrant or a refugee they share common values with their community members in 
other nations. Faist (2000) argues that these relationships are inherently mutually dependent 
for both parties, reliant on the exchange of remittances, active lines of communication, and an 
interest in the welfare of other community members outside their nation of residence. 
Furthermore, as explored by Bauböck (1994) and Mehta and Napier-Moore (2011), the 
                                                     
27 In this context, a physical attachment to the homeland means at least half of a transnational 
community resides within the nation to which the members of the entire transnational community 
consider their ancestral homeland. In much of the theory on transnational networks, the homeland 
represents the epicentre from which these social and financial networks extend. Since the participants 
represented in this study have limited or no connection to their homeland due to ongoing war and 
conflict, it is necessary to extend this definition so that it is defined by their attachment to their culture 
and family rather than connection to the physical location which they consider to be their homeland. 
 63 
reconceptualisation of citizenship to a transnational scale can promote the emergence of 
transnational practices and the social production of community membership not determined 
by lines between nations but rather a migrant’s lived experience.  
 Section 3.2 explores the transfer of remittances between transnational communities; 
whether they be financial or social, remittances are essential for the sustainability of these 
communities, particularly for those whose networks transcend the boundaries between 
developed and developing nations.28 International remittances sent to developing nations 
have been shown to promote investment, increase access to education, and lead to higher 
quality nutrition, sanitation, and healthcare (Acosta et al. 2015; Adams 2006; De Haas 2005; 
Edwards and Ureta 2003; Hildebrandt et al. 2005). When sent to a refugee population living 
inside a camp, these remittances from family and community members can be a lifeline (Van 
Hear and Cohen 2015; Vargas-Silva 2017). In the unpredictable conditions of a conflict- 
affected area or a refugee camp, remittances are desperately needed to buy food to avoid 
starvation and to buy medicine to treat deadly diseases. In this context, remittances are 
needed so that refugees can meet their basic needs of survival rather than simply investing in 
their future comfort. 
 Section 3.3 investigates how the experiences of a refugee are considerably different 
from those of an economic migrant, and argues that the transnational networks among 
refugee communities should be studied based on their unique experiences of migration, 
family reunification, remittance exchange, and community investment. Although refugee 
transnational communities are based on the belief in a common homeland and an attachment 
to its traditional cultural values, the acknowledgment of such communities’ transnational 
properties is not limited to a physical attachment to that homeland. A refugee transnational 
                                                     
28 Levitt (1998: 927) defines social remittances as the “ideas, behaviours, and social capital that flow 
from receiving and sending-country communities” influencing social roles with the family or in 
political, religious, or civil activities. 
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participant typically has limited options to return to his/her homeland, their community 
members are often forcibly displaced across multiple nations, and their lines of 
communication are unpredictable due to eruptions of conflict and the remote locations that 
they often inhabit. In this context, transnational family networks are often based on 
experiences of the loss of contact with community members due to conflict and the efforts of 
family reunification.  
 The study of refugee transnational communities is particularly relevant for 
protractedly displaced populations, specifically those who have lived in exile for multiple 
decades while being denied the rights of being a citizen of any nation. According to Rask et 
al. (2004), protracted refugees often lack social, economic, or political infrastructure and face 
high degrees of uncertainty for their social development and future opportunities. As 
suggested in Chapter 2, it can be argued that the world has failed to incorporate refugees 
inside of the realm of humanity, forcing them to be citizens of no nation and providing them 
with a very limited ability to change their circumstances (Nyers 2006). As shown in figure 
3.2 in this chapter, which I will describe in more detail later, Van Hear’s (2003) theory of a 
refugee diaspora demonstrates that these networks have the potential to transcend the 
limitations of the nation state and the restrictions of national citizenship. 
 This chapter aims to demonstrate that the conditions of bondedness and mutual 
reciprocity and dependency that have come to define transnational communities could 
provide valuable insight into the future of protracted refugee populations. In the case of 
refugees living inside of camps, and often illegally in urban areas, whose freedoms have been 
denied through a combination of continued warfare and the failures of the UNHCR to find a 
solution to their displacement, transnational practices are a potential solution to their mass 
marginalisation. Through the development of transnational practices that promote their 
agency by altering their dependency from that of aid organisations to their own community 
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members (discussed further in section 3.3 of this chapter), protracted refugees have the 
potential to reduce their vulnerability and socio-economic marginalisation within the refugee 
system. 
 
3.1 Transnationalism: Theory and Practice 
 
 Transnationalism has been described as the economic, social, and political networks 
between multi-stranded communities that transcend geographic location and borders between 
nations (Basch et al. 1994). The approach has become an overarching theoretical concept that 
incorporates the analytical methods of social network analysis, and the concepts of social 
capital, embeddedness, and transnational migration to examine the “strength of ties” of 
interpersonal relationships (Vertovec 2003).29 Transnational connections imply collective 
membership, shared values and expectations, loyalty, and mutual reciprocity between all 
community members. Although kinship is not necessarily a requisite for transnational 
participation, most scholars agree that these communities are built on a shared cultural 
identity, a common homeland, and are strengthened when its members share a similar sense 
of obligation to one another built on familial bonds.30 
 Transnational social practices imply the exchange of ideas, money, and various other 
social resources. Identification of transnational communities assumes that migrants maintain 
active communication with a community in another nation, preserve important relationships, 
and establish networks that link groups of people in multiple nations together. Conventional 
(non-refugee) transnational communities are typically created through bonds of kinship and 
                                                     
29 Social network analysis is the mapping and measurement of social capital (the value of social 
networks and relationships). In this context, embeddedness means the cohesion of communities 
regarding communication, participation, and mutual obligation towards the welfare of their 
participants.   
30 Transnationalism can also include economic, social, cultural and political relationships (Basch et al. 
1994:7). Most transnational communities incorporate multiple of these categories simultaneously.   
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ties to communities in the homeland, creating a mutually dependent relationship between the 
migrant and members of their family that remain in the homeland (Faist 2000:193). The 
commitment to family members living in another nation facilitated through the formation and 
maintenance of transnational communities is perpetuated by transnational practices such as 
the transfer of financial remittances.  
Contrary to various other forms of globalised actions, these practices are long-term 
sustained ties rather than fleeting or exceptional. Thomas Faist (2000) argues that there are 
three types of social and symbolic ties that connect individuals to communities that are not 
limited to the borders between nations or governed by the restrictions of physical space. 
These ties are mutual obligation, reciprocity, and community solidarity, and are built and 
maintained by strong familial bonds and community membership. Faist defines these 
sustained ties between individuals and groups as “transnational social spaces” in which 
community members engage in the exchange of ideas and resources for the economic and 
social advancement of both the migrant and the community in the homeland.31   
In the study of transnational practices, the concept of community is often synonymous 
with family and implies the capacity for social support. Family in this sense includes both the 
nuclear family and extended kinship networks such as siblings, cousins, and in-laws.32 Basch 
et al. (1994: 79) argue that: 
The family facilitates the survival of its members, serving as a buffer against 
the intrusiveness of individual state policies; it fosters the social reproduction 
of its members, their class formation and mobility; and as the repository of 
cultural practices and ideology shaped in the home society, it mediates identity 
                                                     
31 Transnational social spaces have also been frequently referred to as "transnational social fields" 
(Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). Both of these phrases refer to the conceptualisation of a theoretical 
"space" in which transnational community members interact and communicate. Rather than 
representing a physical geographic space, it represents networks and relationships that facilitate the 
exchange of resources.  
32 As demonstrated by the data presented in this thesis, family is not always clearly defined and is not 
limited to biological or legal relatedness. In the case of this study, family also incorporated 
community members, friends and neighbours, likely a by-product of cultural values as well as shared 
experiences of marginalisation and deprivation in the refugee setting. 
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formation in the new setting as it socialises its members into a transnational 
way of life. 
 
Participation in family experiences and the reliance on one another for social, moral, and 
financial support is one of the core foundations of transnational communities. Johnston 
(2001) suggests that, in the context of transnational practices, the family is a living network 
of relations that defies the distance between its members. Family social relations enable 
migrants to maintain both a cultural and social connection to their homeland while 
developing networks connecting their old and new nations, exchanging both financial and 
social remittances for the advancement of the community as a whole.  These sustained cross-
border familial relationships enable migrants to both maintain their traditional cultural 
identity while also aiding in their adjustment into their new nation of residence through the 
provision of a social support system.  
 It might be assumed that integration in a migrant’s host community and the 
maintenance of social ties to their homeland are mutually exclusive practices, and that a 
migrant’s cultural identity is lost when they adapt to their new nation. Levitt and Glick 
Schiller (2004) challenge this assumption by arguing that identity, whether it be national, 
cultural, or political, is a fluid concept that is continuously adapting to new experiences and 
beliefs. Consequently, “migrants are often embedded in multi-layered, multi-sited 
transnational social fields, encompassing those who move and those who stay behind” (Levitt 
and Glick Schiller 2004: 1003).  
Similarly, Steven Vertovec (2001: 578) argues that the construction of a transnational 
identity, one that is defined by two or more cultures, is built on the experiences between 
multiple environments contributing to “people’s cultural repertoires.” As transnational 
migrants are becoming more adept at blending multiple cultural identities, definitions of 
citizenship and identity are becoming increasingly vague, urging migrants and academics 
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alike to redefine concepts of social membership, citizenship, and transcontinental bonds 
(Basch et al. 1994; Vertovec 2001). Social networks, especially familial bonds, enable 
migrants to belong to several communities, to live and work in different cultures, to perhaps 
speak several languages, and to hold different statuses of citizenship while continuing to 
maintain a geographically transcendent relationship with other members of their transnational 
community. 
An important concept in the development of transnational migration theory is an 
understanding of what Peggy Levitt and Nina Glick Schiller (2004) identify as 
"simultaneity." Simultaneity is defined as the incorporation of daily habits, activities, and 
social interactions in several nations at once. These authors highlight that the "nation-state 
container view of society does not capture, adequately or automatically, the complex 
interconnectedness of contemporary reality" (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004: 1006). A 
common example of this interconnectedness is the transfer of money between family 
members for daily necessities and investment; a migrant might live, work, and raise their 
children in a new nation, but by sending money home to their family living in another, they 
are empowered to continue their traditional social interactions and commitment to their 
family members. Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004) argue that since social ties are so variable 
between cultures, generations, and even communities, it is important to gain an understanding 
of the strength and impact that simultaneity and transnational participation can have on 
migrant experiences.   
 The migration experience, ranging from leaving one’s homeland to integrating into a 
new culture, can be extremely emotionally straining. Zlatko Skrbis (2008) argues that 
emotions need to be understood as an essential component of transnational family life, and 
the way in which emotional ties link individuals to their families despite being physically 
separated should be examined. Skrbis (2008: 238) identifies three concepts of a migrant’s 
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experience, “co-presence,” “longing,” and the “emotionalisation of the ‘national family,’” 
which assumes the need to be embraced by their community members, that they experience a 
sense of nostalgia and longing, and finally, that they engage in a diasporic discourse in which 
the homeland is idealised. These three emotional concepts directly influence not only how 
migrants adapt to their new environment but also persuade them to maintain ties with family 
members in their homeland and to engage in community practices based on principles of 
obligation and reciprocity. 
A common misconception in the theory of transnationalism is the assumption that 
these practices are a contemporary phenomenon that developed as a result of the 
“Information Age” and various advancements in communication technology. Morawska 
(2013) and Foner (1997) argue, however, that transnational social practices became common 
in the beginning of the twentieth century, and in fact, show remarkable similarities to those 
exercised by immigrants in the twenty-first century.33 Although various historical studies 
have proven the existence of transnational practices before “aeroplanes, telephones, fax 
machines, and electronic mail facilitate[d] contact and exchange among common people,” the 
scale of these practices was less intense and less immediate when compared to the twenty-
first century (Portes 2000: 265). As communication and travel technology advances, so does 
the ability to form and maintain a transnational community.   
Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2004) suggest that transnational networks are not purely 
by-products of migrant communities’ actions or their desire to sustain meaningful 
relationships with family elsewhere in the world. Rather, these authors argue that much of a 
migrant’s “capacity” to engage in transnational activities is dependent on state policies and 
                                                     
33 Morawska (2013) argues that immigrants at the turn of the twentieth century often remitted a large 
proportion of their income to their homeland (up to 75%), actively participated in homeland politics, 
and “transplanted” symbolic cultural symbols in their country of immigration while also bringing 
back new cultural values and symbols to their homeland. 
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the control of movement between borders, thus “fundamentally [shaping] the options for 
migrants and ethnic trans-state social action” (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004: 1178). These 
state-enforced restrictions and control of international movement contribute, therefore, to a 
high degree of variability and capacity for migrant communities to engage in sustainable 
transnational activities.34 
To further this argument, Glick Schiller (2018) asserts that the possibility for migrants 
to engage in transnational practices, such as visiting family, sending remittances, or engaging 
in transnational politics, is becoming increasingly difficult. She argues that this is particularly 
true for those currently living in Europe and the US who are non-white, non-Christian, and 
who are not citizens in their host nation. These migrant populations are increasingly forced to 
face deportation, harassment, and surveillance for their social, economic, and political ties to 
their home nation, experiences that can potentially be exacerbated by continuous 
transnational participation. Consequently, the growing literature on transnational 
participation needs to also incorporate issues of “anti-refugee, anti-immigrant, racist, 
Islamophobic, anti-Semitic, white Christian supremacy and anti-fascist/anti-capitalist forms 
of resistance and socio-political organisation and action” into its theoretical framework 
(Glick Schiller 2018: 206).  
Although the premise of transnational communities and networks implies the 
exchange of social, economic, and political resources across internationally recognised 
borders, there is a significant debate as to what constitutes a transnational community. 35 For 
                                                     
34 It is important to note that the potential for transnational social action has changed significantly 
since 2004. Although the physical restriction of movement between borders has remained the same, if 
not increased in intensity, in recent decades, technological advancements in mobile technology have 
increased in availability and affordability in even some of the world’s most remote regions. In the 
case of the population examined in this thesis, transnational social action primarily took place over 
computer and phone applications like Skype, Facebook, and WhatsApp. 
35 Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2004: 1178) argue that transnationalism is often inaccurately defined in 
the literature on migration studies, to refer to phenomena which are “by-products of globalisation” 
and extend “beyond loyalties that connect to any specific place of origin or ethnic or national group.” 
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example, much of the academic research on transnational communities implies that at least 
part of the community lives and operates in the homeland (Bruneau 2010; Faist 2000; Skrbis 
2008; Vertovec 2001, 2003). Michel Bruneau (2010: 44) even states that transnationalism 
implies that there is “no uprooting from the territory and society of origin, nor trauma, as in 
the case of diasporas.” This limiting definition largely ignores the experiences of refugees 
and other forcibly displaced communities who by all other standards engage in transnational 
practices, sometimes between the homeland, but more commonly between various nations of 
exile.  
In his book, New Diasporas, Van Hear (1998: 5) suggests that diasporas are one type 
of transnational community; both are characterised by a cultural, religious, or ethnic 
population which has been dispersed from an “original centre to two or more regions [which 
retains a] collective memory of the homeland [experiences] partial alienation from the host 
society [aspires] to return to an ancestral homeland, [is committed] to the maintenance or 
restoration of that homeland, [and derives] a collective consciousness and solidarity from a 
relationship with the homeland.” I would argue, however, that since diasporas do not 
necessarily involve transnational participation, identified as social and economic networks 
that transcend national boundaries, Van Hear’s assumption is also limited. Diasporas and 
transnational communities both involve social networks which imply collective membership 
and an emotional attachment to a common homeland; however, they are neither necessarily 
embedded in one another nor mutually exclusive. 
Since diasporas and transnational communities are both distinct and potentially 
overlapping social constructs, it is important to pinpoint the similarities and differences of 
each. Thomas Faist (2010) argues that both are “extremely elastic terms” which imply 
sustained cross-border social relationships based on a common homeland. However, while 
diasporic literature emphasises cultural distinctiveness, research on transnational 
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communities focuses more on migrant incorporation and transnational practices such as 
regular communication and the transfer of financial remittances.  
For the purposes of defining and characterising transnational participation, the social 
and political concept of citizenship is likely the most significant obstacle to the theory of 
transnationalism. Citizenship and the institution of the nation-state are humanity's method of 
dividing the world into different territories, different fields of responsibility, and different 
levels of belonging. In this context, citizenship can be defined as the “political membership in 
a given nation-state through which citizens possess civil, political, and social rights” (Mehta 
and Napier Moore 2011: 418). In the case of transnational participants, this definition, 
however, fails to accurately conceptualise their social, economic, and political participation 
in multiple nations. 
Rainer Bauböck (1994: 3) argues that the concept of "transnational citizenship" can 
bridge the boundaries between people as they "emerge in the crossing of territorial borders 
and in the extension of rights beyond membership of political communities." Although 
arguably an oxymoron, transnational citizenship could potentially be very useful when 
describing the emergence of transnational practices and the social production of community 
membership not determined by lines between nations. Particularly when concerning refugee 
communities who typically lack national recognition and/or protection, new emerging 
definitions of belonging and community participation become ever more vital. Considering 
that this framework is conceptualised by exploring beyond the limitations of nationhood as 
the primary contributor to the formation of social identities, future research in transnational 
communities could use this framework to examine the millions of forcibly displaced people 
who lack the right of citizenship in their current host country. 
Mehta and Napier-Moore (2011) suggest that the concept of citizenship is changing to 
be more based on a migrant’s participation in a society, otherwise recognised as “lived 
 73 
experiences,” rather than formal citizenship. This concept implies that informal citizenship 
can be gained by contributing to the economy or participating in religious, civil, or social 
organisations. The authors argue that despite the lack of recognition from formal institutions, 
citizenship based on lived experiences is becoming much more common in which people 
from all over the world are claiming membership to multiple nations and multiple 
communities.  
In this thesis, I am using Johnathan Fox's (2005: 192) definition of transnational 
citizenship in which a person claims "full membership in a civic or political community that 
is rooted in more than one state, usually based on shared cultures." For example, Paul 
Johnston (2001: 256) proposes that the concept of the citizen is shaped by public involvement 
rather than just the association with an institution, such as with a nation-state. Johnston 
claims that this view allows us to acknowledge the fluidity and transformation of various 
institutions over time. By acknowledging the social membership of a person in a community 
or society through their participation in various civic, political, and economic activities, it 
becomes conceivable to acknowledge the concept of transnational citizenship in which 
actors, or "citizens," can claim rights within multiple societies as a response to their 
participation. 
 Transnational practices that promote community belonging and simultaneity, in which 
migrants are socially and economically active in multiple nations, are an increasingly relevant 
field of study. As technology facilitating communication practices and the exchange of 
money is advanced, growing in accessibility and decreasing in cost, notions of belonging are 
changing. Under these conditions, family values and cultural traditions can be maintained 
across both the borders between nations and between generations of migrants. Furthermore, 
as explored later in section 3.3, transnational citizenship, in which a person’s national 
belonging is identified by their active social, economic, and political participation, has the 
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potential to decrease the marginalisation of refugees who have no government to protect them 
under the current limitations of their national citizenship.  
 
3.2 Transferring Remittances 
 
 The transfer of financial remittances is considered a core concept of many 
transnational communities, often facilitating the maintenance of communication, travel, 
social status, and community welfare. Remittances act as a currency of bondedness within 
communities built upon strong ties of kinship, traditional cultural practices, and emotional 
reciprocity. As discussed in this section, remittances sent between family members living in 
different nations have been shown to have the potential to reduce poverty and generally 
improve the future opportunities of the recipients. However, as argued by Carling (2014), the 
transfer of remittances requires careful social navigation on behalf of both the recipients and 
the senders who choose to partake in these relationships of mutual dependency and 
reciprocity. 
Within the last decade, Kenya, like many other developing nations, saw an increase in 
remittances from US $570 million in 2006 to approximately $1.565 billion in 2015 (Ratha et 
al. 2016: 179).  While many academics (Acosta et al. 2015; De Haas 2009; Fransen 2015; 
Munyera and Matsumoto 2016; Salas 2014) agree that remittances have in general a positive 
effect on the lives of recipients living in the developing world, there is also a debate that has 
developed as to whether the scale of remittances has increased as dramatically as the data has 
shown in recent decades or whether the methods of measuring these financial resources have 
just simply improved as a result of advancements in technology and data resources. David 
McKenzie (2014) argues that only "21.7 percent of recorded remittance growth [worldwide] 
is due to changes in the fundamental drivers of remittances, with almost 80 percent therefore 
potentially due to changes in measurement." While there is still a lack of consensus as to 
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what constitutes a "remittance", some claim that we are getting closer to the truth while 
others contend that we are often overstating data by including other types of financial 
transactions (Guha 2011; McKenzie 2014). Due to this lack of statistical consistency within 
the study of remittances, I suggest that ethnographic data can provide significant insight into 
their influence on the lives of both the remittance recipients and senders. 
Financial remittances can be broadly defined as “cross-border monetary transfer(s) 
made by migrants residing abroad to their families in their country of origin, primarily to 
meet (their) financial needs” (Guha 2011:2). This definition can be interpreted in a variety of 
ways and typically depends on how long the migrant has lived in their new country/region of 
residence, their patterns of migration, and their involvement in transnational activities. 
Although the definition of remittances typically refers to relatively small financial transfers 
exchanged between individual households, researchers and institutions sometimes also 
include stock investment efforts, foreign direct investment, and donations given to non-profit 
organisations (Guha 2011).  
These unclear parameters of measuring remittances vary significantly between 
countries and economic institutions, making comparative statistics and economic analysis 
highly unreliable.36 Furthermore, the identification of the term “remittance” often implies 
direct connections with a homeland, and therefore ignores or inaccurately defines the issues 
faced by refugees and stateless persons. To avoid confusion, I will define financial 
remittances as the transfer of monetary funds between individuals or communities that live in 
separate physical regions, whether international or intranational, but are bonded together by 
                                                     
36 In 2009, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank began a project that aimed to 
1) simplify, clarify, and expand the definition of remittances in order to meet the needs of data users, 
and 2) develop a “practical compilation guidance to support compilers” (Guha 2011). This system is 
designed to be internationally universal and aid in minimising the variations of measurement between 
studies. 
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kinship networks or a shared cultural heritage to meet the primary financial needs of the 
recipients.  
In recent decades, new theoretical frameworks have been developed in remittance 
studies that aim to understand the social reasons behind remittance sending patterns and how 
these transactions aid in community development. As part of the “New Economics of Labour 
Migration” (NELM) theory, analysing migration as a community or household decision and 
remittances as components of transnational systems, King and Lulle (2016: 97-98) claim that 
“remittances contribute to the survival and progress of the family unit based in the country of 
origin [enabling] migrants to develop and sustain multi-stranded relationships that span 
borders.” The authors argue that these transnational communities can have direct implications 
on migration and development and that remittances are a fundamental component of 
transnational livelihoods. 
There is a lack of consensus in the literature about transnational communities, the 
transfer of remittances, and their influence on the developing world (De Haas 2005; Gamlen 
2014). 37  In the 1970s and 1980s researchers argued that remittances did very little to combat 
poverty and to aid social development in impoverished nations because these resources lead 
to a “passive and dangerous dependency” and that they are most often spent on “conspicuous 
… and non-productive consumption”. These statements, however, lack significant evidence 
(De Haas 2005: 1274). 38 De Haas (2005) contends that international migrant households 
have an increased potential to invest and that there is no linear argument to prove that 
                                                     
37 The contradictions that have arisen in the literature on migration and remittances, between what 
Gamlen (2014) identifies as pessimism and optimism in policy research, have undergone wide shifts 
in consensus for well over a century and often reflect political motives and current global economic 
and social circumstances. 
38 De Haas (2005) outlines five common myths about Migration, Remittances, and Social 
Development that have arisen over the past several decades but are founded on poor empirical and 
analytical evidence. These myths are: 1) that we live in an unprecedented age of migration, 2) that 
poverty is the root cause of migration, 3) that forms of development assistance are "remedies" against 
migration, 4) that migration provokes a "brain drain", and 5) that remittances are most often spent on 
non-productive consumption. 
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receiving remittances leads to long-term dependency. In fact, remittances have been shown in 
several studies (Acosta et al. 2015; Adams 2006; Edwards and Ureta 2003; Hildebrandt et al. 
2005) to increase access to education, higher quality nutrition, sanitation, and healthcare. 
Furthermore, even if non-productive consumption practices do increase, this would 
contribute to more economic activity in the remittance receiving country, contributing to the 
development of the economy and wealth distribution.   
In his contribution to NELM theory, Taylor (1999) points out that the impact that 
remittances might have on receiving communities is likely to fall between two competing 
theories. Taylor classifies the first as the ‘developmentalist extreme,’ which argues that 1) 
migration decisions are family strategies to raise income, and 2) that remittances, or even the 
potential for remittances, loosens constraints on investment faced by remittance recipients in 
poor and developing nations. Comparatively, the theory known as ‘the Dutch Disease’ or the 
‘migrant syndrome,’ states that migration patterns drain migrant-sending nations of valuable 
labour and capital. Taylor believes that the reality for migrant-sending communities most 
likely will lie somewhere in between these two extremes dependent on the experiences of 
both the migrant community and their family members who potentially receive remittances. 
Finally, De Haas (2005) suggests that the potential for transnational remittances to 
lead to either increased economic activity or passive dependency on behalf of the remittance 
recipients is largely dependent on general developmental, plus economic, social, or political 
constraints. Such constraints could potentially include bad economic infrastructure, 
corruption, red tape, the lack of appropriate public policies, a lack of legal security, and a 
high level of distrust in government institutions. In the case of the South Sudanese refugees 
studied in this thesis, most of the social, political, and economic barriers outlined above are 
harsh realities for refugees in Kenya, thus significantly contributing to the lack of investment 
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opportunities and further dependency on both their transnational networks in addition to the 
UNHCR.  
Adams and Page argue that there is a significant positive correlation between the 
transfer of international remittances and the reduction of poverty in the developing world 
(Adams and Page 2005: 1660; see also Adams 2006). In a study that examined the uses and 
transfer patterns among mobile money users in East Africa, Munyera and Matsumoto (2016) 
found that people living in rural areas with access to increased financial resources 
experienced a significant increase in food consumption, an improved quality of healthcare, 
and were more likely to invest in education. These socio-economic factors are referred to in 
the literature as “human development,” in other words, development which is focused on the 
human condition rather than purely economic indicators.  
In a study on the influence of remittances on the reduction of household poverty 
across eleven Latin American nations, Acosta et al. (2015) demonstrated a variety of results 
between each nation considered. For example, their study shows that in six of the nations 
examined remittances positively correlated to a reduction of extreme and moderate poverty 
ranging from two to seven percent. The authors argue that remittances have the potential to 
significantly influence the long-term welfare of the recipients through investment in 
healthcare, education, and various other forms of human capital. In the case of extremely 
impoverished remittance recipient communities, this influx of financial resources most 
significantly influenced children’s access to education, particularly when their parents had 
low or no educational history. 
Similar studies have shown that when lower and middle-income families living in 
developing nations gain additional financial resources, they are more likely to invest in future 
social capital resources (Fransen 2015; Salas 2014). In much of the world, basic education 
involves significant costs in the form of tuition, uniforms, transportation, and supplies. Vania 
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Salas (2014) argues that remittances have a significant influence on the human capital 
development of children by altering the cost-benefit relationship of investing in the education 
of community members.  
The relationship between remittances and development can be argued to be more than 
the simple allocation of money but rather a process of building and expanding the abilities of 
the individual, the community, and a population in general (De Haas 2009: 295; Sen 1999). 
Development can be understood as the ability to choose, whether it is an education, a 
business investment, a career prospect, political involvement, or any number of the medical 
treatments that remain unavailable to the majority of the world. It is the ability to chase 
aspirations, to ensure the welfare of family members, and to ensure that there is a future for 
the individual, their family unit, and their broader community network.  
Under Amartya Sen's (1999: 5) definition of "development as freedom", remittances 
are closely linked to "political liberties, social powers, and the enabling conditions of good 
health, basic education, and the encouragement and cultivation of initiatives."39 As suggested 
by Sen, development is more complicated than the provision of economic resources to those 
perceived to be in need, but also entails ensuring access to the labour market, educational 
resources, healthcare, and adequate nutrition. Remittances could potentially become a 
gateway to these development standards pending the stable economic, governmental, and 
                                                     
39 Sen (1999: 38-40) argues that development requires five instrumental freedoms: 1) Political 
freedoms through the opportunities of people to decide who should govern them, 2) Economic 
facilities through the opportunities of people to access economic resources through consumption, 
production or exchange, 3) Social opportunities determined by access to education, healthcare, and 
the general ability to live better, 4) Transparency guarantees and the desire/need for openness, and 
finally 5) Protective security defined as a “social safety net” protecting an individual from misery, 
starvation, violence, and death. Sen suggests that these freedoms are linked to and supplement one 
another.  
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community infrastructures that are necessary for a successful market economy (Bjuggren et 
al. 2008).40 
When compared to foreign direct investment and large-scale development projects, 
De Haas (2005) argues that remittances are considerably less volatile and a more reliable 
source of income to recipients living in the developing world. However, there are several 
pitfalls when considering remittances as a potential solution to poverty. Primarily, 
remittances might not flow to the poorest of any population since migrants typically must 
have at least some economic and social capital to travel and send money back to their 
families (Acosta et al. 2015; De Haas 2009).41 Furthermore, restrictive policies often 
discourage circular migration patterns and incentivise permanent residence in a migrant's new 
nation. As time goes by, a migrant who is unable to return to their homeland and become 
reintroduced into their traditional community can potentially lose touch with their roots, thus 
decreasing the sustainability of remittance transfer practices. 
Remittance decay, the deterioration of remittance exchange practices over time, is still 
a relatively unexplored topic. Several authors (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2006; Grieco 
2004; Stark 1978) suggest that the time pattern of remittances sent by migrant populations 
forms an inverted “U” shape (see Figure 3.1). The Remittance Decay Hypothesis argues that 
remittances increase gradually as a migrant adjusts to their host country, and similarly 
decrease as the migrant’s ties to their homeland become weaker over time. It is also argued 
that the sending of remittances will spike occasionally in response to specific needs or special 
                                                     
40 Bjuggren et al. (2008) argue that the ability of remittance recipients living in poverty to invest their 
financial resources is highly dependent on the existence and quality of financial and non-financial 
institutions such as stable banks, systems of government, and community organisations.  
41 It is important to note that most of the refugees who live abroad were resettled by the UNHCR and 
various NGOs or were granted asylum regardless of their access to money. Although very few 
refugees are resettled every year, De Haas’ (2009) argument that the poorest of the poor are unable to 
migrate and send remittances is irrelevant in refugee populations. A refugee’s ability to be resettled is 
most often determined by the UNHCR’s perception of need, the willingness of a host nation to accept 
refugees, and the ability of the refugee to navigate the bureaucratic resettlement process. 
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events. Similarly, Richard Brown (1998) claims that the longer that a migrant is away from 
their nation of origin, their social ties and perception of need for their family in another 
nation are likely to decline as they lose their urgency and compete with new commitments in 
the migrant’s nation of residence. 
Figure 3.1 Remittance Decay Hypothesis (Stark 1978) 
 
 
 
This figure is a depiction of Oded Stark’s (1978) Remittance Decay Hypothesis which 
suggests that the temporal profile of remittances sent from migrants forms an inverted “U” 
pattern, eventually ceasing except for the occasional spike in response to special events or 
unexpected circumstances. 
 
In contrast, Carling and Hoelscher (2013) argue that a migrant’s ability to engage in 
transnational practices, particularly through the sending of financial remittances, is 
determined by their ability to economically integrate into their host society. In their study on 
several immigrant populations living in Norway, their data suggests that integration and 
transnational participation are “complementary not competing” (Carling and Hoelscher 2013: 
244). Under the assumption that the sending of remittances is simultaneously influenced by a 
migrant’s capacity and desire to do so, integration implies higher rates of employment, higher 
incomes, and thus the capacity to send significant financial resources to their family living in 
another nation. In contrast, difficulties speaking the local language, understanding the local 
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culture, and developing social networks in their nation of residence also implies difficulties 
sustaining both the migrant’s welfare while simultaneously sending regular remittances to 
family members in another nation. 
The different perspectives of these theories on the sustainability of remittance sending 
patterns, will further vary significantly between each migrant population, reflecting their 
particular cultural values and the maintenance of their social bonds, in addition to the time 
elapsed since their migration and their level of integration into their new host nation. Despite 
the variations in these assumptions and between populations, it can be argued that when 
migrants do remit, these funds go directly into the hands of people that need them rather than 
being allocated to governments and aid workers. Although remittances rarely go to the 
poorest of the poor in developing nations, De Haas (2009:310) suggests that they have the 
potential to reduce poverty through what he calls "multiplier effects". For example, 
remittances encourage the development of microenterprises, which even if moderately 
successful could fund the education of family members, influence the general health and 
nutrition of remittance recipients, and create employment for other people in the area.  
The social and economic intentions and commitments that incentivise remittance 
transfer practices are highly variable. According to Jørgen Carling (2014: 219), they are 
composed of “material, emotional, and relational elements.” Carling argues that ethnography 
can provide insight on the culturally-informed expectations and meanings behind the practice 
of remittance exchange, best understood through the utilisation of what he calls remittance 
“scripts.” He defines scripts as a “structure of expectations for specific types of situations 
which facilitate social interaction” that can represent the “roles, actions, and statuses” of 
remittance transactions and the relationships that facilitate these elements (Carling 2014: 
220). Although the social systems and inherent meaning behind these scripts are culturally-
specific, Carling identifies twelve scripts that he maintains can be applied to any 
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ethnography. 42 Carling argues that these scripts are extremely broad and that the social 
interactions that rationalise the behaviours behind them are complicated, typically including 
multiple intertwining scripts. 
For this thesis, I suggest that, of the twelve, the five scripts of Allowance, Obligation 
and Entitlement, Sacrifice, Help, and Investment are the most relevant for the data presented. 
These five scripts explain and justify the reasons behind the transfer of remittances 
(Obligation and Entitlement, Sacrifice, and Help), their uses (Investment), and their 
management (Allowance) in refugee transnational families. The exploration of these scripts 
in relation to Kakuma in Chapters 5 through 8, specifically the justification for sending 
remittances, their uses, and their management will provide much-needed insight into why 
remittances are transferred to refugee transnational participants and the potential influence 
they have on poverty reduction and the promotion of individual and community agency for 
those who continue to live within the refugee system. 
One of Carling’s (2014) primary arguments is that both the senders and receivers of 
remittances play active roles in these transactions and that it is crucial to acknowledge the 
significance of the recipients’ actions. The transfer of financial resources is “reactive,” 
responding to both the desire/compulsion to send money, and to requests on behalf of the 
recipient who must actively make claims of need. Although communication and wire 
transfers have become easier in recent decades, remittance recipients must still invest 
valuable resources to support their transnational relationships with migrant community 
members. These investments could include spending money on cell phones, international 
calling minutes (otherwise known as airtime), internet access, and transportation to access 
these resources.  
                                                     
42 Carling’s twelve scripts are Compensation, Repayment, Authorisation, Pooling, Gift, Allowance, 
Obligation and Entitlement, Sacrifice, Blackmail, Help, Investment, and Donation. 
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In one of the early classic papers on remittances, Lucas and Stark (1985) consider the 
personal motivations behind why migrants engage in these relationships of financial 
dependency with their family and community that are left behind in their homeland or, as in 
the case of this study, nations of exile. They argue that altruism, and thus the love for a 
migrant’s family, is the most obvious and primary motivator behind the sending of 
remittances. However, as suggested by Lucas and Stark (1985), many migrants often have 
motivations that are purely for their self-interest such as to gain respect and prestige in their 
family and wider community or to position themselves to inherit family property.  
Lucas and Stark (1985) argue that most migrants who send financial resources home 
typically lie somewhere in between the spectrum of "purely altruistic" or "purely self-
interest," a zone that they have identified as "tempered altruism" and "enlightened self-
interest.” For example, a migrant might send money home to financially support the children 
in their extended family through their education. In exchange for these resources, they might 
expect to have more authority in various family decisions such as potential business ventures 
or marriage opportunities. While most individuals lie somewhere in between the spectrum of 
altruism and self-interest in this framework, the reasoning behind the sending of remittances 
is unique to each person being studied. 
A common theme in the literature on transnational participants engaging in the 
transfer of remittances is the concept of reciprocity, the idea that people send financial 
remittances for the mutual benefit of all parties involved. An example of these economic and 
social exchanges is “Balanced Reciprocity,” a reciprocal relationship in which “all family 
members are simultaneously receivers and donors embedded in bonded relationships” (Tsai 
and Dzorgbo 2012: 216). In exchange for significant and regular financial contributions, 
migrants can build or maintain a connection to their ancestral homeland or traditional culture, 
gain the trust of both their family and community members, and increase their social status 
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among the recipients of their contributions (Tsai and Dzorgbo 2012; Zhou and Li 2016). This 
reciprocal relationship is crucial for the maintenance of family and community connections 
across borders and arguably mitigates the stress that remittance senders often experience. 
The stress experienced by both the senders and receivers of remittances is often the 
result, as shown in several case studies, of unrealistic demands placed on the migrants to 
support entire extended kin networks (Hammond 2011; Ikuomola 2015; Johnson and Stoll 
2008, 2013; Lindley 2010; Martone et al. 2001; Trapp 2013). For example, Ikuomola (2015) 
argues that conflict can arise between the senders and receivers based on issues of power and 
dependency. Johnson and Stoll (2013) assert that refugee migrants who have been resettled 
often feel obligated to support entire families, despite facing financial difficulties themselves, 
because they have access to more resources than community members living in their 
homeland or a refugee camp.   
 One of the reasons that migrants might experience stress when they engage in 
remittance transfer practices is because they might feel what Laura Hammond (2011) 
identifies as the "obligation to give." Hammond, in her study on Somali refugees living in the 
US, argues that not only are the migrants expected to support their family members in their 
homeland financially, but there is also often a lack of understanding of the high cost of living 
in the West, leading to tensions within the family. Despite the limited economic opportunities 
for new migrants, particularly for resettled refugees, the knowledge that their family 
members might be without necessities compels them to provide what little they might have. 
Participants in Hammond's study mentioned that their families often complained that they 
were not receiving enough money and that these migrants felt tremendous pressure to provide 
for their family but were unable to meet the demands placed on them. 
Accompanying the transfer of financial remittances is the trade of social remittances, 
recognised in transnational literature as the "ideas, behaviours, and social capital that flow 
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from receiving to sending-country communities" (Levitt 1998: 927). Although social 
remittances are more difficult to measure, their impact on both migrant communities and 
their families remaining in the homeland or nation of asylum can be significant. Social 
remittances can influence traditional cultural expectations of "interpersonal behaviour, 
notions of intra-family responsibility, standards of age and gender appropriateness, principles 
of neighbourliness and community participation, and aspirations for social mobility" (Levitt 
1998: 933). These values, beliefs and ideas shape how recipients of social remittances act in 
their everyday lives particularly through household duties and their participation in political, 
religious and civil activities.  
The transfer of remittances, both financial and social, has become a key topic in the 
study of transnationalism and the building of transnational networks and communities. 
Remittances have been shown to influence the reduction of poverty in developing nations, 
aiding the promotion of human development in some of the world’s most economically and 
socially marginalised populations. Transnational communities are built on complicated 
relationships influenced by ideas of obligation, reciprocity, social status, and the nature and 
logic of the social interactions between community members at “home” and “abroad”. In the 
case of the South Sudanese refugees of Kakuma and their protracted state of exile, the study 
of remittance transfer practices and the social networks that promote them will give insight 
into this population’s agency and the potential of their transnational community networks to 
contribute to a durable solution to their protracted displacement.  
 
3.3 Transnational Refugee Communities 
 
 Having reviewed transnational communities in general in the previous sections, the 
question arises: are there distinct features of transnational communities that contain members 
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who live in refugee camps? In the context of refugee transnational communities, remittances 
have the potential to have a significant impact on the livelihood development of community 
members currently living inside a camp, by contributing to education, health, and the general 
welfare advancement of the recipients. In exchange for sending regular financial 
contributions to their families still living inside a camp, refugee migrants living in places like 
the UK and the US gain the opportunity to remain connected to a culture that they were 
physically disconnected from and to gain increased status among their family and community 
members that live in a different nation. As indicated in the previous section, these 
relationships are often very stressful, particularly in refugee communities in which the 
financial needs of the recipients are considerable, and where the earning capabilities of 
resettled refugees are limited. The question remains whether the social and economic impact 
that these practices have on communities that endure these periods of hardship have the 
potential to inspire a much-needed sense of independence and agency in the receiving 
communities. 
 As we have already seen, traditional transnational communities are typically defined 
as the social, economic, and political networks between a migrant community and their 
homeland. However, since refugee populations often have limited access to their homeland, 
these strong familial networks that transcend international borders might not include 
communication to their homeland due to ongoing war, limited reliable communication 
technology, or simply the lack of any community members who still reside in the homeland. 
When compared to traditional economic migrants, refugee transnational participants typically 
have different motives for the development of transnational networks. These motives include, 
but are not limited to, increasingly complex conflict situations, the forced physical separation 
of family members, and the virtually unattainable "durable solutions" outlined by the 
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UNHCR 1951 Refugee Convention. Their participation in transnational social networks is 
influenced by the need for survival in addition to a desire for economic stability. 
 The most significant difference between economic labour migrants and refugee 
transnational communities is that, for the latter, remittances are often crucial for survival 
(Van Hear and Cohen 2015; Vargas-Silva 2017). In unpredictable conflict situations which 
might lack reliable sources of social aid (i.e. medicine, legal representation, and food), the 
exchange of remittances can mean the difference between life and death. When compared to 
economic migrants, refugees have been shown to be more likely to send remittances and to 
send them more often (Carling et al. 2012). Furthermore, these acts of sending money to 
support their family members are more likely to be altruistic than for self-interest, referring to 
Lucas and Stark’s model, because the immediate danger of the family contributes to high 
social pressures to remit (Lucas and Stark 1985; Vargas-Silva 2017) 
 Various characteristics of a refugee transnational community include the lack of 
options to return home, the spread of family members across multiple locations, and the more 
immediate need for the transfer of economic remittances (Van Hear 2006; Vargas-Silva 
2017). In addition, due to eruptions of conflict and the remote locations of many recipients, 
communication between family members is typically unpredictable. Family displacement and 
reunification through established social networks are a part of life for refugees; potential 
transnational participants can go for decades without contact from their family members with 
whom they lost touch due to war, and then immediately undertake the responsibility to 
financially support these community members in need (Luster et al. 2008).  
As discussed in section 3.1 of this chapter, while protracted refugees become 
increasingly disconnected from their nation of origin, concepts of citizenship and notions of 
belonging can potentially be altered to represent lived experiences rather than formal entities 
or institutions (Mehta and Napier-Moore 2011). According to Rask et al. (2014), refugee 
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transmigrants, that is my transnational participants, typically lack social, economic, or 
political infrastructure, and face high degrees of uncertainty regarding social development 
and future opportunities. In a study on Somali refugee women living in Cairo which 
examined the “temporal and material dimensions of transnational lived citizenship,” Elisa 
Pascucci (2016) argued that twenty-first-century citizenship is ultimately a fluid concept 
based on experience and participation rather than formal national affiliation. Likewise, 
refugee “identities" must be fluid by nature, capable of building symbolic “social spaces” 
based on the foundation of familial bonds rather than geographic orientation.  
Refugee transnational networks have the potential to be multilateral, not limited to 
links between the bilateral homeland and the country of settlement. While the participation of 
members in the traditional homeland is not an essential quality of a transnational community, 
Basch et al.’s (1994) definition of transnationalism does suggest that all community members 
share common cultural values and a shared belief in the homeland. Nicholas Van Hear (2003, 
2006) suggests that transnational refugee networks exist in three domains: the homeland, the 
nations of first asylum, and the nations of resettlement (see Figure 3.2). These domains 
represent a diaspora that facilitates the exchange of people, information, money, and ideas 
between members of a refugee population at various stages of displacement, integration, and 
resettlement (Van Hear 2003: 4). He argues that remittances and other forms of transnational 
activity across these domains have become integral components of refugee livelihoods.  
In reference to Van Hear's model of refugee transnational community domains shown 
in Figure 3.2, the South Sudanese diaspora represents an ideal example of the various levels 
of this model. For example, in my past research study (Patterson 2016), participants were 
resettled in the US but were in regular contact with their friends and family in all three 
domains including other nations of resettlement (Australia), first asylum (Kenya and Uganda) 
and the home nation (South Sudan). The networks established between the participants of this 
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study were developed both between and within domains, facilitating the exchange of cultural, 
economic, and social resources.  
Figure 3.2 Refugee Transnational Domains and Corresponding “Durable Solutions” 
 
This figure, based on Van Hear’s (2003) theory, represent the three domains of a refugee 
diaspora (the home nation, the countries of first asylum, and the countries of resettlement) 
and their corresponding "durable solution." These durable solutions include repatriation 
(yellow), integration (blue), and resettlement (orange). Each of these possible domains are 
associated with a potential transnational network developed among the participants of a 
transnational community (or diaspora) with the potential to operate both within and between 
domains. 
 
According to Van Hear (2006: 11), many of the transnational research studies on 
refugee populations examine important aspects of transnational communities (such as the 
flow of money and information) but often fail to portray what he calls “the whole picture”, 
such as the complex political, social and economic relationships and experiences that have 
developed over time and across multiple borders. Considering that transnational communities 
incorporate the resources and experiences of multiple cultures, multiple sites, and changing 
relations between its members, it is necessary to explore beyond a linear analysis of 
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traditional ethnography through the incorporation or consideration of a model which 
considers multiple waves of migrant experiences in multiple locations. 
Each wave of the diaspora, each generation, and each group of community members 
that settles in different parts of the world are likely to have significantly different 
experiences, beliefs, perspectives, and attitudes towards their role and responsibility within 
their community (Van Hear 2006; Vargas-Silva 2017). Furthermore, the study of refugee 
transnational communities is further complicated when considering a community’s 
experiences of trauma, flight, survival strategies, and protracted displacement in addition to 
their adaptation to their life in their current place of settlement. Van Hear (2006) argues that 
only through an in-depth understanding of a refugee population dispersed across the world 
can we begin to identify solutions to protracted displacement and comprehend the potential of 
transnational networks within refugee communities. 
While the experiences of displacement and resettlement vary dramatically between 
populations, Van Hear’s refugee diaspora framework of networks and resource exchange can 
be applied to virtually any protracted refugee population as they each follow a similar pattern 
of limited mobility, inability to integrate into their host nation adequately, and ongoing 
conflict in their homeland.43 Van Hear (2003, 2006, 2014) suggests that transnationalism and 
the interaction of these three levels of refugee statuses are potential solutions to protracted 
refugee displacement. He asserts that “over time complex and enduring relations develop 
among these domains of the diaspora emerging from a combination of migration compelled 
by circumstance or pursued by choice” (Van Hear 2003: 12). Transnational practices 
                                                     
43 The statement that refugees are often unable to integrate into their host nation adequately is based 
on my knowledge of Sub-Saharan African refugee populations who are forced to live inside camps, 
are isolated from the majority of the host population, and are prevented from contributing to their 
economic and political environments. Refugees in Uganda are an example of an exception and are 
more likely to be integrated to the host community when compared to other refugee populations in 
Kenya due to difference in policies established by the host government. 
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empower refugees to actively influence their future while facilitating the maintenance of 
familial ties between forcibly separated community members. 
Although the establishment of transnational communities can potentially become a 
method for refugees to take control of their lives, it is important to consider the limitations of 
transnationalism. Several factors might prevent resettled refugee populations from 
participating in transnational activities including financial insecurity, language barriers, 
limited employment opportunities, lack of reliable communication technology, continued 
insecurity in the homeland, and confusing visa and residency regulations (Al-Ali et al. 2001a, 
2001b; Hammond 2011; Johnson and Stoll 2013; Mascini 2012).  
Pressure to provide financial remittances to family members who continue to live in 
developing nations, particularly inside refugee camps, is a significant source of stress for 
many resettled refugees (Hammond 2011; Johnson and Stoll 2013; Lim 2009). Despite the 
lack of economic opportunities available to them, members of these communities are 
expected to provide for family members, a role which Johnson and Stoll (2008) identify as 
becoming a “global breadwinner,” simply because they live in a wealthy nation. The strength 
of refugee transnational communities is dependent on both the capacity and desire of refugees 
to remit and maintain regular communication with their family members who continue to live 
in the homeland or a nation of first asylum (Bakker et al. 2014). In this context, capacity 
refers to the skills, resources, and organisation of the migrant community to aid in the 
development of a strong transnational community. Desire is largely influenced by cultural 
perceptions of commitment towards family and the maintenance of a balanced reciprocal 
relationship (Lim 2009; Tsai and Dzorgbo 2012). 
Al-Ali et al. (2001a) and Mascini (2012) suggest that resettled refugees are socially 
vulnerable communities who experience considerable stress integrating into their new 
society; when members of these populations are pressured to support family members who 
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continue to live in insecure environments, they experience an eventual lack of willingness to 
engage in transnational practices. Other authors (Brees 2010; Carling et al. 2012; Hammond 
2011; Johnson and Stoll 2008; Lim 2009; Patterson 2016) have argued that due to their 
privileged status, some resettled refugees often feel compelled to provide for family members 
in need despite experiencing financial hardship themselves.  
In the case of South Sudanese resettled refugees living in the US and Canada, the 
participants of several case studies felt an overwhelming obligation and desire to maintain 
transnational ties with family members who they were separated from due to war (Johnson 
and Stoll 2008, 2013; Lim 2009; Patterson 2016; Shandy 2007). Despite varying capabilities 
and considerable stress, resettled South Sudanese were motivated by both their families’ 
immediate need in addition to their personal desire to maintain their cultural identity that 
many lost as children. Soh-Leong Lim (2009) claimed that members of a South Sudanese 
community in California equated the loss of familial connections to the death of their cultural 
identity and their respectability as a person, consequently acting as a strong motivator for the 
development and maintenance of transnational relationships. 
 Diana Shandy’s (2007) ethnography on South Sudanese transnational participants, in 
particular remittance senders, is currently the most extensive study on the experiences of this 
population group. In her study among unmarried male Nuer refugees who had been resettled 
throughout the US, Shandy states that on average each of her participants reported sending 
roughly $5000 USD each year to family members living in refugee camps in Kenya and 
Ethiopia. Remittances were sent primarily through services like Western Union and Money 
Gram; however, some were also sent back informally through friends who were visiting the 
country they needed to send the money to, thereby virtually eliminating transfer fees. In the 
case of formal money transfer channels, remittance recipients may face various obstacles, 
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such as lacking formal identification, particularly for those living illegally outside of refugee 
camps, and the inability to speak the local language. 
 Shandy (2007) found that remittances among this population were typically sent on 
the condition that their use was agreed upon by both the sender and recipient, such as for 
education, food, or healthcare. If the money is used improperly, such as for alcohol, other 
family or community members eventually inform the remittance sender, who will likely stop 
the payments altogether or choose someone more responsible within the family to handle the 
finances. Shandy also argues that there are various other reasons why remittances might stop 
abruptly, highly dependent on the wellbeing and employment of the remittance senders.  
 Finally, Shandy (2007) argues that remittances sent among South Sudanese refugee 
transnational communities do not just sustain relationships between family and friends across 
international boundaries. Remittances also “broker possibilities for dramatic social change in 
the form of reconfigured residential patterns, local economies, and power structures” (Shandy 
2007: 151). In other words, among the South Sudanese diaspora currently living in exile, 
remittances provide a valuable source of opportunity when the humanitarian aid system and 
their host nation have failed to do the same. Remittances, and the transnational relationships 
that facilitate them, could translate to the potential for education, healthcare, higher quality 
nutrition, economic opportunity, and the potential to end their dependency on the refugee 
system.  
As suggested by Van Hear (2006, 2015), the development of transnational 
communities could be a potential “durable solution" to enduring protracted refugee situations, 
incorporating the social and economic resources from community members who have been 
repatriated, resettled, or who continue to live inside refugee camps. Marlowe (2018) claims 
that, by examining transnationalism through the lens of belonging in a migration and mobility 
approach, significant insight could be gained into future opportunities for those who continue 
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to live without a solution to their displacement. Through engagement in transnational 
communities and employing a mentality of lived citizenship (as discussed previously in 
section 3.1 of this chapter), refugee participants gain a sense of belonging that they 
potentially lack in the traditional sense, whether it be in their home nation, or their nations of 
asylum or resettlement.  
Micah Trapp (2013) suggests that the exchange of remittances through “multi-local 
networks” empower refugees to assume a more active role in the refugee and resettlement 
system and decreases dependency on outside resources. For example, in a case study on 
Ethiopian refugees living in Nairobi, transnational remittances were typically the only or 
primary form of income and were used as a strategy to both develop the livelihoods of their 
family members and escape the insecurity of the refugee camp (Lindley 2007). Although 
refugees who received remittances felt that they were maintaining a state of dependency and 
were unable to become self-sufficient, remittances were an effective tool for livelihood 
development and future investment. Unlike humanitarian aid, transnational remittances 
exchanged among community members are reinforced by a mutual commitment and the 
general livelihood advancement of all parties involved rather than a continuous state of 
dependency and vulnerability.   
The most significant limitation to the study of refugee transnational communities is 
that most transnational research has been conducted on economic labour migrants, and thus 
fails to acknowledge the issues faced by refugees (Mascini 2012; Vargas-Silva 2017).  
Furthermore, the vast majority of the existing case studies on refugee transnational 
communities only examine the perspective of resettled refugees and remittance senders, 
while a small minority examines refugees living in urban areas in the developing world, and 
even less on the influence of transnational participation for those living in refugee camps (Al-
Ali et al. 2001a; Carling et al. 2012; Hammond 2011; Horst 2006; Johnson and Stoll 2008, 
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2013; Lindley 2007; Marlowe 2018; Omata 2012; Pascucci 2016; Shandy 2007). Therefore, 
there is a significant gap in the literature on the ways in which remittances and other forms of 
transnational participation influence refugee welfare and livelihood development. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
 A transnational community, as explored in this chapter, refers to the collective cross-
border membership of a group of people developed upon familial bonds, shared values and 
expectations, loyalty and mutual reciprocity.  In the case of refugee transnational 
communities, these community bonds are developed upon their experiences of conflict, 
forced displacement, social and economic marginalisation, limited access to their traditional 
homeland, and often years of disconnection from their family members. Despite the often-
extreme conditions of their economic and social experiences, refugee transnational 
communities are frequently driven by a feeling of obligation towards their forcibly 
disconnected community, strong attachment to their traditional values of family 
responsibility, and an obligation to help their family members most in need. 
 In the case of protracted refugee populations for which the UNHCR has been unable 
to find a solution to their displacement for at least five years, and often decades, can 
transnational participation end their liminal status and empower them to become active 
participants in a society? As suggested by Baubock (1994) and Mehta and Napier-Moore 
(2011), transnational citizenship can enable social, economic, and even political participation 
that transcends the boundaries between nations and promotes the rights of those who have 
been marginalised by traditional notions of belonging.  
 As explored in Chapter 2, protracted refugee status in Kakuma refugee camp means 
much more than the inability to return home or to settle permanently in a new nation. The 
refugees who spend decades of their lives in this camp suffer from poverty and dependency 
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on aid organisations that have been systematically developed into life in the camp. For those 
who are completely dependent on aid organisations for the provision of basic resources, 
physical insecurity is simply accepted as part of life for refugees. Due to Kenya’s restrictive 
policies, the vast majority of refugees cannot live outside of designated refugee camps and 
are incapable of earning a salary that would reduce their complete dependency on aid 
organisations, contributing to their significant need for remittances from their transnational 
counterparts.  
 As suggested by Trapp (2013), transnational participation empowers refugees to 
assume a more active role in their family’s and community’s current and future stability in a 
way that does not encourage the prolonged reliance on the international aid system. These 
refugee transnational networks utilise the social, economic, and political resources that are 
accessible within protracted refugee communities and have the potential to be more culturally 
relevant than the UNHCR’s current policies. In the attempt to assess the validity of these 
assertions, the remaining chapters of this thesis aim to examine whether transnational 
participation has the potential to reverse the marginalisation of refugees in ways that are not 
limited by their nationality, their residency status, or the willingness of international aid 
organisations to continue their limited financial support while offering no alternative to their 
exile.  
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Chapter 4: Methods, Ethics, and Issues Encountered in the Field 
 
 As an anthropological ethnography, this thesis is an attempt to gain a deeper 
understanding of a social process that is a by-product of conflict-induced displacement, 
strong attachments to family and culture, and access to communication technology that is 
continuously evolving. Like virtually all transnational communities, South Sudanese refugees 
are bound by an attachment to their homeland, a sense of responsibility to their heritage, a 
commitment towards the welfare and future opportunities of their community members, and 
are influenced by the tools and resources available to them. 
 In this chapter, I will address the methodological and ethical concerns that arose 
during the course of this research project. Due to the complexity of the experiences of 
displacement and migration within the South Sudanese transnational communities studied in 
this project, it was necessary to explore the nature of these relationships and their influence 
on the remittance recipients living in protracted states of exile from multiple locations and 
from multiple roles within these relationships. All of the methods employed were qualitative 
in nature in the attempt to tell the real lives of the participants in this study, their aspirations 
in life, their frustrations with family members abroad, and their daily struggles.  
 
4.1 Locating the Field 
 
  Since the work of Malinowski and his establishment of the ‘field’ in anthropological 
fieldwork, this concept has for decades implied a structure that is spatially and culturally 
bounded (Coleman and Collins 2006; Gupta and Ferguson 1997). Coleman and Collins 
(2006: 4) suggest that the uniqueness of the anthropological discipline has been grounded in a 
“particular vision of fieldwork” in which the ethnographer travels to a faraway world and 
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immerses him or herself into a culture virtually untouched by outsiders. In traditional 
ethnographic studies, the field is a single location in which to study a particular culture, 
customs, and lived experiences. However, according to Appadurai (1991: 191, 196), this 
traditional anthropological model of the field fails to accurately represent the rise in the 
movement of people and thus the exchange in their cultural values and experiences: 
As groups migrate, regroup in new locations, reconstruct their histories, and 
reconfigure their ethnic “projects”, the ethno in ethnography takes on a 
slippery, nonlocalised quality, to which the descriptive practices of 
anthropology will have to respond… The landscapes of group identity -the 
ethnoscapes- around the world are no longer familiar anthropological objects, 
insofar as groups are no longer tightly territorialised, spatially bounded, 
historically self-conscious, or culturally homogenous… The task of 
ethnography now becomes the unravelling of a conundrum: what is the nature 
of locality, as a lived experience, in a globalised, deterritorialised world? 
 
 Considering that the diaspora discussed in this thesis has been displaced from their 
homeland of South Sudan, have lived in refugee camps in Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda, and 
have been resettled or have moved as economic migrants to places like the UK and US, any 
single field location would fail to accurately represent the transnational nature of their 
relationships. Therefore, in reference to Van Hear’s (2003) refugee diaspora model (see 
Chapter 3 section 3.3), the populations chosen to be studied in this research project represent 
two of his three domains; a nation of first asylum and nations of resettlement. However, due 
to the current civil war in their homeland of South Sudan, it was impossible to conduct 
research in all three of Van Hear’s domains. 
 I chose Kakuma refugee camp as the centre of this research project due to its current 
and historical significance within the globally dispersed South Sudanese diaspora. Kakuma 
has been open to South Sudanese refugees since 1992, and who have since always 
represented a significant proportion of the camp’s population. Unlike camps in Uganda, 
Kakuma is primarily home to the wave of refugees who were originally displaced during 
Sudan’s second civil war (1983-2005) rather than the current war in South Sudan (2013-
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present). Although both of these waves of refugees can be classified as protracted, the extent 
to which Kakuma’s South Sudanese population has been in a protracted state of exile is a 
good example of the refugee system’s inability to fulfil their policy agenda and to provide the 
people under their care with the support that they need to facilitate a solution to their exile. 
Finally, due to the significant resettlement programmes of the Lost Boy community, 
primarily to the US but also to Australia and Canada, Kakuma can be classified as a hub of 
the South Sudanese refugee diaspora. 
 Since this thesis examines transnational relationships, I thought it was important to 
explore both sides of these family networks, remittance senders and remittance recipients, 
through the utilisation of multi-sited ethnography. Marcus (1995: 96) originally defined 
multi-sited ethnography as a “strategy or design of research that acknowledges 
macrotheoretical concepts and narratives of the world system but does not rely on them for 
the contextual architecture framing a set of subjects.” According to Falzon (2009:1-2) “the 
essence of multi-sited research is to follow people, connections, associations, and 
relationships across space (because they are substantially continuous but spatially non-
contiguous).” Since transnational relationships are inherently not bound by the limitations of 
physical spaces for the maintenance of familial bonds and the transfer of economic resources, 
neither should the research methods used to examine them. 
 Ester Gallo suggests that when multi-sited research follows issues of migration and 
the movement of people it is necessary that methodological and research choices reflect the 
needs and limitations of each site. Even when studying the same population within multiple 
locations, unpredictable choices of those being researched make field sites appear 
“disconnected and incoherent with each other” (Gallo 2009: 88). She argues (2009: 89) that 
this is because “multi-sited ethnography is rooted in the recognition that the ‘field’ of 
ethnographic inquiry is not simply a geographical place waiting to be entered, but rather a 
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‘conceptual space’ whose meanings and confines are continuously negotiated by the 
ethnographer and their informants.” Therefore, as the ‘field’ in ‘field site’ becomes less 
defined, the conception of anthropological study becomes ever-more open and unpredictable, 
a reflection of complex human activity. 
 The transnational relationships represented in this study were strongly influenced by 
cultural values, experiences of migration/displacement, and policies developed by multiple 
nations and cultures. As demonstrated primarily in Chapter 6 of this thesis, the remittance 
senders and recipients of this population shared values which were grounded in their 
traditional culture; however, these values were also noticeably altered by their experiences 
after migration into their new nation of residence. Those fortunate enough to be resettled or 
to migrate by choice to the US or UK tended to be relatively financially stable and were 
therefore responsible for financially supporting family members who were living in refugee 
camps or in South Sudan where wages were notoriously unreliable. In comparison, 
remittance recipients, restrained by a combination of displacement and refugee policies, often 
developed a sense of dependency on their loved ones abroad who could financially support 
them through the hard times. 
 These complicated relationships were built on a foundation of strong cultural values 
of responsibility towards those considered kin, despite the distance between family members 
or the limitations placed on their lives. The strongest family networks developed regular and 
extended lines of communication, sometimes over the phone but increasingly through 
applications like Skype, Facebook, and WhatsApp. For example, as discussed further in 
Chapter 5, several participants in this study chose to maintain their relationships over family 
group chats in order to facilitate a continuous conversation between all participating 
community members. Due to the distance between those considered family, these 
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relationships were transformed into a virtual world, in which everyone continued to care and 
worry about one another but were increasingly aided by technological platforms.  
 Although two of my field locations, San Jose, California and London, do not hold the 
largest South Sudanese communities in either the US or the UK, they were both of significant 
size and easily accessible during the course of my studies. The participant observation among 
these communities also led to my introduction to several members of the South Sudanese 
diaspora outside of these locations whose participation in this study was facilitated by phone 
and Skype calls. The location of these participants outside of San Jose and London included 
Salt Lake City (Utah), Dallas (Texas), and Phoenix (Arizona) in the US as well as 
Manchester, Leeds, and Edinburgh in the UK. 
 Figure 4.1 is a representation of where and when I conducted my fieldwork. The first 
phase, carried our in San Jose, was completed as part of my Master’s thesis (Patterson). 
However, many of my participants gave second interviews, particularly among remittance 
senders after I conducted the majority of my research in Kakuma between November 2017 
and July 2018. Similarly, during my time in Kakuma I was also able to conduct phone 
interviews with men and women who at the time of their participation had lived throughout 
the US and UK. 
Figure 4.1 Field Sites and Dates of Fieldwork 
 
Population Location Dates or Fieldwork 
Remittance Senders  San Jose, California, US August 2015- April 2016 
Remittance Senders London, England, UK June 2017- November 2017 
Remittance Recipients Kakuma, Kenya November 2017- July 2018 
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4.2 Positionalities 
 
 There were several positionalities that I represented while conducting my fieldwork 
and which I have separated into four categories: the researcher, the volunteer, the advocate, 
and the cultural/community outsider. Each of these roles influenced the type of access that I 
was able to gain within my target communities, my relationships with the gatekeepers or 
informants of these communities, and the type of information collected during my fieldwork, 
in addition to the means by which I could give back to the communities who helped me 
complete my work. 
 In all three field locations (San Jose, London, and Kakuma) I entered these 
communities with the explicit intention of conducting research on people who identified as 
South Sudanese and engaged in transnational activities with family and friends who lived in 
another nation. This significantly influenced the type of people I was introduced to as well as 
the people who regularly communicated with me and offered their support towards my 
research project. Therefore, the relationships that I made within these communities were all 
based on the assumption that I would ask questions about their culture, their relationships 
with family members abroad, and the various ways they communicated and sent/received 
money from these family members. 
 In order to gain introductions into the South Sudanese communities of San Jose and 
London, I offered to become a volunteer with two organisations: Hope with South Sudan 
(HwSS) and South Sudanese Women’s Skills Development (SSWSD) respectively. During 
the course of my fieldwork in California between August 2015 and April 2016, I volunteered 
for HwSS as a treasurer for their small organisation which sought to raise money for South 
Sudanese refugee children’s tuition fees in Kenya and Uganda. Several members of their 
board of directors identified as members of the Lost Boy community, had developed strong 
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transnational relationships with their family in Kenya, and often socialised with other 
members of the South Sudanese community in the San Francisco Bay Area.  
 Similarly, I volunteered to help organise workshops for the beneficiaries of SSWSD, 
which was run by several South Sudanese women who were active in their community. It 
was through these relationships that I was invited to several cultural events and parties where 
I met potential participants and people who offered to introduce me to their friends and 
family who met the criteria of my research project. 
 In Kakuma, I chose to distance myself from the humanitarian system, cautious that 
refugees would perceive me as having influence over their benefits and thus significantly 
changing the dynamic of our relationships. Consequently, rather than being a volunteer 
within the organisations whose goal was to distribute aid within the refugee camp, I chose to 
give back to the community who helped my research by responding directly to the needs and 
concerns of my participants. As discussed in several chapters throughout this thesis, I was 
sometimes asked to buy medicine or school supplies for my participants’ children when they 
felt like they had no other choice, but primarily I was asked to be an advocate for their rights. 
On several occasions during my time in Kakuma, my participants asked for my help to get 
their family and friends out of jail, particularly when their charges were perceived by their 
community elders to be unjustified. On these occasions, I went with the elders of these 
communities to appeal to the camp manager, the Refugee Consortium of Kenya (RCK), and 
various UNHCR protection officers. In these cases, being a foreigner and non-refugee within 
a refugee camp helped me, and the refugees accompanying me, gain access to people with 
authority who could defend their rights. 
 Finally, in all three of these locations I was both a cultural and community outsider. I 
believe that this position within their societies both limited and aided my ability to gain 
accurate results in my data collection. Firstly, as an outsider who looks different and who 
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does not understand their primary language (I communicated in English or through 
interpreters) or cultural customs, it was difficult for me to make my initial introductions and 
to fully understand the actions and reasonings my participants employed. However, it was 
also because I was an outsider who was interested in learning about their cultural practices 
that participants in all three locations actively made time to sit down with me throughout my 
fieldwork in order to explain some of the cultural phenomena I had witnessed.  
 It is also important to note that as a white American, the majority of my participants, 
or potential participants, in Kakuma were interested to learn about my research project and to 
become acquainted with me. This interest contributed significantly to my presence being 
known within this community, and due to word of mouth, helped to spread my call for 
research participants. In addition, being a woman helped me to gain access to the women of 
Kakuma’s South Sudanese population, which, due to their often-invisible social roles, would 
have been significantly more difficult otherwise. 
 
4.3 Identifying and Accessing Research Participants 
 
 The men and women who participated in this study represented a wide range of ages, 
tribal identities, experiences of displacement and transnational participation, as well as 
strength of their transnational social networks. My primary target population, due to their 
history and connection with Kakuma, were participants who identified as members of the 
Lost Boy population and their family members. However, due to the complexity of migration 
patterns among members of the South Sudanese diaspora, these classifications were far from 
simple. Everyone who participated in this study was either born in South Sudan or in 
Kakuma, and had returned to South Sudan at various points in their lives. All of the men in 
this study who lived in the US were resettled as refugees. Their wives, however, were only 
given the opportunity to migrate as wives under fiancée or marriage visas and as mothers to 
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the sons and daughters of American citizens. In comparison, the majority of the men and 
women who lived in the UK during their interviews migrated as students or working 
professionals, while only two came to the UK as asylum seekers.  
 In Kakuma, many of the men and women who identified as members of the Lost Boy 
community had previously been refugees in Ethiopia, had migrated back to South Sudan 
several times within the previous two decades, and had lived at various times in Uganda or 
elsewhere in Kenya in order to pursue their educations, economic opportunities, or increased 
security. Consequently, the experiences of the diaspora represented in this thesis are complex, 
in large part due to the continuous states of economic insecurity experienced by the men and 
women who identified as refugees.  
 Kakuma’s South Sudanese population was also divided both socially and physically 
by tribal affiliation, the Dinka, the Nuer, and refugees from the Equatorian region in South 
Sudan (shown in Figure 1.3 in Chapter 1). South Sudanese refugees in Kakuma generally 
tended only to socialise, consider as family, and share resources with those from their group 
(see Chapter 6 section 6.2). Tensions in Kakuma were particularly high between the Dinka 
and Nuer, a reflection of the current civil war in South Sudan, which contributed towards 
further insecurity in the camp. For the most part, I found that only the men and women 
represented in this study who worked as pastors, teachers, or for various aid organisations 
socialised outside of their own community structure within Kakuma.  
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Figure 4.2 Participant Demographics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The transnational relationships considered in this study fell into at least one, but often 
multiple, social categories: a spouse, parent, niece/nephew, sibling, an in-law, cousin, or an 
old friend. In many cases, the participants maintained several of these transnational 
relationships to the best of their ability, and chose to discuss during their interview the nature 
of the one that was the strongest or most relevant to my research.  In some of these cases, the 
participants talked with some of their family members abroad regularly and for extended 
periods of time, but barely communicated with others or only called to talk about money. 
 Approximately 20 of the remittance recipients in Kakuma were in what I classified as 
failed or failing transnational relationships. As discussed in more depth in Chapter 5 section 
5.3, these were men and women who used to receive remittances but had not within the year 
previous to their interview or only received a remittance transfer once in the previous year. 
The patterns of receiving remittances positively correlated to the frequency and length of the 
conversations with their transnational counterpart and reflected the declining emotional bond 
between remittance sender and recipient. Although the participants who were identified as 
having failed or failing transnational relationships, or were only able to maintain very weak 
Tribe/Region of Origin 
 UK/US Kakuma 
Dinka 10 21 
Nuer 4 29 
Equatorian 7 30 
Gender 
 UK/US Kakuma 
Men 13 37 
Women 8 43 
Total 21 80 
Age 
 UK/US Kakuma 
18-25 0 20 
26-50 21 53 
51-75 0 7 
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ones, were in one sense peripheral to the core of my project, their experiences gave much 
insight into the social commitments needed to maintain strong relationships.  
 Due to the limited South Sudanese population sizes in California and the South East 
of England, I employed a chain referral recruitment model (Penrod et al. 2003). Similar to 
snowball sampling, chain referral refers to the reliance on a participant’s established social 
networks to help strategically target the scope of investigation, specifically targeting multiple 
networks to diversify the sample. For example, there were several participants in this study 
who were introduced to me by their friends and extended family; however, I also 
purposefully targeted a diverse population sample based on age, gender, and tribal identity. 
Penrod et al. (2003) suggest that chain referral sampling is ideal when studying a vulnerable 
and relatively limited population.  
 For remittance senders living in the US or UK, I specifically targeted people who 
identified as South Sudanese, had lived at some point in their lives in South Sudan and/or 
Kakuma, and who maintained strong transnational connections with family members 
currently living in East Africa, primarily Kenya, Uganda or South Sudan. Many of my 
participants maintained active relationships with family members in all three East African 
nations and held strong opinions about which nations were the most secure, the most 
affordable, and the most comfortable for their family members who continued to live there. 
Although not all participants from the US and UK represented in this study were able to send 
remittances frequently or at regular intervals due to issues of employment or costs of living, 
all acknowledged that it was their responsibility to financially and emotionally support one or 
several of their family members in Africa. 
 The majority of my interviewees in the US and UK were identified due to their 
association with local community organisations, specifically HwSS based in San Jose 
California and the SSWSD based in London, or by their association with other participants. I 
 109 
met two remittance senders while they were visiting their family members in Kakuma, and 
was introduced to two others over the phone by their family members in Kakuma. Although 
there were several people in both San Jose and London who actively attempted to help me 
find participants and to explain various cultural phenomena, due to my work with HwSS and 
SSWSD there was no need to find gatekeepers in the same manner that was needed in 
Kakuma. 
 During my time in Kakuma, I actively worked with four community leaders who 
helped me as gatekeepers to this population. They functioned as recruitment assistants, 
translators, and would often describe various cultural activities, values, or customs which I 
struggled to understand. James was a Dinka pastor who I had been communicating with 
through email for two years prior to my arrival in Kakuma due to our mutual work with 
HwSS. Tim was a nineteen-year-old Dinka man who worked as a teacher, and was the 
nephew of Peter (introduced in Chapter 1) who had been resettled to the US 16 years 
previously. Tim helped me find the majority of the young adult participants, particularly 
those who were determined to attend university to combat their marginalised status as the 
first generation of refugees in their communities born inside the camp. Paul was a Nuer 
pastor who actively visited the members of his community who he believed were struggling 
with insecurity. He also regularly conducted youth leadership workshops and advocated for 
refugee rights within the humanitarian aid system. Finally, Isaac, a member of the Lango 
tribe from the Equatorian region of South Sudan, was an employee of a local NGO. His 
charm and charisma helped him develop extensive social networks between South Sudanese 
tribes and other nationalities in the camp. 
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4.4 Fieldwork Details: Methodology and Analysis 
 
 This research project employed participant observation in collaboration with semi-
structured interviews in all three field sites. This section is an outline of the ways in which I 
employed these data collection methodologies and analysed the results.  
 Participant observation, defined by Emerson et al. (2001) as the method of 
“establishing a place in some natural setting on a relatively long-term basis in order to 
investigate, experience and represent the social life and social processes that occur in that 
setting”, is at the core of anthropological and other ethnographic research. By actively living 
people’s lives with them, to the best of our ability, our research questions and interviews 
become better informed and can better reflect our participants’ experiences rather than simply 
our perception of them.  
 For example, in this study, family and community responsibility were concepts that 
many of the South Sudanese participants found difficult to translate into words. Family was 
everything to the members of these communities, and the thought that individual welfare 
might be more important was inconceivable, particularly for participants who lived in 
Kakuma. When accurate verbal description fell short among the members of this population 
about why maintaining transnational familial relationships was so important, observing daily 
interactions between community and family members filled the gaps in my comprehension. 
Family took care of each other in every capacity because it was their responsibility as 
members of their community, despite extreme poverty or tremendous distance. I do not 
believe that I would have been able to truly understand the depth of this through interviews or 
surveys given that the familial bond among this South Sudanese population was expressed 
through actions and mutual concern, not through words. 
 The majority of my participant observation among the remittance senders of this 
population was conducted by working together with the two community organisations 
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mentioned previously, informal conversations over coffee, in addition to several cultural 
events and community parties. I watched my participants interact with their community 
members living in the UK and US, talk and text with their family in Africa, and help raise 
money within their community as a means to take care of their transnational loved ones.  
 In Kakuma, some of my most insightful experiences were when I was able to spend 
time with both remittance senders and recipients, in which I was able to personally witness 
the unique dynamics between these roles within South Sudanese transnational family units. I 
learned that these families were large, complicated, and messy, but that each participant 
found great satisfaction looking after the social, mental, physical, and financial welfare of 
their family members to the best of their ability. Sometimes this meant listening to and 
supporting their family members abroad about their struggles, acting as a mediator over the 
phone, or ensuring the welfare of the rest of the family in the camp (discussed further in 
Chapters 5 and 6).  
 In Kakuma, I spent recurring periods of time getting to know the gatekeepers to this 
South Sudanese population, their extended families, their daily lifestyles, their life stories, 
and their aspirations for the future. I often accompanied them to church services, their places 
of employment, funerals, weddings, and just shared meals with them and their families. On 
days in which we sought to find interviewees, these men (James, Tim, Paul and Isaac) would 
either walk from house to house within their neighbourhood or we would wait for potential 
participants to come into their homes. I discovered several months after I had arrived in 
Kakuma that much of this work happened without my presence, by which these gatekeepers 
would ask around their own social network and rely on word of mouth to find potential 
participants. In the cases in which these men did not already have an established friendship 
with the potential interviewee, they would often meet up with these individuals prior to their 
interview to assess whether they met my criteria for participants. 
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 The gatekeepers mentioned above, all of whom were quadri-lingual, acted as 
translators for 36 out of the 80 interviewees among remittance recipients in Kakuma, the 
majority of whom were with women. When the interview was not conducted in English, they 
were translated from Swahili, Arabic, or one of many South Sudanese tribal languages. The 
remaining 44 interviews were conducted in English, thus no translator was required. 
 My interviews were held in a variety of places, and were conducted both in person 
and over the phone. These interviews were semi-structured in order to ensure that they 
addressed my research questions but also enabled each participant to tell their story how and 
when they felt the most comfortable. These interviews were divided between specific themes, 
such as communication, family relationships, the process and emotions about 
sending/receiving remittances, as well as their future aspirations for refugee family members. 
These themes enabled me to compare the unique experiences of each man and woman 
presented in this study while simultaneously identifying similar trends among South 
Sudanese transnational participants.  
 The questions asked during these interviews changed regularly during the course of 
my fieldwork as I became better informed about the social experiences and cultural 
expectations of my participants. The more I learned about the communities that I was 
studying, the more informed and prepared I became for each question that I asked. For 
clarification purposes, I often informally interviewed many of my gatekeepers and South 
Sudanese friends in Kakuma, the US, and the UK multiple times in order to ensure the 
validity of my analysis of the more formal interviews conducted in their communities. In 
these cases, friends and gatekeepers helped me further understand the cultural practices and 
some of the experiences of other members of the South Sudanese diaspora. 
 During the course of my fieldwork, I kept a field diary in which I attempted to 
accurately record my experiences during my participant observation within these South 
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Sudanese communities as well as my various thoughts and notes concerning my interviews. 
These notes and the transcripts from the interviews which were recorded were later 
categorised into themes, informed by my research questions, and later subthemes which 
became the primary structure of the empirical chapters which follow. This analysis is 
designed to represent the range of experiences among the participants in this research study 
in addition to highlighting their commonalities.  
 
4.5 Ethical Considerations 
 
 According to the Principles for Professional Responsibility for the American 
Anthropological Association (2012), anthropologists hold certain obligations towards the 
people that they study. These obligations include, but are not limited to, avoiding harm or 
wrongdoing, being open and honest about the context of our work, obtaining informed 
consent, weighing competing ethical obligations, making our results accessible, protecting 
and preserving our records, and maintaining respectful professional relationships with 
research participants. This section is an outline of the ways in which I adhered to this code of 
ethics to the best of my ability, for both the protection and benefit of my research 
participants. 
 At the beginning of each interview in all three field locations, I would explain to each 
participant the nature of my research and read to them the consent form. In Kakuma, due to a 
fear that their answers would influence their refugee status or aid package, the majority of my 
participants requested to give only verbal consent. I also explained to each participant that 
they reserved the right to refuse to answer any question, to refuse the recording of their 
interviews, and had the right to end their interview at any time. The majority of my 
interviews in the US/UK were conducted privately, except in the one case in which I needed 
a translator. In cases in which phone or Skype interviews were conducted, I emailed each 
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participant a synopsis of my research plan and the consent form, and they gave their verbal 
consent. 
 In Kakuma, these interviews were treated like community or family events in which 
large groups of people would gather, often at the request of the interviewee, to listen to their 
stories. It was not uncommon for a group of friends or an entire extended family to gather 
together for an afternoon, taking turns answering my questions, surrounded by their 
community for emotional support. I found that the South Sudanese community of Kakuma 
were willing and comfortable to share their experience with people that they knew and 
trusted. However, they were also wary of outsiders knowing their stories due to the 
perception that it would further increase their insecurity in the camp. 
 For each interview in Kakuma, I gave 100 KSH (75p/ $1 USD) to both the 
participants and the recruiter/translator in compensation for their time. Erlen et al. (1999:86) 
define incentives in research studies as inducements which “entice and motivate people to 
engage in particular activities…provid[ing] a stimulus for action.” The authors suggest that, 
in order to address ethical concerns, particularly when conducting research on vulnerable 
populations, it is crucial to gain informed consent, that a participant is not pressured to 
participate, and that the researcher creates an environment in which the participants feel 
comfortable to ask questions. Although the incentives used in this research project were only 
enough to buy a soda in the camp, these small financial contributions helped all of the people 
who participated in this study feel like their experiences and knowledge were valuable and 
worth communicating.  
 Each of my interviews, both with remittance senders and recipients, were recorded 
and transcribed with the participants’ permission, with the exception of one woman in 
Kakuma and one woman in the US. All of the names and some demographic details 
presented in this study have been changed to maintain anonymity. The data presented in this 
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thesis is therefore meant to be a reflection of the transnational activities, struggles, and beliefs 
of the South Sudanese diaspora rather than emphasising the story of any one person. 
 
4.6 Issues Encountered 
 
While conducting my fieldwork in both the UK and Kakuma I encountered several 
issues that forced me to reconsider my research design and explore alternative options. Some 
of these issues concerned the availability of participants who matched my criteria, my access 
to those communities, and issues of tribal affiliation and ethnic tensions. I attempted to 
navigate these obstacles and come up with creative solutions without compromising the 
validity of my data or my relationships with the members of the community that I sought to 
study. In this section I outline the issues that occurred during my fieldwork and my methods 
of navigating these obstacles. 
The South Sudanese community that I became acquainted with in England had never 
lived in Kakuma. Many of these individuals have never identified as refugees, and had 
migrated from southern Sudan before much of the violence in the 1980s began. Although 
they were active members of transnational communities and had family who were either in 
South Sudan or were refugees, only three out of eleven participants in the UK maintained 
some sort of transnational connection to Kakuma. The majority of their family members had 
fled since the recent post-independence civil war that began in 2013, settling primarily in 
Uganda, a nation that was often argued by the participants in this study as having less 
restrictive refugee policies when compared to Kenya. 
 Worried that the South Sudanese population in England was too small, at least the 
portion that was reasonably accessible to me, I decided to incorporate the interviews that I 
collected during my Master’s research at San Jose State University in California, the original 
inspiration for this research project. All the participants for this previous research study 
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identified as members of the Lost Boys of Sudan community, all had lived in Kakuma for at 
least eight years, and were participants in transnational marriages in which their wives and 
children lived in Africa (one in Australia) while they lived and worked in California. Four of 
these participants had family members who continued to live in Kakuma at the time I was 
conducting my fieldwork there. I was also able to reconduct three of my original seven 
interviews by calling my participants from 2015-2016 over Skype and I met two additional 
participants who were visiting Kakuma at the time of their interview but who lived 
permanently in the US. As mentioned previously in this chapter, I was also introduced over 
the phone to two participants living in the US at the time of their interview by their family 
members living in Kakuma. 
 Although the remittance senders and recipients in this study were not always directly 
connected, they all shared similar patterns of remittance transfers, social support, and 
motivations to establish and continue these transnational relationships. I believe that the 
experiences represented in this thesis are an accurate example of Nicholas Van Hear’s (2003) 
model of refugee transnational domains, introduced in Chapter 3 section 3.3, in which the 
intricate network of a refugee diaspora incorporates a population’s experiences across all 
stages of their displacement and migration. In this model, transnational participation 
incorporates social and financial networks between and across three domains: the homeland, 
the nations of first asylum, and the nations of resettlement. By examining a variety of these 
networks between two of the three domains, I believe I was able to construct an accurate 
depiction of South Sudanese transnational communities as a whole rather than within one 
specific population. 
 While in Kakuma, I successfully managed to identify current and former remittance 
recipients in both successful and failed transnational relationships. However, while 
conducting interviews on the other side of these transnational relationships, that is remittance 
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senders, I failed to find participants who identified as former remittance senders. This gap in 
my data was partly because I did not consider this to be a potential pattern until after my 
fieldwork in Kakuma. In addition, I believe that these participants would have been 
significantly more difficult to identify, or less likely to be open about the nature of their failed 
transnational relationships. More than likely, some of the remittance senders that I 
interviewed could have been classified as having been in both successful and failed 
transnational relationships at the time of their interview; however, they likely chose to focus 
on the strongest familial bonds that they were able to maintain. 
As previously outlined in section 4.3 of this chapter, during the course of my 
fieldwork in Kakuma I became acquainted with several individuals that I identified as 
gatekeepers, whose kindness, curiosity, and willingness to help significantly aided in my 
ability to gain the trust of the majority of other community members. However, in the 
beginning of my data collection process, one of my chosen gatekeepers, who was a very 
valuable and respected elder in his community, attempted to control who and when I 
interviewed other refugees. Specifically, he asked to attend each interview and maintain the 
ability to vouch for each participant’s trustworthiness. As I mentioned above, I attempted to 
meet a variety of South Sudanese communities in Kakuma, divided among ethnic lines. 
Conscious of limiting my results to who might be perceived as being acceptable and what 
they might even be expected to say in his presence, I struggled with maintaining my 
friendship with this man in addition to ensuring the validity of my results. 
 One of the most difficult issues that I was forced to navigate was the deep divisions 
within Kakuma, not only between nationalities, but also significantly between tribal 
affiliations. Although everyone that I interviewed proudly expressed that they were South 
Sudanese, they often communicated resentment when talking about tribes other than their 
own, tension that was argued by the men and women in this thesis to have been amplified in 
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recent years, particularly as a result of the current conflict in South Sudan. Although there is 
relative peace in Kakuma, approximately 100 km from the South Sudanese border, most 
participants still had family members in their homeland, currently experiencing significant 
violence between the Dinka and Nuer. As a consequence of a political war that is driven by 
tribal affiliations, it had become natural to distrust members of other tribes that share their 
nationality within this refugee camp.  
 Researching the experiences of women within Kakuma was a significant obstacle that 
I struggled with during the entire nine months that I was there. Women were particularly 
busy, especially when compared to the men of this community, collecting water, washing 
clothes, cooking, and taking care of their children. In addition, on several occasions their 
husbands insisted on being present during their interview or doing the interview themselves 
despite their wives having the transnational relationships in which I was interested. Finally, 
the women of this community were significantly less likely to speak English and therefore 
often needed a translator. I noticed that two of the four translators recruited for this study, all 
of whom were male, regularly simplified the answers that women gave during their 
interviews, compromising my results. Unfortunately, I was unable to find a woman translator 
who spoke English, did not have childcare duties, did not have to work six days a week, and 
who could dedicate several hours per week to help me. Therefore, it can be assumed that due 
to the power imbalance between some of the women participants in this study and their male 
translators, that some of the collected data might be limited, either failing to portray the depth 
of their experiences or being translated through the perspective of their interpreter. 
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Chapter 5: Foundations of a Transnational Community 
 
 The transnational connections maintained by the South Sudanese refugees I spoke to 
and other members of their diaspora represented in this thesis were driven by a strong sense 
of community welfare and facilitated through various means of communication. As 
demonstrated in this chapter, ensuring the welfare of both their nuclear and extended family 
was a priority in many of my participants’ lives, particularly those who were able to maintain 
strong transnational networks. The commitment to their parents, siblings, aunts/uncles, 
nieces/nephews, and cousins was the driving force behind the formation of these 21st century 
family networks assisted through advancements in communication technology. 
 The first two sections of this chapter investigate how members of the South Sudanese 
transnational diaspora engaged in various forms of communication strategies and how my 
participants suggested that these social relationships are incredibly important to maintain 
despite the physical distance between community members. Section 5.3 then examines the 
conditions under which these strong cultural values of responsibility to family and 
community failed to be sustainable. In general, these transnational relationships, although 
facilitated by the transfers of financial remittances, needed to be based on a genuine 
relationship of mutual concern for the social and emotional welfare of all parties involved. 
When these responsibilities are neglected, the viability of these transnational relationships 
deteriorates over time. 
 Basch et al. (1994:79) suggest that family is a core foundation of transnational 
networks, “facilitat[ing] the survival of its members.” Within the study of trinational 
practices, the concept of community is portrayed as synonymous with family, both within 
nuclear and extended kin networks, and implies the capacity for social support. Therefore, 
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participation within transnational communities implies a reliance on other community 
members for social, moral, and financial support. 
 As discussed further in Chapter 3 section 3.1, Faist (2000) argues that the social ties 
which transnational communities depend on are mutual obligation, reciprocity, and 
community solidarity. These transnational social ties are built and maintained by systems of 
community membership and familial bonds and sustained by “transnational social spaces” in 
which all participants engage in the exchange of both social and financial capital for their 
mutual benefit. Faist suggests that transnational communities and practices create a mutually 
dependent relationship in which participation implies a reliance on other community 
members for social, moral, and financial support. To support this, Johnston (2001) argues that 
these transnational families are a living network of relations, defying physical distance 
between one another, to maintain a connection to the homeland and traditional culture while 
simultaneously working towards the economic and social advancement of the community as 
a whole. 
 As suggested by Morawska (2013) and Foner (1997), the transnational activity 
represented in this thesis is not a by-product of 21st century technology, but rather shows 
remarkable similarity to transnational relationships among immigrant communities at the 
beginning of the 20th century. Portes (2000) asserts, however, that although historical studies 
have proven the existence of transnational communities and practices before aeroplanes, 
phones, and email, the scale of these practices was far less substantial when compared to 
recent advancements. Portes therefore argues that as technology in communication and travel 
develops so do the capabilities of transnational practices and maintaining meaningful and 
sustainable transnational communities. 
 Carling (2014) argues that the viability of transnational relationships and their 
maintenance is highly dependent on both the senders and receivers of remittance transfers 
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playing active roles within these transactions. It is crucial, therefore, to acknowledge the 
significance of remittance recipient actions, a component of transnational relationships that is 
often overlooked. Carling writes that remittances are “reactive,” responding to both the 
desire/compulsion to send money as well as the active request to receive financial support. In 
order to actively engage in the maintenance of these relationships, it is necessary that 
remittance recipients invest valuable resources to support their transnational relationships. 
These investments could be economic in nature such as the buying of phones or paying for 
transportation, but also include the investment of social welfare such as active 
communication and genuinely caring for the wellbeing of their transnational counterparts. 
 This concept has been coined as “balanced reciprocity”, the idea that engagement in 
transnational participation is based on the mutual benefit of all parties who are 
“simultaneously receivers and donors” (Tsai and Dzorgbo 2012: 216). Tsai and Dzorgbo 
suggest that in balanced reciprocal transnational relationships, remittance recipients are 
expected to give back to their financial donors to the best of their ability. This is crucial for 
the maintenance of transnational communities and often mitigates the stress experiences by 
transnational participants. 
Furthermore, refugee transnational communities are distinct when compared to 
economic migrants in relation to the desire/compulsion to engage in transnational 
participation and establish a position of responsibility to remit as well as the social and 
financial constraints that might prevent them from doing so. Resettled refugees living in 
developed nations might face significant language, education, and employment barriers, and 
thus lack the ability or opportunity to adequately support themselves and their transnational 
family members. Resettled refugee communities are socially vulnerable and likely to 
experience significant stress integrating into their new society (Al-Ali et al. 2001a; Mascini 
2012). However, due to their perceived privileged status, in particular when compared to 
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their refugee family members who continue to live in exile, resettled refugees often feel 
compelled to provide for community members in need despite facing significant financial 
hardships themselves (Brees 2010; Carling et al. 2012; Hammond 2011; Johnson and Stoll 
2008; Lim 2009; Patterson 2016; Shandy 2007).  
 
5.1 Maintaining Contact 
 
 For the participants who maintained strong and sustainable transnational 
relationships, regular, meaningful and honest communication was key to their success. 
Therefore, this section explores how the South Sudanese transnational participants whom I 
interviewed facilitated these lines of communication as well as the topics that were most 
commonly discussed. As demonstrated throughout this section, communication facilitated 
through the use of cell phones and increasingly through applications like Facebook and 
WhatsApp, was essential for the maintenance of strong transnational relationships. For both 
refugees living in Kakuma and their family members outside of Africa, regular 
communication ensured that they could inform one another about their emotional and 
physical wellbeing.  
 The members of these communities who chose to have an active transnational 
relationship spoke to their loved ones frequently and for extended periods of time. These 
lines of communication, their frequency and length, were dependent on the nature of their 
relationship and how comfortable they were expressing their experiences and emotions to one 
another. The strongest bonds were typically between husband and wife, parent and child, 
often talking four or more times a week and for several hours at a time. Other bonds of 
kinship which were common were between siblings, cousins, aunts/uncles and 
nieces/nephews. Bonds between close friends who perceived themselves to be like kin were 
also common. I found that typically, as the bonds of kinship became more distant so did the 
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time between phone calls. The range in which people reported speaking to their family 
members ranged from once a year, once every six months, once a month, once a week, to 
once a day. Similarly, when asked how long on average their conversations were, people 
reported anything from twenty minutes to three hours. The men and women who reported 
that they had not spoken to their family outside of Africa for more than a year were 
considered to be part of a failed relationship, discussed further in section 5.3 of this chapter. 
 For those who maintained successful transnational relationships, the primary topic of 
discussion was the general wellbeing of their family members abroad. They asked about 
issues of health, family relationships, and general mental wellbeing. For South Sudanese 
community members living in places like the UK or the US, loneliness was a significant issue 
as they were often disconnected from not only their family but also their culture and 
language. These issues of mental wellbeing were significantly escalated when their loved 
ones a world away were ill and they were unable to be physically present with them. For 
Diane, my primary key informant in the UK, 2018 had been a particularly difficult year. Her 
sister living in Juba, South Sudan had been diagnosed with lung cancer and had passed away 
seven months later. Diane argued that “it was so difficult. I wanted and needed to be there to 
support [my sister] but it is too expensive. All I could do was be there for her on the phone as 
much as I could.” Although Diane made sure to call every day to talk to her sister and to 
support her emotionally, she could not afford to go to South Sudan to be with her sister in her 
last moments.  
 Knowing the health and wellbeing of family members through active and regular 
communication was a cornerstone of these transnational relationships. More importantly, 
concern for your family members abroad went both ways, given and received by all 
participants. Remittance senders indicated to me that it was important to feel a sense of 
connection to their community living in refugee camps, or in a nation at war with itself as this 
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ensured that they were both aware of the issues facing their family and motivated to help in 
whatever capacity they could. In a reciprocal fashion, I was told that it was important that 
remittance recipients took a genuine interest in the lives of their family abroad. This included 
knowing where their family members lived, what they did for employment, and the social 
issues that they were facing. 
 Family reunification was also a commonly discussed topic, primarily between 
husbands and wives but also between parents and their children with whom they had 
originally lost contact with due to war. One woman named Heather arrived in Kakuma as a 
result of the conflict that broke out in 2013. Her daughters, however, were two of the original 
inhabitants of Kakuma having arrived in 1992 when they were forced to flee their village 
without their mother. Heather’s daughters had been resettled to Australia in 2003 and, until 
their mother had arrived in Kakuma in 2014, had believed that both of their parents had died 
in the war. Luckily, due to strong community networks, they had been reunited over the 
phone. Heather told me that “they were so happy, they cried when they first heard my voice. 
We now talk every week and we discuss me coming to Australia with them.” As soon as 
Heather found her daughters, they applied for her resettlement, an application which Heather 
claimed was rejected for reasons still unknown to either herself or her daughters. Four years 
later, she stated that her daughters still regularly discussed moving their mother to live with 
them in Australia. 
 Rose, a 58-year-old woman, discussed how she talked to her husband in Canada every 
day, telling me that “he always says that he misses me and that he needs me there with him.” 
Rose is the second wife of her husband, who was resettled to Canada with his first wife ten 
years previously. Although their marriage is recognised within their culture and community, 
they were not considered family according to Canadian immigration officials and therefore 
could not be resettled together. Although the chances of family reunification in Canada were 
 125 
slim, Rose and her husband discussed these prospects every day. In this case, the dream of 
becoming reunited with their loved one was a driving force behind the continuation of their 
relationship.  
 For those who lived in Kakuma, it was important for participants in this study to 
discuss the conditions within the camp, particularly the extreme poverty that they 
experienced, with those in other countries. The lack of food and the lack of medicine, 
discussed further in Chapter 7, were the primary impediments to their health and wellbeing. 
Only by discussing the conditions of the camp, in terms of sheer deprivation, could refugees 
living in Kakuma ensure continued support when they needed it.  
 The family members living outside of Africa who were the most sympathetic to their 
struggles were the ones who had previously lived in Kakuma and understood the extreme 
conditions of life in the camp. Peter, first introduced in Chapter 1, said “we grew up in 
Kakuma, we understand there is no food, no medicine, that life is hard, and you cannot do 
anything about it.” For Peter, much like several other remittance senders in this study who 
grew up in Kakuma, their memories of the refugee system were of a harsh environment and a 
vicious cycle of dependency for food, security, and medicine. They knew from experience 
that urgent and desperate requests for remittances were not exaggeration or laziness. 
 Interestingly, the majority of the people whom I interviewed in Kakuma had access to 
a smartphone. The relatively recent change in available and affordable communication 
technology in the camp contributed to a significant modification in how people were 
communicating with one another. When compared to international calling minutes (also 
known as “airtime”), cell phone data was much cheaper, facilitating more consistent and 
extended conversations. Particularly for participants who were in their twenties, family group 
chats through applications such as Facebook and WhatsApp were very common. These group 
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chats often included all of the siblings within a family living in up to four different countries 
and were ongoing when compared to regular phone conversations.  
 These group chats were less direct than talking over the phone, but enabled families to 
regularly keep each other updated. Jeffery, a master’s student living in the UK who was also 
financially supporting his brothers in Uganda, argued that “sometimes it becomes essential 
because you find out things they would have never told you otherwise.” For Jeffery, a 
common topic of discussion was issues with girls, which his younger brothers in their early 
twenties were dealing with. As the older sibling, it was Jeffery’s responsibility to provide 
guidance as they became adults and to make sure that they stayed out of trouble. 
 Group chats solved one particular issue that all participants, both remittance receivers 
and senders, addressed as being an impediment to their communication: time. For members 
of the South Sudanese communities living in the UK and the US, their lives were dictated by 
their busy schedules, often a consequence of working in multiple jobs due to high costs of 
living. Diane says that her normal day in London consisted of a missed breakfast, running 
between jobs, a quick meal on the go, and then bed. She claimed that many of her family 
members in Africa did not understand how she could be so busy so much of the time. 
However, as a result of these limitations to her daily schedule, she usually dedicated Sundays 
to catching up with her family in South Sudan, Kenya, and Uganda.  
 In order to account for the difference in time zones and the often-busy schedules of 
the remittance senders, it was important that family members knew when they could talk to 
each other. Scheduling specific and regular times in which they were able to call one another 
ensured that their phone calls could last for extended periods of time. John, a 23-year-old 
university student living in Nairobi, told me that his family’s phone calls revolved around the 
schedule of his sister in California, typically either between five and seven in the morning 
before she went to work, or in the evening after she had eaten dinner. Knowing each other’s 
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schedule and working around it meant that members of this family could talk more often and 
for longer periods. Scheduling also prevented any unexpected phone calls at three in the 
morning from family members who are calling in the afternoon in Africa. 
 Some families used video chat services, through applications like Skype, Facebook, 
and WhatsApp, in which individuals can talk to one another while seeing each other’s faces. 
This method of communication enabled the members of these communities to add an 
additional dimension to their virtual relationship, mimicking physical proximity. Jacob, a 32-
year-old resettled refugee living in the US whose wife and two children lived in Kakuma at 
the time of his interview, preferred using video chat applications above all other methods. 
“Being here, I don’t get to see my children grow up. At least when we see each other on the 
phone or computer they can recognise who their father is and I can see them get older every 
day.” For Jacob and his family, the pain of being so far away from one another was 
ameliorated by not only hearing one another but also by seeing each other grow together. 
 Many refugees living in Kakuma, however, lacked the money needed to buy airtime 
or data to call their family abroad. This was a particular issue for those who only had 
extended family members abroad, such as aunts/uncles or cousins, and consequently did not 
communicate with them regularly. Many participants in Kakuma mentioned that because 
their family abroad were so busy they only wanted to be called if there was an emergency. 
For those who did not have money to buy airtime and whose family members did not call 
them, they needed an alternative method to contact their community abroad. One method 
utilised by many in Kakuma was an act that they called flashing. To flash someone is to call a 
person’s phone and hang up right away, signalling to your family that you need them to call 
you back. Flashing was also useful if someone did not have a phone and needed to borrow 
one from a friend. For those who did not have any other means of communication, whether it 
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was because they had no money or no phone of their own, flashing was a cost-effective 
method of signalling to their family abroad that they needed to talk.  
 My conversations suggest that when a family is physically separated, an emotional 
attachment to the life and general wellbeing of each other facilitated by regular 
communication is essential for the maintenance of a strong transnational relationship. As 
communication technology is continuously being developed and improved, so too is the 
nature of these relationships. For those fortunate enough to be able to afford smart phones 
and data bundles, relatively recent technology applications such as Skype, Facebook, and 
WhatsApp were the preferred method of communication. These applications made 
communication between family members living in different regions of the world simpler, 
more frequent, and more realistic when compared to standard phone calls. For refugees in 
Kakuma who did not have enough money to call their family abroad, they utilised techniques 
like flashing to maintain communication despite their limited circumstances. In this next 
section, I will demonstrate why maintaining communication was so important for the 
participants in this study. 
 
5.2 Why was Maintaining Contact so Important? 
 
 The notions of family, belonging, and responsibility were the roots of these 
transnational communities, generating a continued dependence on one another despite 
prolonged physical absence. Although communication was the primary means by which these 
families maintained their relationships, their sense of responsibility to one another and the 
means by which they acted upon it was the fuel. Participants often said that family was 
everything, referring to a sense of belonging that is otherwise unobtainable, and claiming that 
it was crucial to have an attachment to their roots and heritage. For the men and women 
living in the UK and the US, many felt it was their responsibility to support their less 
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fortunate relatives, particularly children and those in refugee camps who were unable to 
support themselves. Various ways that these transnational participants undertook 
responsibility for one another, beyond the provision of money, was to act as a mediator, a 
sponsor, or a leader within their family. Within this South Sudanese diaspora, it is assumed 
that everyone struggles in life, and that it is the responsibility of elders in the family and 
those who are more financially stable to support everyone else.  
 When asked why it is so important to maintain a relationship with family members 
abroad, many of my participants gave me quizzical looks and responded with vague 
statements like “It is obvious, it is because they are family.” According to the majority of the 
people referred to in this chapter, their family, and therefore their relationships with them, 
were their identity. Without the proper maintenance of these bonds of relatedness, they felt as 
if a piece of themselves was missing. When prompted about her relationship with her cousin, 
Anna, a 24-year-old Kakuma resident, stated that “as we grow, we are always family and we 
will always need each other.” Likewise, Diane, who had been living in the UK for over 
twenty years, claimed that “I am still missing them, time doesn’t satisfy me. Although I 
cannot recognise most of their faces, at least this is better than nothing.”  
 For nearly all the participants in this study, the maintenance of an attachment to their 
family was a priority in their lives despite the need for this attachment to be aided by 
technology. Mach, a 35-year-old man who had been living in the US for seventeen years, 
stated that “we want to connect with people back home because we want a connection to our 
roots. I have to help my family because they need my help. We have a very strong culture 
and we long for that connection.” Among almost all the men and women presented in this 
chapter, family, culture, and identity were perceived to be synonymous and thus self-
explanatory. Although it was easier at an intellectual level for my participants living in the 
UK and the US to articulate this concept due to their years of integration into Western 
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culture, for many refugees in Kakuma the question of why their transnational family 
relationships were important to maintain might as well have been “why are you a person?”  
 When Diane was asked why she felt such a strong sense of responsibility to support 
her family in Africa, she claimed that “by being a member of my family, I am expected to 
contribute what I can when it’s needed. Everyone in the family contributes. We do it so we 
can survive.” According to Diane, ensuring the welfare of the family was not the 
responsibility of any one individual, but was rather a collective duty. What was important to 
Diane was that both her and her family acknowledged her responsibility to help as well as to 
mutually understand when she was unable to help. After several decades of living in the UK, 
Diane believed she had mastered the balance between what her family needs and what she is 
actually able to provide. She argued that in order for families abroad to understand the 
struggle to meet their obligation to send money, it was crucial that remittance senders spoke 
openly about their financial limitations in order to avoid conflict, stress, and distrust. 
 John, the university student living in Nairobi, discussed similar balancing acts 
between ensuring that everyone contributes to the family’s welfare as well as understanding 
their limitations. John was responsible for taking care of his three younger siblings, while his 
household was financially supported by his father living in South Sudan, his mother living in 
Uganda, and his older sister living in California. John explained that they were six months 
behind on their rent, but that each adult was working very hard to support the children in the 
family. In John’s case, the welfare of the family meant that they needed to live in four 
different countries and ensure that they understood their responsibilities to the group. 
 Jeffery, the master’s student living in the UK, mentioned similar responsibilities. He 
claimed that years previously his mother, father and him had equally divided the financial 
and social responsibilities within their family. Jeffery was responsible for paying for his 
brother’s university education and ensuring that he acts responsibly because his brother often 
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refused to listen to his parents. Jeffery said that even though his university studies consumed 
most of his time, he was still considering getting a part-time job so that he could maintain his 
commitment.  
 These financial and social commitments were inherently understood within these 
communities, among both remittance senders and recipients. Although responsibility and 
ability were often formally discussed, it was also assumed that all community members who 
had the ability also had the responsibility to help others in need. When asked why he believes 
that family members living abroad financially support refugees, Paul, a Nuer pastor and 
community elder in Kakuma, claimed that “they know what life is like here. They understand 
what little we have and that we cannot earn money to support ourselves.” Most refugees in 
Kakuma believed that their family who live outside of Africa made enough money to support 
family members who are refugees. Within these communities, it was the responsibility of 
those who were more fortunate to financially support those who did not have the same 
opportunities. Trust that a family member would contribute what they can when they can, 
particularly for those who were unable to support themselves, was essential for the 
continuation of these relationships. 
 Elders, both within their families and extended social network, held significant 
authority among this population in determining the roles and responsibilities of each family 
member. An elderly woman in Kakuma, who asked to be identified as Mama, had a son who 
was resettled to the US while she was still in South Sudan. In the decades since they were 
separated from one another, they managed to find each other and now talk on a weekly basis. 
Mama claimed that “because there is no father [in our family], I often tell him that he needs 
to help the family and that we are in need here. He needs to step up as leader of the family.” 
For members of the South Sudanese community living outside of Africa, many are expected 
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to both follow the instructions of the family’s elders in addition to financially supporting their 
extended family. 
 When asked why it is important to respect the requests of elders in his family, Mach, 
argued that “they give you wonderful advice to solve problems. We understand that elders are 
important because you cannot live without them, they cannot live without us too.” The men 
and women in this study often explained to me that the elders within a family gave them life 
and made them who they are today. Even if they have been physically separated from each 
other for decades, participants argued that they would not be who they are today without the 
love and guidance of their family. For many remittance senders, parents and parents-in-law 
were priority remittance recipients, second only to their spouses and children. 
 In the US, I met two men who emphasised the importance of caring for the welfare of 
both their parents and their parents-in-law. Both of these men, who had been living in 
California for over fifteen years, had participated in arranged transnational marriages in 
which their wives lived in Africa at the time of their interview. In Simon’s case, his wife in 
Uganda cared for both his and her elderly parents while he worked to financially support 
them. For David, although he had been orphaned as a child, he felt a strong duty to support 
not only his wife and child in Kenya but also her mother. When these men entered into their 
marriages, they knew the welfare of the elders in their family was a priority. Their 
responsibility was to provide financial support to those perceived to be most in need, while 
their wives were responsible for providing the social support as a means to give back to the 
people who gave life to them and their children. 
 As mentioned previously, for the families who maintained the strongest relationships 
with one another, support extended beyond the provision of financial resources. Important 
responsibilities that were expected of people on both sides of these relationships were the 
provision of mediation in family or community disputes, and the provision of guidance for 
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younger relatives. Undertaking these responsibilities ensured that members of their family 
were emotionally cared for; that disputes were handled respectfully before they resorted to 
violence; and that younger members of the family were taught how to be responsible adults 
capable of contributing to the family’s welfare. 
 In Kakuma, I encountered two issues in which family members abroad needed to 
intervene and mediate a solution. The first was when Bill, an eighteen-year-old secondary 
school student, and his girlfriend became pregnant. In South Sudanese culture, in cases of 
premarital pregnancy, it is the responsibility of the man’s family to propose marriage and to 
provide the woman’s family with a bride price. As an elder of his family, Bill’s uncle in 
Australia was forced to intervene and negotiate the bride price and terms of the marriage, 
thus ensuring peace between their families. The other case of mediation that I encountered 
was through a young woman named Tina in Kakuma who suggested that her husband 
verbally and physically abused her. Tina often talked to her sister in the US about how to deal 
with this abuse, from whom she gained useful communication techniques. Tina’s sister also 
frequently talked to Tina’s husband to discuss his treatment of her. Tina suggested that her 
sister’s intervention, while it did not stop her husband’s mistreatment, had made her marriage 
bearable.  
 Guidance, particularly for younger members of their family, was perceived to be 
essential in order to ensure that the future leaders in their family were both responsible and 
caring when the welfare of their family was concerned. In general, this meant encouraging 
young adults to value their education, to learn how to manage money, and to take 
responsibility for their younger siblings’ welfare. Furthermore, everything that was invested 
in the lives of these young adults was explicitly explained to them so that they understood its 
importance. Paul, a student in his final year of secondary school, claimed that “I do my part 
as we struggle until I can repay [my uncle] back for my education. I want to be close to him 
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to appreciate everything that he has done for our family.” In these cases, repayment of 
financial support rarely translated to owing an exact amount of money, but rather was 
interpreted as a responsibility to support their family members in the future.  
 By investing time and money into the education and development of a responsible and 
caring person within their family, transnational participants wanted to ensure that future 
generations would be similarly supported just as they were by the generation before them. 
Many members of the communities living in the UK and the US that are represented in this 
study undertook the responsibility to sponsor children within their family through their 
education and development as an adult. Undertaking the responsibility of sponsoring a child 
meant that they were expected to both pay for their school tuition fees as well as provide 
guidance to ensure that these students graduated with good grades.  
 Sponsorship and guidance of a child or young adult within the extended family 
supplemented parental obligations. Many young adults who were sponsored claimed that 
their aunts and uncles who lived in places like the US or the UK often understood them in 
ways that their parents could not. They talked to them about their friends, their romantic 
relationships, and their struggles with school. More importantly, their sponsors often inspired 
them to dream big. Several young men and women said that once they finish secondary 
school they would like to go to university to become doctors or lawyers. Although their 
sponsors could rarely afford to pay for their university education, they inspired them to dream 
beyond the limitations defined by life in Kakuma as a refugee (as discussed more in depth in 
Chapter 8).  
 As discussed in this section, undertaking the responsibility to financially and 
emotionally support their family members was often recognised as a duty. Traditionally, this 
commitment followed along generational lines, in which the youngest members of a family 
respected the wisdom of their elders who were in return expected to support and guide 
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younger generations. As families become displaced all over the world with some having 
more opportunities than others, I believe that these generational dynamics are slightly 
changing. Those who live outside of Africa are sometimes expected to contribute more, 
particularly in a financial sense, due to their higher standard of living and income. However, 
advice, mediation, and genuine concern for each other’s welfare are expected from all family 
members. This mutual sense of responsibility guarantees that each member of their family is 
adequately looked after, while ensuring that the next generation will continue their altruistic 
cultural traditions. 
 As outlined in sections 5.1 and 5.2 of this chapter, I found that transnational 
relationships within the South Sudanese diaspora followed certain rules and expectations. 
These expectations were considered traditional within their culture; however, they were also 
evolving due to participants’ changing abilities to contribute what is expected from each 
family member, as well as the deterioration of their relationships if not properly maintained 
through consistent, open, and honest communication. The final section of this chapter 
considers failed or failing South Sudanese transnational relationships. I argue that these 
outcomes were a by-product of both the extreme conditions of life as a refugee in Kakuma as 
well as the failure or inability to adhere to the rules and expectations of their transnational 
relationships.  
 
5.3 Common Pitfalls in a Transnational Relationship 
 
 In order for these South Sudanese transnational relationships to prosper, each member 
needed to equally participate and meet certain expectations to tend for the welfare of their 
family as a whole. Although these social expectations were culturally passed down, 
transnational participation in these families was a relatively recent phenomenon. Many of the 
men and women in this study struggled to willingly care for their family members abroad 
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whom they had never met or had not seen in person for years. Just knowing that they were 
related to the members of this community and that they should care about their welfare was 
rarely enough, and needed the caring relationship to be actively nurtured. The most common 
pitfalls that led to the failure of these relationships were deteriorating lines of 
communication, the inability to be emotionally involved in each other’s lives, inadequately 
communicating inabilities to send money, and unreasonable expectations for financial 
contributions.  
 The men and women living in the US and the UK who participated in this study 
highly valued their commitment to their families and thus were able to maintain strong 
transnational relationships. However, from inside Kakuma it became easier to witness the 
experiences of transnational participants who had failed to maintain these complicated and 
physically distanced relationships. Approximately one quarter of my participants in Kakuma 
were classified as being former remittance recipients or only maintaining very weak 
transnational relationships. This section is an attempt to outline the conditions that 
contributed to these failed and failing transnational relationships. 
 The majority of the failed or failing relationships that I encountered were those which 
were primarily based on extended family relationships such as those between aunts/uncles, 
in-laws, or cousins. While in Kakuma, I encountered one case of a failing relationship which 
included members of a nuclear family. Nyadet, a 36-year-old refugee, explained to me how 
she was caring for her sister’s children. 
My sister married a man who was resettled to the US and she left her two 
children here with me. She divorced her first husband and married this man. 
Her new husband is not their father so they could not come to the US with 
their mother. She used to say that she would come back for them but now she 
does not say that anymore. We haven’t talked to her for a year. Maybe her 
husband refuses to give her money to support these children. 
 
Since Nyadet’s sister was resettled to the US three years previously, she had not sent any 
money to support her children still living in Kakuma. Although Nyadet had essentially 
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adopted her sister’s children as her own, she still believed it was her sister’s responsibility to 
financially support them. In this case, however, Nyadet believed that her sister’s new 
husband prevented this support under the assumption that she knew her responsibility to her 
family and would only fall short of this responsibility if she had no other choice.  
 The absence of regular and meaningful lines of communication between the 
remittance sender and recipient was the most apparent reason for a failed transnational 
relationship within these communities. Participants who showed signs of a failing 
relationship only communicated once or twice a year with relatives abroad and often only in 
times of an emergency or to ask for money. I found that in these circumstances, refugees 
were unaware and typically uninterested in the welfare of their family members living in 
Western nations, failing to reciprocate the commitment necessary to maintain strong 
transnational relationships. In these cases, it was the beginning of the end for these 
relationships, leading eventually to complete disconnection. Although participants rarely 
explicitly stated how their relationships had arrived at that point, their expectations of their 
family members abroad and interactions with their transnational counterparts gave some 
insight into the dynamics of these relationships.  
 Many refugees in Kakuma told me that they had completely lost communication with 
their family members who used to send them money. Some refugees said that their family 
member’s phone just rings continuously and they never receive a call back, while others 
claimed that the phone numbers of their relatives abroad had been changed or disconnected. 
When asked about her last phone call with her cousin, one woman named Meredith said “we 
spoke in August of last year. We talked about the issue of money, that we are suffering, the 
children are suffering. That we have no shoes and no food. He sent money. We tried to call 
him more recently but he did not pick up.” Conversations in which refugees in Kakuma only 
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asked for money and failed to maintain a genuine relationship through phone conversations 
regularly led to a complete disconnection between transnational family members.  
 One significant factor that is unique to refugee populations when compared to other 
transnational communities was the extreme conditions of life in a refugee camp. I believe that 
such a drastic difference in lifestyles between places like the UK or the US and Kakuma 
contributed to an inability to comprehend various difficulties in the life of both remittance 
senders and receivers. On the one hand, family members living in a developed country 
frequently failed to understand the constant states of deprivation experienced by refugees, 
and often believed that their urgent needs were superficial. More significantly, refugees in 
Kakuma were often incapable of understanding the stress that their family members outside 
of Africa dealt with regularly. From the perspective of much of the South Sudanese 
community in Kakuma, all people in developed countries lived like the popular reality TV 
stars the Kardashians.44 Many refugees believed that it was the responsibility of family 
abroad to shower them in wealth, and their refusal to do so was infuriating.  
 A twenty-year-old refugee named Justin had a cousin in Canada whom he had only 
spoken to once and had used the opportunity to ask for $100 USD to pay for his tuition for a 
computer skills course. His cousin said that he would call him back and has since failed to 
pick up Justin’s calls. When asked whether his cousin might not have the money, Justin 
claimed that “he has money! He is in Canada, of course he does. I can see that they have a lot 
of money.” In this case, even though they were considered family, Justin was essentially a 
stranger to his cousin. Furthermore, he did not understand why his cousin could not spare 
what he thought was a reasonable amount of money for a good cause when, at least from 
Justin’s perspective, he most likely had the ability to support him.  
                                                     
44 Several participants mentioned the Kardashians to me, convinced that this was a representation of a 
standard American lifestyle. Reality TV shows like this often played in public spaces in Kakuma such 
as restaurants, bars, and tea houses.  
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 Although Justin’s transnational relationship had ended before it had even begun, 
many of the men and women in this study had managed to establish more realistic 
relationships with family abroad, but at the time of their interviews had no contact with them. 
The social and economic strain that led to the end of these transnational relationships for 
refugees in Kakuma normally took years. Often family members abroad would initially 
establish a line of communication and send money, even if only in times of emergency, 
because they understood it was their responsibility to help their family. However, due to the 
inability to understand the stressful conditions of life on both sides of a transnational 
relationship, participants often found it difficult to sympathise with their counterparts a world 
away.    
 One man, a school teacher named Sam, explained to me the dynamics of his 
transnational relationships. His primary sponsor was his aunt who lived in the US and who 
tried to call him regularly to ask him how he was doing. He claimed that he did not like to 
talk to his aunt. “If I do not have a good reason to talk then I find it boring.” Sam explained to 
me that his aunt and her son in the US had financially supported him through a private 
secondary school outside of Kakuma. He wanted to go to university in the US but no one in 
his family was able to finance this. What was clear was that Sam felt entitled to his education, 
and was annoyed that his family could not help him continue it despite his unwillingness to 
maintain a meaningful relationship with those who had supported him that far. In Sam’s case, 
his aunt who acted as his sponsor, had failed to help him recognise the significance of his 
family’s contributions and the need for him to care about the welfare of the community as a 
whole, particularly for those who struggled to pay for his school fees.  
 When asked what their relatives outside of Africa did for a living, where they lived, or 
who were the important people in their lives, many refugees did not know the answers to 
these questions. I believe that this unfamiliarity with their family elsewhere in the world is a 
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by-product of a lack of communication on both sides of the relationship, disinterest on the 
part of the refugee community, as well as an unwillingness for their family abroad to be open 
about their lifestyles. For the refugees in Kakuma who were in failed or failing transnational 
relationships, most people were upset that they were no longer being sent remittances, and 
that their family members were not fulfilling their duty by taking responsibility for their 
extended community. However, these participants in general had also failed to recognise that 
they too had neglected their responsibilities, specifically to care for the emotional wellbeing 
of their family members abroad. 
 As emphasised in section 5.1 of this chapter, open and regular communication is 
crucial for a sustainable transnational relationship. After I came back from Kakuma and 
described these failed transnational relationships to my UK key informant, Diane, she seemed 
unsurprised and explained to me that many people who live outside of Africa rarely discussed 
their struggles to the people they support. According to Diane, “these people hide their 
struggles. They want to prove that they are living a good life and live in luxury. But they 
don’t tell you the reality.” She said that they do not want their family members to know that 
they are unemployed, living in government housing, or cannot afford to pay their bills. Living 
in a place like the UK, you are supposed to have wealth and opportunities, and failing to 
achieve these things was often difficult to communicate. 
 Diane told me that she did the exact opposite. She made sure that her family was well 
aware of her financial commitments, and how much money she might be able to spare each 
month. “If they understand that I do not have money, then whatever I give them they will use 
it wisely.” These lines of honest communication about her inability to meet her family’s 
every demand, contributed to strong transnational relationships during which she had been 
able to send money for over two decades. However, if her family had been unaware of her 
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living situation and the difficulties that she experienced, they would have continued to ask for 
money whenever they felt like they needed it. 
 For most of my participants in Kakuma, it was clear that their transnational 
relationships centred around the need for remittances. This need for money was influenced by 
several factors. The first, just like in most transnational relationships, was that the ability to 
earn an income for family members who lived in a developed nation far exceeded those who 
did not, particularly those living within a refugee camp. The second influence, however, is 
unique to a refugee population, in that remittances were needed to not only supplement 
livelihoods but also to survive regular crisis situations, to be discussed further in Chapter 7. 
Under these conditions, the need for remittances for the transnational participants in Kakuma 
was heightened, and in many cases, could not be fulfilled by their family abroad. Those who 
managed to maintain successful transnational relationships understood the limited abilities of 
their family members to support them because they actively nurtured a meaningful 
relationship with them and continued to be concerned about the welfare of those who 
supported them. 
 In many cases, refugees in Kakuma were unaware as to why their family abroad had 
cut all lines of communication. However, prior to this disconnection, they clearly stated that 
the primary topic discussed with their transnational family members was their constant need 
for money. Based on the phone conversations that were described to me among Kakuma’s 
South Sudanese transnational participants, their family members elsewhere in the world were 
aware of the deprivation they experienced in the camp, but the inability to develop a 
relationship beyond the exchange of money led to significant strains on their family. It was 
clear that the men and women whom I identified as having failed or failing transnational 
relationships did not know anything about the lives of the people who sent them money and 
often did not care. 
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 As demonstrated above, bonds of relatedness and strong cultural assumptions of 
responsibility were not enough to maintain a transnational relationship. In refugee 
communities, in particular, the drastic difference in quality of life contributed to an inability 
to understand the struggles of life for one’s transnational counterparts. Disinterest in the 
emotional wellbeing of community members abroad led to deteriorating lines of 
communication in which refugees only called family in order to ask for money, contributing 
to total disconnection. Although these relationships were based on blood ties, participants 
who were in failed or failing transnational communities were essentially strangers to their 
family abroad, about whom they knew nothing. In order for transnational relationships to be 
sustainable, particularly those involving remittances, it is necessary that they become 
emotionally committed to one another beyond the need for money.  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 At first glance, communication, primarily through the use of cell phones, was the 
cornerstone on which these transnational communities operated. However, the means of 
communication were also highly variable in terms of methods, frequency, and duration which 
significantly influenced the ability to talk to one another as well as the quality of the 
conversation. In general, sustainable transnational relationships were dependent on frequent 
lines of communication that lasted for extended periods of time. The strongest relationships 
were between husbands and wives, siblings, and parents and children, with conversations 
taking place several times a week, and usually lasting for several hours.  
 Although communication facilitated the ways in which families cared for one another, 
a strong attachment to their culture, and thus their commitment to the welfare of their family, 
was the driving force behind many of the successful relationships I encountered. This 
commitment was often described along generational lines in which the wishes of their elders 
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needed to be respected. Similarly, participants who lived in the US and the UK often 
undertook the responsibility to sponsor their younger siblings, nieces, and nephews through 
their education, but also through their guidance to be responsible and caring adults.  
In general, these relationships were highly dependent on how well the men and women in this 
study were able to develop a genuine bond with their transnational community members with 
whom they have no, or very little, physical contact. Although communication is needed to 
maintain these bonds, unless both sides of the relationship are involved in each other’s lives 
and each participant genuinely cares for the wellbeing of one another, then the transnational 
network will likely fall apart.  
The transnational relationships described in this chapter as failed or failing were the 
ones in which its members were only concerned about the need for money. In these cases, 
family members did not ask one another about their general wellbeing, knew very little about 
the events in each other’s lives, and were for the most part unconcerned about the lives of 
their community members abroad. When these transnational relationships were based purely 
on the constant need for money, the family members felt disincentivised to contribute to their 
refugee community member’s welfare. 
 Since the foundation of these relationships was based on a strong commitment to the 
welfare of their family, it was necessary that these lines of communication centred around 
knowing and genuinely caring about the wellbeing of family members abroad. Although the 
commitment to their community’s welfare was strong for the men and women in this study 
who lived in the US and the UK, many refugees in Kakuma struggled to sympathise with 
their transnational counterparts living in a developed nation. I believe the conditions of life in 
Kakuma, as well as the distance between family members, significantly influenced the ability 
of these communities to continue their traditional practices of ensuring the welfare of the 
family as a whole.  
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 The constant need for financial support often blinded refugees to the struggles that 
their family abroad went through, contributing to false assumptions that their individual 
welfare mattered above all else. The unrealistic expectations that were held by many refugees 
in Kakuma as well as their unwillingness or inability to learn about the lives of their family 
outside of Africa, often led to a complete disconnection and were thus labelled as having a 
failed or failing transnational relationship. As discussed in the next chapter, sending 
remittances and undertaking the responsibility to financially support family members abroad 
was an extremely stressful process. In order to ensure that this process was sustainable, it was 
essential that every family member felt appreciated and that their welfare was a topic of 
concern.  
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Chapter 6: Changing Hands: Remittance Transfers and Investment in 
Economic and Social Capital 
 
 Although the foundation of a transnational relationship is based on establishing strong 
social bonds across international borders through communication, the transfer of remittances 
is often argued to be a vital component of these communities. While the previous chapter 
focused on the strength of these transnational relationships and their maintenance strategies, 
the purpose of this chapter is to explore the ways in which remittances specifically are sent 
and used among the participants of this study. From the perspective of remittance senders and 
recipients respectively, this chapter discusses the ways in which the members of this South 
Sudanese diaspora navigate their perceptions of need and responsibility for both themselves 
and those they consider community or family. 
Divided into two sections, section 6.1 examines how remittance senders living in the 
US and UK justify their sense of responsibility to their family in Africa, measure the need for 
remittances, and finally cope with the stress of being unable to send remittances when they 
know their family genuinely needs the support. In comparison, section 6.2 of this chapter 
investigates the social context in which these remittances are utilised, particularly for the 
welfare of not only the receiving family but also their surrounding local community in the 
refugee camp. 
 As discussed further in Chapter 3, financial remittances can be defined as “cross-
border monetary transfer(s) made by migrants residing abroad to their families in their 
country of origin, primarily to meet (their) financial needs” (Guha 2011: 2). Although 
remittances are often assumed to be sent only to the homeland, in this case South Sudan, this 
definition fails to recognise the experiences of displaced populations such as the community 
discussed in this thesis. A more accurate representation of the remittance transfer cycle in a 
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refugee community can be represented in Van Hear’s (2003) Refugee Diaspora Model, 
discussed further in Chapter 3, section 3.3. Van Hear argues that refugee transnational 
networks have the potential to operate both within and between three domains (the homeland, 
the nations of first asylum, and the nations of resettlement) in the form of communication 
networks and the transfer of financial remittances. This model accurately describes the 
communities studied in this thesis by acknowledging the potential transnational networks 
between resettled refugees and economic migrants in the US/UK and their families living in 
refugee camps outside of South Sudan. 
 Jørgen Carling (2014) argues that the remittance transfer process is composed of 
“material, emotional, and relational elements” facilitated by socially developed structures of 
expectations (scripts). Five of Carling’s scripts were found to be relevant in the relationships 
studied within these South Sudanese refugee transnational communities: these were 
Obligation/Entitlement, Sacrifice, Help, Allowance, and Investment. The first three scripts 
(Obligation/Entitlement, Sacrifice, Help) explain why family members living in the US/UK 
send money to their family members in Africa, and similarly, why remittance recipients share 
these financial resources with their friends and neighbours within the refugee camp. 
Allowance, discussed in the first section of this chapter, is represented by the remittance 
sender needing to know that their earnings are being spent wisely. Investment, discussed 
further in Chapter 8, is investigated through the experiences of both remittance senders and 
recipients investing in the education of themselves and of the children within their families 
currently living as refugees. 
Shandy’s (2007) ethnography on South Sudanese transnational participants living in 
the US suggests that members of this diaspora are likely to remit a significant proportion of 
their income through the use of both formal money transfer channels and through the 
utilisation of their existing social network. Johnson and Stoll (2008) argue that it is common 
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among South Sudanese former refugees living in Canada to undertake the role they identify 
as “global breadwinners” due to their ability to earn a Western wage as well as their families’ 
continued residence in either a war zone in South Sudan or in refugee camps in neighbouring 
nations. As suggested by Hammond (2011), social and economic pressure placed on resettled 
refugees to undertake this role as the global breadwinner and to send substantial amounts of 
remittances contributes to significant stress for transnational family members living in 
developed nations. 
As explored more extensively in Chapters 3 and 5, family is a central theme in the 
sustainability of transnational communities, and thus the perpetuation of remittance sending 
practices; however, kinship relations which are constitutive of family can be defined 
differently in various cultures and across generations. Evans-Pritchard (1951) and Hutchinson 
(1996; 2000) suggest that among the Nuer, the second largest tribe in South Sudan, kinship 
(mar) is built upon generations worth of interpersonal relationships. Hutchinson also argues 
that, within this culture, relatedness and the sharing of food are intertwined, and thus anyone 
with whom one shares food is considered family. Although family can be argued to be a 
relative term, several studies on South Sudanese resettled refugees have suggested that 
members of this population go through tremendous efforts to financially and socially support 
those they consider family who still live in Africa (Johnson and Stoll 2008, 2013; Lim 2009; 
Luster et al. 2008; Patterson 2016). 
 One of the key arguments in this chapter is that traditional notions of kinship within 
these transnational South Sudanese communities are changing based on their lived 
experiences and connection to their traditional culture. In Chapter 3, I explored two theories 
on how the degree of integration that an immigrant experiences influences their financial 
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remittance sending patterns.45 Stark’s (1978) Remittance Decay Hypothesis argues that the 
time pattern of remittances forms an inverted “U” shape which grows as migrants adjust to 
their new host society and increase their material wellbeing, and then decreases as ties to 
their homeland become weaker over time (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2006; Grieco 2004; 
Stark 1978).  
However, more recently Carling and Hoelscher (2013: 244) have suggested that a 
migrant’s transnational participation is positively correlated with their level of integration 
into their host nation, arguing that therefore integration and transnational activity are 
“complementary not competing.” Providing some insight on the difference in these theories, I 
found that a participant’s experience within the refugee system, and thus the social and 
economic marginalisation associated with it, and the strength of their transnational 
relationships were much stronger factors than their degree of integration into their nation of 
residence for the sustainability of their financial remittance sending patterns.  
 If continued transnational participation and the sending of financial remittances are 
also dependent on the level of integration that a migrant is able to achieve in their host nation, 
then the capacity for migrants to engage in transnational practices may be becoming 
increasingly difficult (Glick Schiller 2018). Glick Schiller suggests that migrant populations, 
particularly ethnic and religious minorities in the US and Europe, are facing rising insecurity 
in terms of deportation, harassment, and surveillance for their social, economic, and political 
ties to their home nation. Consequently, the ability of transnational communities to become 
sustainable is also dependent on the capability for migrants to successfully navigate the 
social, economic, and political environment in both their home and host nations. 
                                                     
45 In the case of this thesis, degree or level of integration refers to the migrant’s (remittance sender) 
communication capability in their host nation, their established social networks, level of education, 
and employability (Beversluis et al. 2006; Carling and Hoelscher 2013). All of these factors influence 
the degree to which a migrant is capable of navigating the social, economic, and political institutions 
within their nation of residence, thus influencing their ability to sustain their transnational networks 
and to send remittances regularly. 
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 Refugees living in Kakuma often considered all friends and neighbours who had 
witnessed similar experiences of social and economic marginalisation as kin. Other African 
refugee populations who have experienced displacement, dependency, and economic and 
physical insecurity, showed similar community support networks (Grabska 2005; Horst 2006; 
Omata 2012). For example, Omata’s (2012: 267) study on Liberian refugees in a Ghanaian 
camp found that when confronted with crisis situations in an “impoverished and inhospitable 
environment,” refugee participants who received remittances expressed a moral responsibility 
to share cash, food, and other resources which facilitated the survival of their surrounding 
community. For refugees who are economically and socially marginalised, fictive kin 
relationships, in which friends and neighbours are “like family”, have the potential to expand 
resource accessibility through the provision of material and social support that would have 
otherwise been unavailable. 
 Although the aim of this chapter is to explore the ways in which remittances are sent 
and utilised, this process was strongly influenced by who participants considered family and 
the ways in which they internalised responsibility. Due to the differences in experiences, and 
the extended periods of time the men and women of these communities were physically 
separated from one another, notions of kinship and responsibility diverged. Therefore, in this 
chapter I explore how perceptions of kinship, and thus responsibility, expanded in the refugee 
camp, contracted for remittance senders with only extended transnational family 
relationships, and remained relatively similar to South Sudanese cultural standards for 
remittance senders whose wives and children were in Africa or who were recent immigrants. 
 
6.1 Navigating Responsibility, Ability, and Financial Limitations 
 
 The act of sending money in itself was a difficult process to establish and navigate. 
Those who lived outside of Africa maintained a variety of motivations for sending money, 
 150 
and held very specific perceptions about their families’ needs and responsibilities. I found 
that all of the remittance senders interviewed for this study argued that it was their 
responsibility to care for their family members in Africa and to do this to the best of their 
ability. These beliefs contributed to various stress factors, particularly from an inability to 
provide for all of their families’ needs and the attempt to navigate the most cost-effective 
methods of sending money. From the perspective of remittance senders, this section aims to 
explore the perceptions of need and responsibility that motivate the sending of remittances, 
and the methods utilised to obtain and send these financial resources to their family members 
in Africa. 
 The remittance senders in this thesis can be classified into two primary categories of 
transnational participation: those whose transnational relationships were primarily with 
immediate or nuclear family members, often with extended family also, and those whose only 
transnational relationships were with extended family. In the case of the South Sudanese 
Diaspora, immediate/nuclear families typically included wives, children, parents/parents in-
law, and unmarried younger siblings, while extended transnational family relationships 
included older or married siblings, aunt/uncles, nieces/nephews, and cousins. I found that the 
majority of my participants in the US, who grew up as refugee children in Kakuma and 
participated in transnational marriages, were all supporting their immediate family members 
in East Africa. In contrast, for the majority of my participants in the UK, since their 
immediate family lived in their host nation with them, their transnational relationships were 
generally with those they considered extended family. The exception to this trend was 
Jeffery, who was a recent immigrant to the UK and who actively supported his brother’s 
university education. 
 All of the 21 remittance senders who participated in this study faced challenges in 
combining their lives in their current nation of residence with their sense of responsibility to 
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their family in Africa. One man, in particular, who had provided me with great insight into 
the contemporary South Sudanese culture of family and responsibility, epitomised these 
experiences. After weeks of coordination, calculating time differences, and missed calls, I 
was finally able to talk to David, an old friend from California. David became a refugee at the 
age of five, had lived in Kakuma for eleven years, and was finally resettled to San Jose in 
2003. At the time of our call, he was in his car driving for Uber, one of his three jobs. Like 
many other men within his community, he shared a flat with several other former South 
Sudanese refugees. Although these men might live and work in California, their wives, 
children, and extended family continue to live in Kenya, Uganda, and South Sudan. In order 
to provide for his family still living in Africa, David worked as much as he could and sent the 
majority of his money to his wife, her family, his new-born baby, and his nieces in Kakuma. 
 David’s lifestyle was common among men resettled to the US and who had wives still 
living in Africa. These men were torn from their homeland and culture at a young age, and 
have undergone efforts to reunite with their family members that they lost as children. Eight 
of the participants in this study were resettled to the US as members of the Lost Boys of 
Sudan community in the early 2000s, and have since participated in arranged marriages with 
South Sudanese women living in Kenya or Uganda (Patterson 2016). By participating in 
these transnational marriages, these men undertook significant responsibility, as both head of 
their household and primary family member living in the West, to financially support their 
wives, children, and often their wives’ parents and siblings. This financial responsibility to 
undertake the role that Johnson and Stoll (2008) identify as “global breadwinners” had 
become a priority in their lives, and they were consequently expected to send as much as they 
could to their family members in Africa.  
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 According to David, he tried to send $800 USD (£600 GBP) per month to his wife 
living in Nakuru, a city in western Kenya.46 He claimed that “the rent has to be paid, and 
there is no other food source for them. I also have to support my nieces in Kakuma, but 
unfortunately, I am not able to send as much as I would like, it’s maybe 10-20% of what I 
send to my wife. I have to support my wife, baby, and in-laws first.” David argued that by 
marrying his South Sudanese wife (a choice that many South Sudanese men in the US made 
as an attempt to reconnect with their culture), it was now his responsibility to financially 
support her mother and siblings. Consequently, this responsibility, although manageable, 
made it significantly more difficult to provide for his blood relatives, in this case his nieces’ 
education. 
 Although it was common among the men resettled as refugees in the US to engage in 
transnational marriages in which they undertook significant financial responsibilities, 
members of the South Sudanese diaspora living in the UK discussed a larger variation of 
roles and responsibilities within their transnational networks, specifically to financially 
support their family members in Africa. My participants in the UK immigrated for a variety 
of reasons, not limited to their experiences of war and trauma in South Sudan. Some had 
immigrated as students or working professionals, two came as asylum seekers, and some 
came as tourists and eventually gained permanent residency. These variations in experiences 
as immigrants within the UK correlated to a variety of perceptions about the roles and 
responsibilities within their transnational family networks. 
 Remittance senders in the UK reported a variety of life circumstances and abilities to 
provide for their family members when needed. For example, Jeffery, the master’s student 
                                                     
46 As mentioned previously in this thesis, South Sudanese refugees living in Kenya who could afford 
to live outside of the refugee camp often chose to do so, however, typically illegally. Despite the 
precarious lifestyle, these refugee communities living illegally outside of refugee camps choose to do 
so due to a higher standard of living and the perception of reduced social and economic 
marginalisation. 
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and recent immigrant discussed in the previous chapter, argued that his primary impediment 
to continuing his studies was the pressure to get a part-time job to support his brothers. He 
claimed that “I have been thinking about getting a part-time job because my scholarship is 
barely enough to support me and I have nothing to send to my brothers. I think I could make 
£600 GBP ($800 USD) per month but I would be happy if I could send half that.” After only 
a few months in the UK, Jeffery argued that he was struggling to balance his commitment to 
his studies with that of his responsibility within his family to financially support his brothers 
living in Uganda. 
 When asked whether their family in Africa needed to ask for money to be sent, the 
men and women in this study reported numerous answers. For those who had recently 
immigrated to the UK or the US at the time of their interview, or for those who had a spouse 
still living in Africa, the need for their family to ask for money meant that they were failing 
in their duties to adequately provide for them. For example, Jeffery argued that: 
If I wait for my family to ask for money, then I would never send 
because they would never ask. It’s not appropriate. We don’t do that; it 
is just something that you know that you are supposed to do. My 
brother could call and talk for hours, but he would never ask for money 
because he knows that if I had it then I would send it. I just need to 
sense that they need it. Whatever extra I have I will send anyways. It is 
not culturally appropriate to ask. 
 
Jeffery stressed the point that families provide for one another within their culture, and to not 
do so when one has the ability means ignoring their culturally established bonds of kinship, 
responsibility, and trust. 
 Similarly, David recounted his financial responsibilities to support his two younger 
brothers through their secondary education after he was first resettled to the US. He claimed 
that “I trusted them because they knew how to spend their money wisely. I would think they 
were starving and I wanted to support them and they would say they could last a few more 
days. I never had to give them anything extra and they were ok with that.” In David’s case, as 
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in Jeffery’s above, the process of sending money was dependent on both the sender being 
aware when their family might need money as well as the responsibility of the remittance 
recipients to budget the money wisely, suggesting that trust is central to the sustainability of 
these relationships. 
 Several men and women in the UK claimed that they often only sent money when it 
was specifically requested. The fact that all of these participants had lived in the UK since the 
1990s and their nuclear family members lived with them was a significant factor in their 
decreased sense of responsibility when compared to participants who were either recent 
immigrants or who had spouses and children to financially support transnationally. The 
members of their family in Africa that they supported were typically their cousins, nieces and 
nephews, and adult siblings who were no longer in school or university. Daniel, a medical 
doctor living in Leeds, claimed that “the money that my family asks for are specific requests. 
Whatever little we are able to help we try to send.” Although each of these participants 
maintained regular communication with their family in Africa, their lives had become firmly 
rooted in the UK. Consequently, the needs of their transnational family members were less 
apparent or were perceived to be less important.  
 This trend in the difference between these two groups of remittance senders (recent 
immigrants/transnational nuclear family and established immigrants with only extended 
transnational family) aligns with both Carling and Hoelscher’s (2013) and Stark’s (1978) 
theories on the relationship between integration and remittance sending patterns. The former 
group were largely based in the US, identified as members of the Lost Boy community, and 
specifically sought to engage in transnational marriages to increase their connection to their 
culture that they became disconnected from as children. In this case, greater integration into 
their host nation and increased social/economic mobility correlated to greater transnational 
participation, an amplified sense of responsibility, and an enhanced ability to send 
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remittances, as suggested by Carling and Hoelscher (2013). However, established immigrants 
living largely in the UK, who considered themselves as economic migrants rather than 
refugees, and whose only transnational connection was with extended family members, 
expressed a significantly decreased sense of responsibility despite often being financially 
stable, thereby confirming Stark’s (1978) hypothesis.  
 The exceptions to this trend were single men who were relatively recent immigrants 
to both the UK and US. As demonstrated above by Jeffery’s account and David’s past 
experience a decade previously, as young single men they had an ability to earn an income 
that their brothers were incapable of earning as refugees living in Kenya and Uganda. From 
the perspective of these two men, the ability and responsibility to provide financial support to 
younger siblings were intertwined, specifically to aid them through their education, an 
important investment that most participants in this study emphasised as being necessary and 
which will be discussed further in Chapter 8. 
 In the cases of decreased responsibility and attachment among my participants living 
in the UK, the perception of duty to help had altered from just knowing when their family 
members needed help, argued to be culturally appropriate in South Sudanese kinship 
networks, to only helping when requests were made for specific needs. I believe that these 
differences in perceptions of need and appropriateness to request money were simultaneously 
dependent on their relative attachment to their traditional culture, their length of time in their 
new host nation, and the nature of their transnational family networks.  
 Among the transnational participants of these communities, trust that remittances 
would be used wisely was a common concern. According to several men in this study, trust 
was earned when both parties knew that the remittances were being spent wisely, ideally 
lasting longer than remittance senders expected. Two women in the UK also mentioned that 
they often suggested that their family receiving money engage in communal meals to save 
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money, and stockpile canned goods in order to prepare for inevitable hardship in the future. 
These women claimed that since they worked hard for this money, they needed to ensure that 
every penny was used wisely and that their family could survive until they could send again. 
 Due to the high cost of living in both the UK and the US, all of my remittance sender 
participants reported that at some point in the past they had been unable to provide the money 
needed by their family members in Africa. According to Daniel, over the years he has had to 
restrict his financial commitments to his family abroad to only funding children’s school 
tuition and various medical emergencies. He argued that school fees are manageable because 
they are a predictable expense. Medical emergencies, however, are always unexpected, often 
costlier than anticipated, and need to be acted upon urgently. Daniel claimed that “of course 
there are times when I cannot send money right away. I just have to tell them ‘not now’ and 
ask them to wait. Sometimes we ask them to wait a couple of weeks to see if their condition 
improved and see if we are in a better position to help.” In Daniel’s case, he had to balance 
his personal financial security with that of the health concerns of his family members in 
Africa. 
 In the case of urgent situations in which money needed to be sent immediately, but 
they lacked the funds, three participants reported having borrowed money in the past from 
friends, neighbours, and co-workers. Nadia, a 29-year old former asylum seeker living in 
London, said that although she was unemployed at the time of her interview, she previously 
used this method with other immigrants at her place of work. She described how “once a 
week a group of women would get together and talk about the needs of our family members 
abroad, and we would try to help each other by lending money to the ones that needed it. This 
would all be paid back on payday and then we would start again.” Nadia claimed that she had 
not participated in this group since she lost her job a year previously, but she was confident 
that once she had a reliable income she could find a similar group.  
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 David recounted a similar support system that had been developed among the Lost 
Boy community living in San Jose. All of these men grew up together in Kakuma refugee 
camp, and developed a similar familial support system after their resettlement to the US. 
David claimed that:  
We all lived together for years. We worked as much as we could and 
went to school. We needed to support each other…We all had similar 
responsibilities [to support our family in Africa] and we helped each 
other when we could. If there was an emergency, we would [pool] 
together our money with the understanding that it would be paid back 
when possible. 
 
 Since financial resources were so limited and valuable within these communities, 
remittance senders often went to great lengths to maximise the cost-efficiency of sending 
money to Africa. Although money transfer companies like Western Union, Money Gram, and 
Dahabshill were often used, many participants also tried to utilise their social resources when 
possible. Several men and women in the UK reported having a bank account in either Kenya 
or South Sudan, in which the cost of transferring money would be significantly cheaper. 
Diane, first introduced in Chapter 5, said that she also always tries to keep emergency funds 
with a family friend living in Nairobi. Diane argued that: 
I know I can trust this person. I will say ‘keep this money here in case 
there is an emergency.’ When I get a call from one of my family 
members for an emergency, I will call this friend and ask him to send 
them the money. This is someone I know that even if they spend the 
money then they will pay it back. This is safer because sometimes 
those money transfer shops will take the money and keep it, and 
sometimes they send it too late.  
 
In this case, Diane utilised existing social networks beyond her family within the nation to 
which she sends money. Sending money within Kenya would account for a fraction of the 
cost when compared to sending from the UK, but it also ensured that she always had a safe 
emergency fund when her family needed it the most. 
 Similarly, five of the participants in this study claimed that they tried to send money 
when they knew that a family member or friend was traveling from the US/UK to either 
 158 
South Sudan, Kenya, or Uganda. Jeffery said his friend living in London was planning on 
returning to South Sudan and that he was trying to earn enough money to give to his friend to 
distribute to his family once he was home. 
I trust him completely. We grew up together, are from the same village, and 
went to school together. Before he leaves next week, I want to give him £500. 
If I give him this money, I know that he will deliver it to my father in Juba, 
who will then distribute it to the rest of my family. I know that it is not 
uncommon for people in our culture to do this. We trust each other. If 
someone is already going home, then it is no extra cost to them, and I get to 
provide my family with more money. 
 
In the case of this study, the sending of financial remittances meant understanding the costs 
of services and utilising cost-effective methods. In many circumstances, the best method for 
sending money to their family members in Africa was through the utilisation of established 
social networks such as those demonstrated above. 
 Participants in this study reported a wide variety of time frames and amounts in which 
they sent remittances to their family in Africa. For the men in this study whose wives were 
living in either Kenya or Uganda, they typically tried to send remittances monthly, ranging 
from £400-600 GBP ($530-800 USD) per month. Although these figures were reported to be 
ideal for recent immigrants (those who had moved to the US/UK within the last five years), 
as students or asylum seekers/resettled refugees, their ability to send this money was 
restricted by their limited earning potential. Other participants claimed to only send 
remittances every two or three months, primarily to pay for school tuition fees and medical 
emergencies. In these circumstances, participants reported sending £50-350 GBP ($65-500 
USD) every three months, primarily for specific requests rather than the general cost of living 
for their family members they were supporting.  
 Within the data collected for this study, there is an important distinction that must be 
made, identifying two separate and distinct perceptions of responsibility to provide 
financially for remittance senders’ family members in Africa. As suggested earlier in this 
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chapter, this divide could be made between those who have a stronger attachment to their 
traditional culture, and thus their immediate/nuclear family who lived in Africa at the time of 
their interview, and those who have developed a stronger connection to their life in the UK or 
US and therefore have adopted more Western or individualised perceptions of responsibility. 
Therefore, for remittance senders, their willingness to send remittance to support their family 
in Africa was dependent on the nature of their transnational relationships, and thus their 
connection to their traditional culture, rather than simply their level of integration into their 
host nation.  
 Those who identified more strongly with their South Sudanese culture had all either 
recently immigrated to the UK/US or had a spouse who continued to live in Africa, and in 
most cases returned to Africa regularly when financially possible. In these cases, participants 
argued that they were their families’ primary financial provider and that they willingly 
accepted this role. As demonstrated in this section, these participants argued that it was their 
responsibility to not only provide for their families’ financial welfare but also to innately 
know when they are in need of money.  
In comparison, the men and women whose primary social sphere was in their current 
nation of residence, and who self-identified as British or American, did not suggest that they 
were their families’ primary financial provider. In these cases, participants argued that they 
positioned themselves as a last resort and were only willing to send remittances for specific 
reasons such as school fees or medical emergencies. As the lives of these men and women 
became more fully integrated into their nation of residence, their attachment to their culture 
slowly diminished and their perceptions of responsibility were altered to reflect their new 
culture. 
 Therefore, the willingness to send remittances correlated more to the strength of my 
participants’ relationships with their family in Africa rather than their degree of integration, 
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or even their ability to send. In many cases, those who only sent money in response to 
specific requests were much more financially stable compared to those who accepted a 
greater degree of responsibility within their family. For this reason, I believe that the 
motivation to send money was only minimally influenced by their ability to send. The 
immigrants’ attachment to their culture and the type of relationships developed and 
maintained with their transnational counterparts were much stronger influences.  
 
6.2 Sharing Community Resources 
 
 This section aims to explore the social pressures on remittance recipients within 
Kakuma to share remittances with extended family members, friends and neighbours. I 
believe that these social expectations to share resources when there is a need and ability to do 
so are interrelated with the same motivations and pressures for the remittances to be sent in 
the first place. The majority of the participants in this study emphasised that it is their 
responsibility to support their family if they have the ability. Along transnational lines, family 
was more clearly defined in biological or legal terms such as spouse, mother/father, 
brother/sister, cousin, aunts/uncles, and nieces/nephews. In Kakuma refugee camp, however, 
these lines of kinship were transformed to represent shared experiences of bondedness and 
survival in addition to biological relatedness. 
 In response to shared experience of trauma and deprivation within the camp, explored 
further in Chapter 7, extended family, friends and neighbours within Kakuma had learned to 
rely on one another in order to ensure the collective survival of the group. In the case of 
Kakuma’s South Sudanese community, financial stability was measured by the ability to 
survive each day. Even if a participant claimed to be financially or materially stable at the 
time of their interview, their survival in the future was highly dependent on their established 
social networks. The majority of the men and women who participated in this study from 
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Kakuma argued that they needed to provide what little they had to their neighbours who had 
nothing so that when they inevitably had nothing in the future they would similarly be 
supported.  
 These conditions created a unique culture that had developed in Kakuma in which 
traditional South Sudanese notions of kinship and responsibility had altered to meet the needs 
of life as refugees within this camp. There were several influences that this emerging culture 
had on the people who participated in it. Foremost, community members were separated into 
“good” and “bad” people based on their willingness to share financial and material resources 
when their community knew that they had the ability to do so and when their friends and 
neighbours needed it the most. Secondly, due to this heightened sense of bondedness, 
virtually everyone within their tribal community in the camp was their brother or sister, 
mother or father, dependent on age and seniority within their community. Finally, the effect 
that remittances had on the livelihood development of the individual remittance recipients in 
Kakuma was minimal since remittances were expected to be shared with their community 
around them. In this case, the introduction of remittances into this community acted as a form 
of welfare stabiliser, distributed to community members who needed it the most, but rarely 
enabling the recipients to develop their livelihood in a sustainable manner. 
 Among Kakuma’s South Sudanese population, family was an ambiguous term, 
virtually synonymous with community and embodied a sense of bondedness that had 
arguably been developed through shared experiences of deprivation. In many instances, 
members of this community introduced me to their brother or sister, daughter or son, only for 
me to discover that these relationships were not built on blood ties but rather based on their 
friendship and loyalty to one another. For example, Simon, a 40-year-old quality control 
manager for Kakuma’s school system, explained to me that: 
Brother does not necessarily mean that you share the same parents, but you are 
from the same people. We are one family, and we are responsible for one 
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another. I have to be my neighbour's keeper because we are all equal. When 
they don't have [food], we must share what little I have together. 
 
These fictive kin relationships and terminology, much like biological kin within this 
culture, symbolised solidarity, mutual support, and responsibility, and was argued to be 
crucial for their continued survival. In the extreme conditions of Kakuma that threatened 
daily survival, it was the expectation of the community that individuals and families share 
what they have with the less fortunate members of the community. A 46-year-old builder 
named Charles said that: 
When someone is arrested, I contribute [money to pay the police bribe]. If 
someone says ‘I don't have shoes,’ then I can give. This builds your 
relationships with the good people around you. We don't just share money and 
things; we share our problems. If you do not do these things, then you have no 
relationships, and you have no one to support you when you need something. 
 
This culture of willingness to share resources, and distinguishing community members 
between “good” and “bad” people, was a common theme discussed throughout most of my 
interviews in Kakuma. Sharing community financial and material resources was often 
described as the sharing of problems. 
 The men and women of this community often talked about “good” and “bad” people 
when discussing remittances and common expenditures. People would say “how can I eat if I 
know my neighbours have not eaten for three days?” Paul, the Nuer pastor and community 
leader introduced in Chapter 5, argued: 
Of course, it is difficult to share what little we have but that is our society. 
You cannot suffer here while someone has something. You must support the 
community otherwise many of us would have perished. So many of us don’t 
have relatives and support outside of Kakuma. If a family is struggling, my 
wife and I will discuss what we can give them because we cannot let them 
die. How could you let a friend suffer and die while you survive? We must 
divide what little we have and pray that it all works out. 
 
From Paul’s perspective, the survival of the community as a whole was dependent on the 
willingness of each able community member to look after the collective. “Bad” people were 
consequently identified as those who were known to have financial and material resources 
 163 
but refused to share these resources beyond their immediate family. Since “bad” people 
looked out for themselves, when they eventually needed help their community were less 
likely to support them. 
 When asked how their friends and neighbours knew that they received money from 
family members abroad, participants would often say that they could be seen shopping in the 
market, that their children were bathing with soap, or that they were eating more meals per 
day than plausible if their only income were their WFP food rations or a refugee salary. 
Mama, the elderly woman first introduced in Chapter 5, said that “I need my neighbours’ 
help going to pick up the money because I do not speak Swahili. I also need help getting food 
from the market. Everyone around me knows that I get money from my sons in the US.”  
 John, the university student living in Nairobi also previously introduced in Chapter 5, 
told me that he participated in a more formal community support system. He said that the 
“South Sudanese in Nairobi belong to this community group where we each pay 1000 KSH 
(£8 GBP) per month. As members of this organisation, they help us when we desperately 
need money for things like tuition fees, medical fees, or food.” A few participants in Kakuma 
said that these organisations were common within their culture, but in the camp, it was too 
difficult to organise a sustainable version due to the unpredictable income of its community 
members. Instead of paying a membership fee each month, members of this community 
simply asked themselves whether they had the ability to help someone in need. 
 Ability to help their community members through the provision of financial and 
material resources was interpreted in a variety of ways, mirroring to some extent the same 
position and sense of responsibility experienced by the remittance senders in this thesis. 
Some people told me that they could not justify having food for a week, when their friends 
and neighbours had obviously not bathed or eaten for several days. Some people said they 
only tried to help their extended family, specifically anyone remotely related to them by 
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blood or marriage. Finally, others argued that their family only pooled together resources for 
a community member in the case of a medical emergency when the refugee clinics were 
incapable of treating a life-threatening but reasonably affordable condition such as malaria. 
 Although it was not perceived to be sharing resources by the participants in this study, 
all of the men and women who identified themselves as leaders within their community 
helped their friends and neighbours through actions as well as through the provision of 
financial and material resources. For example, Paul organised youth leadership workshops, 
and actively confronted authority figures when a member of his community was imprisoned 
for reasons he believed were unjustified. Similarly, Isaac, discussed further in Chapter 7, was 
fostering 14 teenage boys at the time of his interview. He said that “they have been here ten 
years. It’s difficult parenting so many teenagers, but if they were not here, they would be on 
the street.” The actions of these men were not uncommon within this community. They 
argued that they were luckier than most because they had jobs and wives to support their 
choices, and that it was their responsibility to help those who could not help themselves. 
 Within this emerging culture of sharing community resources, many participants 
suggested that it is not appropriate to ask for money or material resources from community 
members. Similar to Jeffery and David’s experience outlined in section 6.1 of this chapter, 
refugees in Kakuma argued that it was their responsibility as members of their community to 
recognise when someone needs help and to offer what they can when they can. Rachel, a wife 
and mother of three small children, argued that “we are all refugees, we all live the same life. 
We are all starving. It is our responsibility to help the people around us, but if we cannot 
offer then our friends know that we cannot help.” Participation within this community meant 
continuously questioning who needs help, how could one potentially help them, and does one 
have the ability to help them without significantly putting one’s own family at risk in the 
future. 
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 Finally, since open and honest communication and trust were significant factors in the 
sustainability of my participants’ transnational relationships, the need to share remittances 
with other community members in the camp also needed to be disclosed to their transnational 
counterparts. I found that the remittance senders who were most sympathetic to this social 
responsibility were those who used to be refugees in Kakuma themselves. One woman in 
California named Claire, who was a former remittance recipient turned sender, described the 
expectations of her community in Kakuma. “Our neighbours would know when we got 
money, they would ask for a little to help with their rations. Because I had something and 
they had nothing I needed to share.” Claire described how her husband who lived in 
California at the time was aware of this responsibility and accepted it as part of the conditions 
of living in Kakuma. 
 I believe that remittances under these conditions have a much wider reach than most 
outsiders expect, but also that the ability of these remittances to significantly influence 
livelihood development is marginal. In the case of the South Sudanese community of 
Kakuma refugee camp, remittances created a ripple effect for the receiving community. The 
welfare of the remittance recipients was significantly improved through the provision of 
financial resources for food and medicine (discussed further in Chapter 7); however, in order 
to remain a valuable participant within their community, remittance recipients were also 
expected to share any financial and material resources with their friends and neighbours 
around them. Therefore, remittances introduced into this community had a much greater 
influence for the survival of the collective as a whole, and a correspondingly limited 
influence on the personal development of the receiving family. 
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6.3 Conclusion 
 The flow of remittances through transnational networks and within Kakuma itself was 
facilitated by strong notions of kinship, responsibility and trust. In general, both remittance 
senders and recipients believed that it was their responsibility to financially help those who 
they identified as family with social, financial, and material resources when they have the 
ability. Since all of the remittance senders in this study lived in wealthy nations at the time of 
their interview, it was assumed by both sides of these relationships that they would be 
financially responsible for the members of their family who were incapable of supporting 
themselves. Therefore, these relationships were based on a system of trust that family 
members outside of Africa would provide what they could when they could. Similarly, 
remittance senders needed to trust that their recipients would spend these financial resources 
wisely and only ask for money when absolutely needed. 
 Although this was the ideal situation for most of the participants in this study, the 
actual ability to adhere to these traditional cultural notions of responsibility and trust was 
dependent on several factors. For remittance senders, their willingness to send remittances to 
support their family in Africa was dependent on the nature of their transnational 
relationships, and thus their connection to their traditional culture, rather than simply their 
level of integration into their host nation. In this study, I found a clear correlation between a 
strong sense of responsibility to send remittances with participants who were either recent 
immigrants or established immigrants whose spouse and children were their primary 
transnational relationships. In contrast, participants who could be considered well integrated 
into their host community, specifically in terms of education and employment, but who also 
only had extended family as transnational counterparts, expressed a significantly lower sense 
of willingness to be their families’ global breadwinner.  
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Therefore, I found both Stark’s (1978) Remittance Decay Theory and Carling and 
Hoelscher’s (2013) integration-based theory to be accurate. In both the UK and the US, with 
the exception of three individuals, all of my participants had lived in their host nation for over 
a decade, spoke English, had obtained some form of higher education, and were able to earn a 
livelihood through employment. However, as discussed in section 6.1 of this chapter, those 
who lived in the UK and those who lived in the US held very different perceptions of 
responsibility towards their family, a theme that was more significantly influenced by the 
nature of their transnational relationships and their experiences within the refugee system 
than their level of integration in their current host nation. It is important to note that these 
were general trends, and that the perception of responsibility to transnational family members 
was different for each person. 
 Furthermore, the impact that the remittances had on Kakuma’s transnational 
participants was also strongly influenced by changing cultural notions of family and 
responsibility within the camp itself. In this population, the definition of family was often 
expanded to include anyone within their tribal community within the camp, particularly those 
who were identified as “good” people. Under these conditions, remittance recipients were 
expected to share their financial, material and social resources with their fictive kinship 
network in the same manner that their transnational family members shared with them.  
 Therefore, within both sides of these relationships, I found that participants very 
strongly argued that family takes care of each other when they have the ability. However, 
how participants defined family and ability varied considerably and was highly dependent on 
their experiences in their nation of residence and their attachment to their traditional culture. 
Interestingly, members of the South Sudanese community living in the UK were more likely 
to experience a diminished perception of responsibility to their transnational counterparts, 
while participants in Kakuma held a heightened sense of accountability to not only their 
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family but also their friends and neighbours. The notions of responsibility for the remittance 
senders living in the US who identified as members of the Lost Boy community and who 
typically engaged in transnational marriages were positioned somewhere in between, closer 
to traditional cultural values than the other two groups. For both the remittance senders and 
recipients in this thesis, it was clear these perceptions of responsibility to family, whether 
fictive, legal or biological, had very little to do with financial security and were more strongly 
related to their attachment to their traditional culture as well as their lived experiences of 
insecurity. 
 Due to the expanding notions of kinship among Kakuma’s South Sudanese 
population, often contradicting Western perceptions of relatedness, the impact that 
remittances had on this community was unexpected. According to much of the literature on 
transnational remittances, these flows of economic welfare should have a positive impact on 
the recipients’ livelihood. However, as indicated in this chapter, such impact is dependent on 
the social, economic and political constraints in the receiving nations (Acosta et al. 2015; 
Adams 2006; Adams and Page 2005; De Haas 2005). As discussed in the next two chapters, 
this anticipated outcome for the livelihood development of remittance recipients was part true 
and part false for Kakuma’s transnational participants.  
 For urgent expenses that risked survival, such as access to food or medicine, the 
benefit of these remittances for the recipients of Kakuma was significantly diminished due to 
their responsibility to share their resources with their surrounding community as well as the 
political and economic insecurity prevalent in the camp. Therefore, while the introduction of 
remittances often acted as a ripple effect, ensuring the survival of the collective community, 
on the other hand, it had relatively little impact on the immediate general welfare of the 
original recipients. However, as discussed in Chapter 8, South Sudanese transnational 
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participants in Kenya also put tremendous effort in investing in education, perceived to be the 
livelihood development of the next generation of their family. 
 Although remittance recipients in Kakuma were expected to share their financial and 
material resources with their extended family, friends, and neighbours in the camp, I found 
no evidence to suggest that participants asked for remittances specifically for these reasons. 
Refugees in Kakuma shared what they had available and accessible to themselves and their 
family in the camp, which sometimes included remittances, but did not make requests to 
fulfil these social obligations. Therefore, the survival of the individual was dependent on the 
strength of their personal social network reaching out to friends, family and neighbours in the 
camp as well as transnational social networks developed with their family, and sometimes 
family-like, relationships.  
 The manner in which transnational remittances changed hands within these South 
Sudanese communities was a complicated process. Remittance senders often struggled to 
earn enough money to support their families, and to juggle meeting the demands of their 
family members in Africa with that of their own life in the UK or US. Similarly, once 
remittances reached Kakuma, community members were often aware that a transnational 
participant had received money. Just as it was expected that family members living in the 
West support family who needed help in Africa, remittance recipients in Kakuma who were 
perceived to be more financially stable than other members of their community were thus 
expected to provide financial support. Financial support was clearly justified by perceived 
bonds of kinship, although these perceptions varied drastically between participants living in 
the West and Kakuma, strongly influenced by their attachment to their traditional culture and 
their experiences of shared trauma. 
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Chapter 7: Surviving Daily Crisis Situations through Transnational 
Resources 
 
 The transnational relationships presented in this thesis, and the social and economic 
navigation required to facilitate them, were tools to combat the insecurity that the protracted 
South Sudanese refugees of Kakuma faced on a daily basis. Due to a combination of policies 
which restricted the movement of refugees in Kenya, their inability to work legally, and their 
lack of freedom of speech, members of this population found themselves in an inescapable 
state of refugeeness. Their social and economic marginalisation, a by-product of Kenyan and 
UNHCR policies, ensured that the members of this population remained continuously 
dependent on humanitarian aid until they could achieve one of the UNHCR’s three “durable 
solutions”. 
 This chapter is an exploration of how the transnational participants of Kakuma’s 
South Sudanese population navigated their protracted states of marginalisation, through the 
utilisation of their social networks and community resources, both transnational and local, to 
survive each day. This chapter is divided into three sections, each of which considers a 
prevalent form of insecurity which the participants in this study regularly addressed as being 
a serious impediment to their welfare, and consequently, were the primary expenses for 
which remittances were used.  
 Starting with the most prevalent form of insecurity endured by this population, section 
7.1 examines how the South Sudanese community of Kakuma dealt with the persistent lack 
of food due to an inadequate quantity of rations provided to each family in the camp. 
Similarly, 7.2 looks at both the prevalence of various diseases and illnesses in the refugee 
camp and the inability of the members of this community to access adequate medical 
treatment. Finally, 7.3 explores the vulnerability and violence that the members of this 
community suffered due to harassment by the local police. Although this form of insecurity 
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was the least common of the three, it was the most costly and difficult to combat without 
risking further insecurity for their family and community as a whole. 
 Kakuma is administered by a combination of limited governance by the local county 
and police in collaboration with the Department of Refugee Affairs operated by the Kenyan 
government, in addition to several international aid organisations led by the UNHCR (Betts 
et al. 2018b; Refugee Consortium of Kenya 2012). Bram Jansen (2013:116) argues that the 
UNHCR and their implementing partners can be classified as a “pseudo-government” 
attempting to uphold international human rights-based laws. Their role in Kakuma is to 
supervise and coordinate refugee services and policy enforcement (Verdirame 1999). 
Security is enforced through a combination of Kenyan private security officers, UNHCR 
protection officers, the local police force, and refugee-led security teams. 
 Physical insecurity for refugees in Kakuma is a daily struggle. According to the 
World Food Programme (2017), the primary supplier of food rations for refugees in Kakuma, 
in 2017 they were facing critical levels of insufficient funding to adequately feed refugees in 
Kenya. This resulted in refugees in Kakuma only receiving 70% of their required calories per 
day. Consequently, for refugees who lack economic capital or a livelihood to support their 
families, food insecurity in the form of malnutrition and near-starvation are commonplace 
(Betts et al 2018a; Verdirame 1999; World Food Programme 2017).  
 Many refugees in Kakuma suffer from malaria, various infections, parasites and 
pneumonia, in addition to the occasional outbreak of typhoid and cholera (Bayoh et al. 2011; 
Just et al. 2018; Verdirame 1999). This population is theoretically entitled to free medical 
treatment from two camp hospitals, run by the Red Cross and the International Rescue 
Committee (IRC); however, in her thesis on the coping strategies of South Sudanese women 
living in Kakuma, Gladden (2012) indicates that several of her participants argued that the 
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treatment received at the free clinics for refugees was rarely enough and expressed high 
levels of dissatisfaction for the medical service available to them.  
 Newhouse (2015) argues that the macroscale policies of encampment, humanitarian 
management, and resource restrictions have had violent effects on displaced populations 
dependent on humanitarian aid.47  Verdirame (1999: 75) suggests the UNHCR and other 
humanitarian aid agencies in Kenya manage refugee camps in ways which seem to be in 
“blatant disregard of international human rights standards” by compromising their 
responsibility to protect refugees and shifting their priorities in humanitarian situations. In the 
context of Kakuma refugee camp, Newhouse (2015) maintains that violence has become a 
by-product of various practices and actors which police the physical and symbolic boundaries 
of the camp. These restrictions constrain the legal pathways available to refugees in Kakuma 
to combat their insecurity and their “persistent precarity” (Newhouse 2015: 2293). Illicit 
activities, such as the selling of food rations, become a strategy to 1) improve their standard 
of living, and 2) contest the inadequacy of humanitarian assistance in the refugee camp.  
 Betts et al. (2018b) suggest that refugees in Kakuma are forced to rely on their close 
social networks to supplement their lack of food or medicine within the inadequate 
humanitarian system upon which refugees have become dependent. The structural violence 
that refugees witness every day, as suggested by Newhouse (2015), has been developed as a 
consequence of the violence built into the foundation of Kakuma’s camp operations. The vast 
majority of refugees remain completely dependent on an insufficient amount of food rations, 
contributing to widespread poverty and an ingrained sense of helplessness (Bartolomei et al. 
2003; Betts et al. 2018b; Crisp 2002; Ossome 2013; Verdirame 1999). The establishment of a 
                                                     
47 Newhouse (2015: 2293) defines violence as “practices (brutal acts) that cause direct harm to 
humans. Those harms have to be understood in physical, symbolic, cultural and emotional terms….it 
is also critically important to draw the lines of connection between the often less visible routine, 
ordinary, and normative everyday violence…and the eruptions of extraordinary, pathological, 
excessive, or gratuitous violence.” 
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strong family network is essential for daily survival, especially for those without capital to 
protect themselves from abuse.  
 Prejudice and corruption by the police, local offices of government, and in the legal 
system are some of the most significant problems that refugees in Kakuma face. Hope (2018) 
argues that the Kenyan police have consistently been identified as the most corrupt institution 
in the nation, representing a systematic failure of governance. Hope defines police corruption 
in Kenya as bribery, “extortion, robbery, burglary, theft, or overzealous policing with the aim 
of personal advancement” (Hope 2018: 85). Furthermore, Kumssa (2015) argues that the 
people who suffer the most from police corruption in Kenya are the poor, refugees, and those 
who live in slum areas, specifically because they lack the economic or political power to 
defend themselves. Being a refugee in Kenya means that you are often subjected to arbitrary 
arrests and detainment unless you have money to bribe the police (Betts et al. 2018b; Refugee 
Consortium of Kenya 2012; Rogers 2017; Verdirame 1999). Consequently, poor refugees in 
Kenya are particularly vulnerable to harassment, while others can use their financial stability 
to act freely and manipulate law enforcement to act in their favour. 
 The transnational participants of Kakuma’s South Sudanese community were the 
lucky ones. They had additional social and economic resources available to them in times of 
extreme emergency and/or to supplement the food and medicine needed to live a relatively 
stable lifestyle. Although the literature suggests that remittances sent to developing nations 
increase the ability of recipient communities to develop their livelihood, some authors argue 
that this is largely dependent on their economic, social and political constraints (Acosta et al. 
2015; Adams 2006; Adams and Page 2005; De Haas 2005). Due to the regular states of 
insecurity that the members of this population found themselves in as victims of policy, 
explored further in this chapter, transnational remittances did little to develop their livelihood 
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but rather acted as a welfare stabiliser, ensuring the survival of both the receiving family and 
often their surrounding friends and neighbours.  
 While King and Lulle (2016: 97-98) suggest that transnational remittances have the 
capability of contributing to the “survival and progress” of the receiving families, I found that 
due to this population’s “persistent precarity” (Newhouse 2015: 2293) in their daily lives, 
remittances did little to aid in the livelihood development of the recipients.48 In the case of 
Kakuma’s South Sudanese community, while remittances contributed towards the survival of 
the receiving families, I found that progress was stalled due to their vulnerability as refugees 
in addition to the social, economic and political restrictions placed on their lives. As 
suggested by Vargas-Silva (2017) and Van Hear and Cohen (2017), remittances in the 
context of this refugee population acted as a lifeline for the recipients, often meaning the 
difference between life and death. 
 
7.1 Food Insecurity 
 Despite the remoteness of the refugee camp, Kakuma’s market neighbourhoods 
flourished with food goods ranging from fresh vegetables, grains, meats, and sweets. 
Although these markets offer the perception of food security, their goods come at a price that 
the poorest members of the community can hardly afford to pay. Furthermore, despite being 
the longest resident inhabitants of the camp, Kakuma’s South Sudanese community’s market 
presence was virtually non-existent compared to the camp’s Somalian, Ethiopian, and 
                                                     
48 As discussed in the next chapter, the exception to this pattern was the investment in education, 
primarily those considered to be the next generation within their families. However, even in the case 
of investing in education, I found that these efforts often only contributed to further insecurity, and for 
the members of this community who continued to live inside of the refugee camp rarely contributed to 
a sustainable standard of living. 
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Congolese populations.49 
 However, all refugees are entitled to food rations distributed by the World Food 
Programme (WFP) in association with the UNHCR. Once a month, refugee families in 
Kakuma will queue outside of the WFP’s food distribution centre as early as 5am. As the day 
goes on, this line can continue outside of the centre’s courtyard and along the street. In a 
single day, tens of thousands of people will be asked to show identification in the form of 
their UNHCR manifest and will be distributed their family’s monthly food rations. At the 
time of my stay in Kakuma between November 2017 and July 2018, most families reported 
that they received between 1 and 3 kilograms of a grain such as maize or sorghum on a 
monthly basis. Depending on the size of each family, this worked out to be 11 to 20 grams 
per person per day. These grains were supplemented with oil, a small amount of sugar, and 
some firewood. For the vast majority of the South Sudanese community in Kakuma, these 
food rations were their primary, and in many cases their only, food source. 
 One afternoon I met a 19-year-old secondary school student, John, who was born in 
and had lived his entire life inside Kakuma. When asked about food, John explained that the 
shortage of food was a part of daily life for the members of his community. He argued that 
the rations were “never enough.” 
People always have problems; they just have to eat smaller every day, and 
then the food runs out. That is what the UN gives; there are so many refugees 
so they must give us smaller amounts. A family cannot survive on it. If you do 
not have enough people supporting you, or even only one person supporting 
you, the money you get will always be used for food rather than other 
expenses. 
 
                                                     
49 Betts et al. (2018b) argue that refugees face greater restrictions than the host community concerning 
access to banking institutions and loans, and therefore entrepreneurship is highly dependent on family 
and savings for credit. These authors suggest that the lower market presence of the South Sudanese 
community of Kakuma is due to their recent arrival compared to other nationalities; however, this 
does not account for the population examined in this study. Of the South Sudanese that I 
communicated with in Kakuma, many saw more value in investing in education (further explored in 
Chapter 8) than in the development of businesses, especially when compared to other nationalities 
represented in Kakuma. 
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For John and many other refugees in Kakuma who were born and raised in the camp, 
food insecurity was all they had ever known. Like many other educated young adults 
in Kakuma, after secondary school John anticipated being employed as a teacher in 
the camp by the Lutheran World Federation (LWF), one of the many aid 
organisations in Kakuma. His monthly salary as a refugee in Kenya would likely be 
7,000 KSH per month, equivalent to $70 USD (£53 GBP), a fraction of the wage that 
a Kenyan national would make for the same job. Once he begins to work, he will be 
expected to undertake financial responsibility for his extended family in Kakuma, 
similar to the responsibilities assumed by his transnational family members living in 
the US. Consequently, virtually all of his salary will be used to buy food for his 
family, leaving almost nothing for other emergency situations or livelihood 
investment. 
 Although all of my participants agreed that the monthly food rations that they 
received from the WFP were not enough to support their entire family for a whole month, 
their survival techniques varied depending on their resources available and their social 
networks both within and outside of Kakuma. At the time of my arrival, the WFP was in the 
early stages of launching a new programme called Bamba Chakula, a Swahili phrase loosely 
translating to “get food.” Bamba Chakula was a mobile money system aimed to give refugees 
the right to choose their food and to have the opportunity to buy what they wanted rather than 
simply being given rations. Instead of waiting in line on distribution day, the head of a 
refugee family would receive the money electronically on their phone, a resource that could 
be used at one of the many approved refugee-run shops around the camp, thus stimulating the 
economy.  
 For many families, this new project was flexible enough to temporarily prevent food 
insecurity, particularly for those who knew that they would eventually receive remittances. 
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Nyjuok, a 35-year-old woman who cared for her seven children and husband, was at the time 
of her interview one of a handful of refugees who were chosen to launch this programme. 
Nyjuok claimed that: 
If we are short [on food], we can go to a local shop and borrow food for a few 
days, especially if it is close to the distribution day. Then our Bamba Chakula 
will come to our phone, and the owner of the shop will deduct what we owe. 
We usually get 2,400 shillings (£18.25 GBP) for our family of nine people for 
one month. 
  
In this case, Nyjuok managed to utilise both the flexibility of the WFP’s new food 
distribution project and her neighbourhood shop owner's trust that she would pay him back. 
Although Nyjuok managed to feed her family, since her survival technique was dependent on 
a system of credit, she had to find additional income elsewhere, or she would remain in a 
state of indebtedness and near starvation. Nyjuok held a strong belief that her sister, currently 
living in the US, would eventually send remittances to mitigate this cycle. 
 Careful utilisation of their social resources through family connections and 
networking abilities, as well as financial resources gained through humanitarian aid projects 
and remittances, enabled the refugees in this community to survive their persistent states of 
food insecurity. For example, Isaac, a 36-year-old man who had been working in a cafeteria 
in one of the NGO compounds, had negotiated a deal with his Ethiopian refugee employer. 
Isaac was supporting his wife, his two children, his brother's wife, and her son, in addition to 
14 orphans that he had taken in 10 years previously. Isaac's monthly wage for working 60 
hours per week was only 5000 KSH (£35 GBP), but he was also entitled to take home any 
leftover food from his place of work at the end of the day, thanks to his long-standing 
friendship with his employer. Although he did not have the money to buy clothes, shoes, and 
school supplies for 17 children, he at least he ensured that his family were able to eat every 
day. Though Isaac’s only transnational connection was for extreme medical emergencies, he 
was more fortunate than most of his neighbours in the fact that he and his family were 
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relatively food secure due to his personal relationships.  
 Lucas, a 38-year-old married man who had nine children and fostered three others, 
employed different tactics when his family ran short on food by utilising his strong kinship 
ties to community members in South Sudan. For example, Lucas stated that: 
For one family, [the WFP] gives us 2 kilos. It does not take very long to feed 
your family and finish this. Then I must go looking for something else. I must 
communicate with my siblings in South Sudan and request that they sell a cow 
and send me the money so that I can buy food. That is how we must survive 
here. 
 
To make up for the lack of available resources for his family, Lucas was required to rely on 
his ability to maintain strong relationships with his family in his home nation and trust that 
they would support him and his family in Kakuma when he needed it the most. 
 When his family in South Sudan were unable to sell a cow, Lucas would contact his 
friend Albert currently in Australia. According to Lucas, he had lived with Albert in Kakuma 
for over ten years; as members of the Lost Boy community, they had survived a multitude of 
traumatic experiences together as unaccompanied minors within the refugee system. 
However, like many of the original South Sudanese community of Kakuma, their paths 
diverged in the early 2000s. Lucas married and started a family in the camp. His friend Albert 
on the other hand became one of thousands that were resettled to the US, Canada and 
Australia, resettlement programmes that primarily targeted single men. 
 Despite their separation for almost two decades, and lack of any blood relationship, 
Lucas and Albert had created a childhood bond of survival that facilitated a continued 
relationship of mutual dependency. When Lucas has no other option to feed his family, he 
told me that he can always rely on Albert to send him some money. Similarly, Lucas told me 
that Albert expects him to keep him updated about the wellbeing of their childhood 
community still living in Kakuma and their extended family in both the camp and elsewhere 
around the world. I found that through the provision of money to buy food staples like maize, 
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rice, beans, and maybe a little powdered milk, resettled refugees living in the global north 
have the opportunity to fill a much-needed responsibility but these relationships also helped 
them gain valuable insight into the health and wellbeing of their community members that 
they left behind. 
 All of the participants in this study currently living in Kakuma were highly dependent 
on both the humanitarian system and their relationships with their local and transnational 
community to feed their families. Even among the 42 participants who maintained some sort 
of employment in the camp, due to their inability to gain a legal work permit and earn a 
sustainable wage, all expressed concerns about food insecurity due to their perceived 
responsibility to feed their often large and extended families. Remittances sent from family 
and friends in times of food insecurity typically ranged from $50-100 USD (£35-75 GBP), 
and frequencies ranged from only at Christmas to once per month, although most people 
claimed that they received money for food every three or four months. 
 As discussed above, the food insecurity that refugees in Kakuma faced during my stay 
was systematically built into the refugee system and was most detrimental for refugees who 
were primarily or completely dependent on the goodwill of aid organisations like the WFP 
and the UNHCR. Their food rations were equivalent to one or two cups of maize porridge a 
day, supplemented by their marginal ability to earn a salary or to receive the occasional 
financial remittance sent by community members abroad. Every man and women who 
participated in this study and lived in Kakuma experienced food insecurity, the degree of 
which was highly dependent on their social skills and ability to maintain meaningful 
relationships with people who might help them survive the next day. 
 For remittance senders living abroad, the provision of financial remittances filled a 
much-needed responsibility to help make life in Kakuma survivable, particularly for the 
poorest members of the camp. However, due to the inconsistency of the amount and 
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frequency of remittances sent to the South Sudanese families in Kakuma, they were only a 
temporary solution to food insecurity, only delaying similar hardship to the near future.50 As 
discussed above in the example of Lucas and Albert, I found that strong transnational 
relationships within the South Sudanese diaspora were not necessarily based on biological 
relatedness. The people who chose to support each other, particularly in times of insecurity, 
did so due to their perceived responsibility to those whom they considered their community, 
often incorporating familial ties but not uncommonly extending beyond those considered a 
blood-relation.   
 The lack of food was only the most common form of insecurity witnessed by the 
refugees of this community. As discussed in the sections below, medical emergencies and 
police harassment, respectively, when coupled with food insecurity and other forms of 
uncertainty, made life in Kakuma a constant state of crisis for the men and women 
represented in this study.  
 
7.2 Medical Emergencies 
 Issues with health and access to adequate medical treatment were a persistent struggle 
for all the refugees in Kakuma who participated in this study, an experience that was 
intensified for the poorest members of the South Sudanese community. In Kenya, refugees 
are entitled to free healthcare provided by NGOs like the IRC and the Red Cross. However, 
these hospitals and clinics are notoriously underfunded and often fail to prevent or treat even 
                                                     
50 It is important to note that refugees typically lived in Kakuma because they had no other choice. 
Several of the remittance senders in this study claimed to send remittances regularly, often monthly, 
to their families living outside Kakuma in urban centres throughout Kenya and Uganda. Although 
these refugee communities are often illegal and particularly vulnerable, those who had the financial 
security to live outside of the refugee camp actively chose to do so.  Therefore, the members of this 
population who continue to live inside of the refugee camp do so because they lack the financial 
security, typically the regular remittances, needed to support their families outside the humanitarian 
aid system. 
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the most common diseases in Kakuma, such as malaria. When discussing their experiences 
with treatment in these free clinics, refugees would explain to me that they were frequently 
not tested for any disease and were more often than not sent home with only paracetamol. 
Participants mentioned bringing their sick family and friends to these hospitals several times, 
but their treatment was entirely dependent on the resources available in the clinic on that 
given day.  
 Scattered throughout the camp and Kakuma Town were dozens of private medical 
clinics, and one that was government operated, with the equipment to test the wide range of 
diseases found in the region as well as the medicine to treat them.51 However, these clinics 
cost money, and while they were physically accessible, they were not affordable to the 
majority of the South Sudanese refugees in Kakuma without help from their local community 
or family and friends abroad.  
 In one instance, I was asked to pay for the treatment of an eight-month-old girl who 
had been suffering from a fever for almost a week and was unable to access treatment in the 
refugee hospital. Her father, James, had called early one morning and asked me to meet him 
in Kakuma Town at one of its many clinics. He then explained that his daughter had been 
sick with a fever for five days. Due to her age and the high mortality rate for small children in 
Kakuma, they had been taking her to the refugee clinic every day. Each time they were told 
that their infant daughter only had a cold. She was never tested for any of the multitude of 
diseases prevalent in the camp, and her vulnerable age and susceptible immune system were 
not prioritised in the free clinic for refugees. It was clear to James and his wife that they 
needed to seek alternative treatment in one of the clinics in town, at a price that neither him 
nor anyone in his community could afford to pay. 
                                                     
51 Some private medical clinics in Kakuma are operated by refugees, others by Kenyan nationals who 
migrated to Kakuma in search of business opportunities.  
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 James was a member of the original Lost Boy population and had been a refugee 
since he was nine years old. Like many other men within this community he had been a 
soldier in various militias in the past few decades, but at the time of his interview was 
volunteering as a pastor in Kakuma. James, who had been one of my key informants, had just 
graduated with a Bachelor’s degree in accountancy but struggled to find paid employment in 
the camp. As one of the more socially connected members of this population, James had 
close friends all over the world due to his involvement in the church. Although he was 
relatively food secure because of these transnational relationships, medical emergencies were 
much more unpredictable and needed to be acted upon very quickly. 
 James had asked me if I would be willing to pay for his daughter’s much-needed 
treatment. I sat in the waiting room with her parents as the doctor tested her blood for known 
diseases in the area until she was eventually diagnosed with malaria and an infection. Her 
treatment, one that probably saved her life, was only 700 KSH (£5.40 GBP). Like many of 
my participants, most of the limited funds that James had access to were used to supplement 
their family’s insufficient food rations. Consequently, medical emergencies like this, 
although anticipated, could not have been prepared for financially.  
 This incident was only the beginning of my experience witnessing the impact that 
malaria had on my participants and their families over the next few months. The months 
between January and April 2018 were plagued by downpours and flooding that facilitated the 
breeding of malarial mosquitoes. Several people referenced this time period as the season of 
sickness in which waterborne diseases, the lack of proper sanitation, and mosquitos were at 
their height. None of the people that I had met who had malaria during my time in Kakuma 
could afford a mosquito net, easily bought for 600 KSH (£4.50 GBP), further escalating the 
deprivation and poverty in this extreme environment. In these cases, extreme poverty and 
social and economic marginalisation were a cyclical pattern that bred illness that then 
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contributed to high rates of mortality and further impoverishment. 
 Although medical emergencies were perceived by the members of this community to 
be inevitable, ultimately their occurrence was unpredictable. For the South Sudanese refugees 
in Kakuma who struggled to feed themselves every day, planning and saving for a medical 
emergency was not a realistic option. When a member of their family became ill, they hoped 
that the refugee clinic was adequately supplied that day and, if it was not, they prayed that a 
family member or friend could send them money so that they could seek treatment elsewhere. 
All of my participants claimed to have been regularly turned away at one of the refugee 
clinics, were often barely seen and rarely tested. According to the men and women in this 
study, paracetamol was the most commonly prescribed drug, expected to treat everything 
from ulcers, malaria, infections, and intestinal parasites to cholera and typhoid.  
 For many refugees who had limited or no income, remittances were the primary tool 
used to combat this institutionalised deprivation. However, the ability to receive remittances 
quickly in an emergency was almost entirely dependent on the ability of remittance senders 
to be prepared for these requests and have money already set aside for these circumstances. 
Unlike in the case of food insecurity, money for medical emergencies needed to be sent 
within a few days, often had to be in much higher amounts, and there was no guarantee that 
the treatment would cure the sickness. The men and women who maintained strong and 
reliable connections with their family and friends in the global north typically received 
money the day after making the request for a medical emergency, while others struggled even 
to contact their loved ones when they needed it most.  
 South Sudanese refugees in Kakuma employed a variety of techniques to convey the 
desperate and urgent need for remittances to treat sickness within their community. While 
some only needed to ask, other participants needed to prove that either they or a loved one 
was actually ill. Isaac, whose methods for securing food were discussed in the previous 
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section, had no family outside of Kenya or South Sudan but had made several close 
international friends who worked and lived in Kakuma at various points in time. One of 
Isaac’s friends was a Dutch pastor who had worked with his community for over five years. 
Several years after this man had left, one of Isaac’s foster children was badly burned on his 
arm, chest, and leg. In order to ask for funds from his old friend, Isaac emailed him a picture 
of the child to prove his need for money to access treatment. This pastor was able to send 
Isaac $150 USD two days later, thus enabling his son to get adequate treatment. 
 During my stay in Kakuma, it was clear that Isaac suffered from cataracts. When I 
asked him about his eye condition, he stated that over a decade previously the IRC took him 
to Kitale in western Kenya to seek treatment. He claimed that this treatment did help initially 
but the condition has gotten worse in recent years. When asked if he thought the IRC would 
send him for specialised treatment again, he argued that “there is no money for refugees 
anymore. If they cannot even feed us, how could they possibly give us the [medical] 
treatment that we need.” Isaac is the only breadwinner in his very large family, ensuring that 
his biological kin and 14 foster children can adequately eat. If this 36-year-old man 
eventually becomes blind because he did not have access to medical treatment, his family 
would lose what little financial stability they have. 
 Family members abroad who have never lived in Kakuma, and were therefore 
ignorant of the conditions within the camp, would simply insist that their loved ones seek 
treatment in one of the many clinics free to refugees rather than requiring them to send 
money. Like many people who had some idea of the resources inside a refugee camp, but 
who had never actually lived as a refugee, they often failed to understand the realities of life 
in Kakuma. All my participants claimed to have sought treatment in these free clinics 
regularly; however, the inadequacy of their treatment required that they seek further help 
from their family members outside of the refugee system. For most of my participants in 
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Kakuma, their ultimate goal was not to live a wealthy lifestyle through the use of 
international or transnational resources, but just to survive their current state of insecurity. 
 On several occasions, parents explained to me that they were unable to access 
treatment for their children in time and were still suffering the consequences. Nyadet 
described how other girls beat up her 14-year-old daughter in school. She was left with an 
untreated concussion and now suffers from memory issues and migraines. Similarly, a 29-
year-old woman named Nyachual told me that a dog bit her nine-year-old son. She explained 
that the refugee hospital gave him pain medication but did not treat him for rabies. 
I asked my cousin [in the US] for money to buy the rabies medicine for my 
son, but she said that she didn't have anything to give. I had to take him back 
to the refugee hospital. The first time they said the medicine was not there and 
then the second time they gave it to him. However, since they waited so long 
he now has mental issues. 
 
Although her son survived, he continues to suffer from seizures and is mentally disabled, 
although neither of these issues had been diagnosed by a medical professional, nor had they 
been treated due to Nyachual’s inability to afford the fees. 
 Several of my participants suffered from chronic issues that had lasted for years. One 
elderly woman told me that she was prone to stomach ulcers that were so painful that she 
would spend entire weeks bedridden. Her adult children living in the camp would take turns 
cooking and feeding her as well as attempting to take her to the nearest refugee clinic where 
she was often given paracetamol for the pain. Occasionally her daughter living in Australia 
would send her $100 USD (£75 GBP) to go to Kakuma Mission Hospital, the only 
government funded clinic in either the camp or the town. Although their treatment plans were 
better than those in the refugee clinic, they would often just give her pain medication. Due to 
the remoteness of the region, even the clinics that cost money had limited testing and 
diagnostic abilities. Unfortunately, this woman’s daughter could not afford to send her 
mother to a hospital in Nairobi to undergo more conclusive testing. As a result, she lives in an 
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almost constant state of pain, hoping for more good days than bad. 
 The men and women in this study suffered a wide range of medical issues, ranging 
from ulcers, cataracts, and arthritis to malaria, rabies, cholera and typhoid. Those who were 
fortunate enough to receive money for medical treatment from family members abroad were 
sent anything from $50 to $200 USD (£35-155 GBP). In general, most of this money was 
spent on medical examinations, tests, and medicine to treat the illness. In some cases, 
participants were instructed by their doctors to feed their sick children milk, a costly luxury 
in Kakuma. Any additional funds were spent on supplementing the limited food rations for 
the rest of their family. 
 As discussed within this section, although food insecurity was more common than 
medical emergencies, the need to seek adequate treatment tended to be a much more urgent 
issue and required more substantial remittances that needed to be readily available and sent 
quickly. Despite the apparent presence of free medical facilities in Kakuma for refugees, they 
often failed to meet the urgent medical issues that all of my participants said that they and 
their families had experienced. In order to supplement the failure of the refugee system to 
adequately provide treatment, the South Sudanese refugees in Kakuma who managed to form 
meaningful transnational relationships sought remittances to pay for treatment available in 
one of the many clinics in either the camp or the town. The ability to quickly secure these 
emergency financial resources meant that they were able to prevent ongoing medical issues 
and avoid more expensive treatment, or even the possibility of sudden death. 
 
7.3 Police Harassment 
 The last significant form of insecurity that the South Sudanese community of Kakuma 
faced was institutionalised harassment by the local Kenyan police force. Throughout Kenya, 
the arrest and detention of refugees was frequently arbitrary, typically based on their 
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ethnicity, their marginalised status in Kenya, and lack of ability to protect themselves from 
Kenyan authority figures. The men and women who had been victims of police harassment 
were typically the refugees who had been living in Kenya for decades rather than victims of 
the most recent civil war. Although there were protection officers employed by the UNHCR 
and other aid organisations to help refugees in such circumstances, access to these officers 
was extremely difficult. Most people in the community had lost their faith in the protection 
system and found ways to utilise transnational remittances and other community resources to 
pay steep police bribes. 
 My first experience with discrimination by the Kenyan police was when I first arrived 
in Nairobi in November 2017. I had arranged to meet James, who was my first introduction 
to Kakuma, and his friend Mark in the city and they agreed to show me around. While 
walking through the bustling crowds of central Nairobi, James’ arm was grabbed by one of 
the many armed police officers stationed throughout downtown. The two spoke angrily in 
Swahili for a minute until finally James was able to rip his arm away and walk off. As the 
police officer tried to do the same thing to Mark, he quickly disappeared into the crowd, 
catching up with James and I a few minutes later. 
 As we sat down for lunch, I asked James what the police officer wanted. James 
claimed that “he was asking for my travel documents. I refused to give them to him because I 
knew that they would not matter.” According to James, Mark and he were immediately 
recognised as non-Kenyan due to their dark skin, tribal scarring on their foreheads, and 
missing front teeth, a traditional coming of age practice among the Dinka. James argued that 
“he knew we were refugees, and thought he could take some money from us as a bribe. In 
Kenya, we are not like you. Even though we are also foreigners, we do not have a 
government to protect us.” Both James and Mark were part of the original Lost Boy 
community and had been living in Kenya as refugees since 1992, occasionally returning 
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home to South Sudan. They both told me that their travel documents were worthless when 
shown to a Kenyan police officer. Money was their only true protection, a resource that the 
majority of the South Sudanese refugees in Kakuma lacked.  
 Over the next nine months in Kakuma, I was forced to deal with the police on several 
occasions. In the attempt to get my friends and neighbours out of jail for their arbitrary 
arrests, I spoke to the local police chief, the refugee camp manager, the local magistrate, the 
Refugee Consortium of Kenya (RCK), and several UNHCR protection officers. On one 
occasion, I helped facilitate the negotiation and payment of a bribe for a group of youth 
leaders who were arrested, ironically, for holding a workshop on peace and reconciliation 
without the permission of the camp manager. When asked about their experience with the 
police, my participants who were familiar with the corruption of Kakuma’s police force 
argued that money for bribes was their only protection. Without financial resources, they 
risked continued detention and possible deportation back to South Sudan. Kakuma’s police 
preyed on the inability of refugees to protect themselves, utilising fear and punishment to 
solicit easy money. 
 My key informant for Kakuma’s Nuer population was Paul, a pastor and active 
community leader. On two occasions, Paul had asked me to help him get members of his 
community out of jail. In both instances, the victims had been detained for crimes they had 
clearly not committed, and were threatened with expulsion from the camp or prosecution 
unless they could pay a large bribe to the police officers who arrested them.  
 The first time Paul had asked for my help he explained that an issue had come up 
concerning his neighbour who he had identified as his family, and as an elder it was his 
responsibility to mediate discussions. The day prior his neighbour was approached by the 
local police accusing him of being in possession of a phone that was stolen from a man in 
Nairobi two years previously. According to the police, the person who stole this phone had 
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beaten its owner into a coma from which he had only recently woken up. This reopened case 
led them to the streets of Kakuma. According to many of his local community members, this 
man named Andrew, who was a 32-year-old primary school teacher, had not left Kakuma 
since 1998 and had bought the phone off of a street vendor in Kakuma Town. 
 The police gave Andrew 48-hours to pay them a bribe of $200 USD (£155 GBP) or 
they would arrest and send him for trial in Nairobi. Even though Andrew, Paul, and their 
entire community knew that he was innocent, no one thought that it was worth the risk to go 
to trial. As refugees in Kenya for decades, they were well aware of the discrimination that he 
would face along the way, and argued that there was no guarantee he would receive a fair 
trial. The consequences for failing to give in to the police’s demand for a bribe meant that he 
would potentially be separated from his family for years, unable to earn an income, and 
possibly be deported back to South Sudan where, as a Nuer, his life might be at risk.   
 Although the UNHCR has protection officers to deal with situations just like this, in 
order to access them, refugees needed to wait in an extremely long line in the blazing hot sun 
outside an UNHCR field post office for hours, or have a special gate pass to get past the 
security guards into the UNHCR compound. Neither of these options ensured that you would 
see a protection officer or that they would be capable of intervening. Issues with the police 
are intentionally made to be time-critical, with immediate deportation threatened unless 
someone in power intervenes or the victims are willing to pay a bribe, so quick action is 
paramount. Although I did help Paul access a protection officer before Andrew was taken 
from Kakuma, his family had long since lost confidence that the UNHCR or the Kenyan legal 
system would protect them from harassment. Andrew and Paul’s community pulled together 
resources, both transnationally from family members abroad and locally from friends and 
neighbours, to pay the bribe demanded by the police. Andrew was then released without 
question.   
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 A month later Paul called me one afternoon and asked if I could help him find 
someone to get a young woman named Rebecca get out of jail. I first met her at the Kakuma 
police station where she and her three-month old baby were being detained. According to 
Rebecca, the police came to her doorstep in search of her husband. They were given orders to 
arrest him and repatriate him back to South Sudan because he had recently criticised the 
South Sudanese government in a Facebook post. Since her husband was currently in Nairobi, 
the police arrested her and her baby for his “crime.” The police had demanded from her 
family a bribe of $2000 USD (£1540 GBP) to release her and her baby.  
 Although Paul and I did not manage to find a UNHCR protection officer, we did use 
my gate pass to get an audience with the Refugee Consortium of Kenya (RCK), an 
organisation funded by the Kenyan government to protect refugees. We sat down with a RCK 
representative as they recorded Paul's account of the event. They said they would look into it, 
but most likely they would not be able to prevent Rebecca’s deportation for her husband’s 
crimes against the South Sudanese government. Neither the UNHCR nor the RCK 
intervened, in this case, to protect Rebecca from her arbitrary detainment and potential 
deportation to South Sudan that risked her and her baby’s lives. 
 Eventually, Rebecca’s family and community were able to negotiate the police bribe 
down to $250 USD (£192 GBP). Luckily she had a brother in Ethiopia and a sister in 
Australia; together they were able to raise the money, send it to Rebecca’s mother in Kakuma 
and release her from her jail cell. After being imprisoned for three days, both Rebecca and 
her infant daughter suffered from malaria and were forced to ask her community for more 
money to pay for their treatment. 
 Based on my experience among Kakuma’s South Sudanese population, harassment by 
the police was fuelled by multiple factors, the most important of which was this community’s 
marginalised status in Kenya and their extreme poverty. Although all refugees in Kakuma 
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were subjected to the often arbitrary will of the Kenyan police, by being the poorest refugee 
population in the camp, the South Sudanese suffered the harshest consequences from an 
enforcement system that demanded money in exchange for their safety. Protection officials 
who were supposed to deter refugee mistreatment were incredibly difficult to access, and 
their ability to intervene was limited. Although harassment by the police was much less 
common than food insecurity or medical emergencies, it often demanded larger sums of 
money from refugees and their family members, and needed to be acted upon urgently. In all 
the examples of arrest that I became involved in and that my participants told me about, 
remittances from family and friends abroad were used to pay bribes to the police. 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
 Each of the three forms of insecurity discussed in this chapter were by-products of the 
failure of the refugee system to promote the welfare of Kakuma’s inhabitants, a reality that 
was intensified by the extreme poverty of its South Sudanese population. These various 
forms of insecurity were institutionalised into the refugee system and affected every family 
represented in this study. In the case of Kakuma’s South Sudanese population, insecurity was 
a consequence of their economic and social marginalisation in a country where they have 
almost no rights to protect them or ability to provide for their families. 
 Although my participants all reported an almost constant state of physical insecurity, 
they each utilised a variety of survival techniques dependent on their social networks and 
limited economic resources. Within this community, the maintenance of strong social 
relationships, both transnationally and locally, was central to each individual and family’s 
ability to endure each day. Under these conditions, remittances sent to the members of 
Kakuma’s South Sudanese community were critical to maintain some semblance of economic 
stability in an environment which preyed on its poorest inhabitants. In the case of this 
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population, remittances meant the difference between whether or not a family would eat that 
week, and whether they would be able to access the medical treatment to cure life-threatening 
conditions, or to avoid harassment by the Kenyan police. As suggested by Vargas-Silva 
(2017) and Van Hear and Cohen (2017), remittances acted as a lifeline for the receiving 
members of this diaspora currently living in Kakuma, often meaning the difference between 
life and death for the participants in this study and their family, friends, and neighbours. 
 In the case of this community, remittance recipients were almost completely 
incapable of developing their livelihoods through the utilisation of their transnational 
resources because of their institutionalised economic and social marginalisation. As discussed 
in the next chapter, although remittances could rarely be used for recipients’ livelihood 
development in the present, the investment in education was the exception to this trend and 
often emphasised as crucial. I found that the dichotomy between the inability of remittance 
recipients to escape their refugeeness, that is their marginalised social and economic status in 
Kenya, and their investment in the next generation created a sense of hopelessness in the 
present but also a belief in a hopeful future. Although none of my participants in Kakuma had 
more than $100 USD (£75 GBP) in savings, and were therefore constantly worried about 
future expenses, virtually all strongly believed that their and their children’s education would 
lead to social and economic security in the future.  
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Chapter 8: Challenging Refugeeness through the Pursuit of Education 
 
 
 The value of education was a strong theme throughout my experience of the South 
Sudanese diaspora in Kakuma, the UK, and the US. As mentioned previously, between 2015 
and 2016 I volunteered for an organisation in California called HwSS which was created to 
help resettled South Sudanese refugees in the US support the refugee children of their 
families through their education. These children were primarily based in Kakuma and were 
sent to boarding schools in Kenya and Uganda. At the time, I underestimated the complexity 
of these transnational relationships and the drive of this resettled refugee community to fund 
the education of their extended family left behind in the refugee camp. The desires of this 
resettled refugee community living in California exceeded their financial capabilities at the 
time, so they creatively used their social networks and faith-based communities to help them 
meet their responsibilities as what Johnson and Stoll (2008) describe as the “global 
breadwinners” within their families. 
 The transnational bonds created between refugees currently living in Kakuma and 
their family members living in Western nations, who have achieved high levels of success 
compared to other refugee populations, have created an interesting dynamic concerning 
education, motivations to pursue it, and expectations after completing it (McKinnon 2008).52 
This chapter explores the role that education played for the South Sudanese community of 
Kakuma, the various ways it has been pursued, and how these aspirations for education have 
been influenced by their transnational relationships with family abroad. In reference to De 
Haas’ (2005) argument that remittances can either lead to economic activity or passive 
dependency depending on various economic, social, or political constraints, I argue that both 
                                                     
52 McKinnon (2008) argues that the 3,500 members of the Lost Boy community who were resettled to 
the US between 2000 and 2001 are considered one of the most successful resettlement programmes in 
US history in terms of rates of employment, education level, and English fluency after resettlement. 
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the aid system and transnational remittances promote a sense of dependency within this 
refugee community due to the incapability of either to support the long-term development of 
this population’s livelihood. However, I pose the question as to whether remittances help 
refugees challenge their sense of refugeeness created by the refugee system. 
 When I first arrived in Nairobi in 2017 to begin my fieldwork, I began to witness the 
importance that remittance recipients placed on the value of education. Mark, a South 
Sudanese refugee sent by HwSS to escort me to Kakuma, took me out to dinner with his 
niece Jessica who was visiting the city during the school break. Jessica had recently 
graduated with top marks from the Morneau Shepell secondary girls school in Kakuma, and 
was then employed as one of their English teachers. Mark and Jessica explained to me that 
she wanted to go to medical school and help her community. Over dinner, we discussed 
university applications, scholarships, visas, and the various ways to gain experience by 
volunteering in the camp.  
 During my time in Kakuma, such discussions about applying to university were 
common among the young adults of the camp’s South Sudanese community. As the youngest 
participants in this study, the 20 men and women aged 18 to 25 years old had all spent the 
majority of their lives in Kakuma, many born within the confines of the camp, and they all 
held a strong interest in pursuing a higher education. On several occasions, after completing 
an interview, my participant’s friends gathered around to ask me questions about university. 
Where do I apply? How do I get accepted? How do I get a scholarship? What could I study? 
 Although I attempted to answer the questions these young adults had about pursuing 
university, the reasons behind these questions were more difficult to understand. As an 
American, a university education and the funding to support it was accessible. I had pursued 
higher education because that was what my culture told me was the logical step to a 
successful career. To this new generation of South Sudanese refugees in Kakuma, however, 
 195 
education was not just a key to a career, it was perceived to be the solution to their and their 
families’ displacement. Furthermore, for the majority of this community gaining access to 
higher education was far from simple. Between an ongoing war in their homeland, the cost of 
tuition, visas, transportation, and the lack of knowledge required for university applications 
and scholarships, these future community leaders were facing much steeper barriers than I 
could have managed at their age.  
 Kirk and Cassity (2007) argue that education programmes within the refugee system 
should be considered a “minimum standard” for the security and wellbeing of a camp’s 
inhabitants in an emergency situation. These authors suggest that in humanitarian 
emergencies, chronic crises, and early post-war reconstruction, education aids in security as 
well as the physical, cognitive and psychological wellbeing of students and their surrounding 
community. According to these authors, although several humanitarian organisations like the 
UNHCR, the LWF, Save the Children, and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) advocate 
for the right to education, there has been “little coordination of these efforts, limited funding 
and no solid foundation of accepted good practice on which to base their interventions in 
humanitarian contexts” (Kirk and Cassity 2007: 51).  
 Supporting Kirk and Cassity’s observation, Meda et al.’s (2012) study on the 
accessibility of education for refugee children in South Africa, argues that this demographic 
is likely to face limited opportunities to enrol into primary and secondary schools due to their 
refugee status. Obstacles preventing access to education include being unable to afford their 
tuition fees in addition to the costs of transport, uniforms and books. Other limitations 
include lacking official documents for children to register with a school or finding that the 
schools accessible to refugees are already full. Meda et al. (2012: 166) suggest that refugee 
children are, therefore, marginalised and denied opportunities due to their refugee status, a 
theme that is “symptomatic of the global refugee experience”. 
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 Between 1983 and 1991, members of the community now described as the Lost Boys 
of Sudan, learned to access and appreciate Western education, a resource that became open to 
them through makeshift schools developed by Christian missionaries in refugee camps in 
Ethiopia (Chanoff 2005; Scott-Villiers et al. 1993). Chanoff (2005: 41) argues that after the 
members of this community settled in Kakuma in 1992 and in the face of their families and 
cultural identities being stripped from them through conflict, displacement, and death, the 
Lost Boys strove to “reconstruct themselves through education.” Finishing secondary school 
enabled these young men to become teachers in the refugee camp, and after their resettlement 
to Western nations like the US, their pursuit of higher education led to employment 
opportunities.  
 Several authors suggest that when remittances are introduced into low and middle 
class communities in developing countries recipients often invest in the education of their 
children in addition to the healthcare and nutrition of the entire family (Acosta et al. 2015; 
Fransen 2015; Munyera and Matsumoto 2016; Salas 2014). In Acosta et al.’s (2015) study, 
the authors found that in extremely impoverished nations, the influx of financial resources in 
the form of remittances significantly influenced children’s access to education, particularly 
when their parents had no or very low educational history. In the context of this thesis, 
education can be included under Sen’s (1999) theory of “Development as Freedom” in which 
economic opportunity enables refugee remittance recipients to make active choices for the 
betterment of their future when education is perceived to be linked to economic stability, 
political liberties, social capital, good health, and further investment in the future of the 
receiving communities.  
 In section 8.1 of this chapter I will describe how for refugees in Kakuma, primary and 
secondary school education was expensive, always requiring fees for uniforms, notebooks, 
pens, and for those who could afford it, tuition, transportation, and boarding. These costs 
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multiplied with each child in the family, and in general exceeded the income accessible to the 
refugees. As discussed more in-depth in the previous chapter, the pursuit of education 
remained a strong aspiration for this population despite ongoing insecurity. To many of 
Kakuma’s South Sudanese community, education was an investment for the entire family, 
both in the camp and elsewhere in the world. The financial costs and insecurity incurred in 
the present were perceived to be an investment towards their future independence and 
livelihood development, reducing their reliance on both humanitarian aid organisations and 
their transnational family members. 
 In section 8.2, I will assess the extent to which the transnational participation of 
Kakuma’s South Sudanese community and their receipt of remittances has contributed to the 
belief that education is the solution to their protracted displacement. Despite finding very 
little evidence to support the assumption that education aided in the advancement of my 
refugee respondents’ livelihoods, the participants in this study held a strong belief that the 
continued education of their family members was needed for a sustainable future. Based on 
the experiences and desires presented in this chapter, I believe that these aspirations were 
strongly influenced by the success stories of their community members living in the global 
north, particularly those who broke free of their refugee identity and the social and economic 
marginalisation associated with it. 
 
8.1 Accessing Education  
 
 For most of the men and women in this study, education was associated with both 
immediate costs in the face of already existing and significant forms of insecurity and an 
investment towards the future financial security of their family. Depending on a family’s 
willingness and ability to invest in their children’s education, costs ranged from buying 
school supplies, paying for a private school in Kakuma, paying for boarding school elsewhere 
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in Kenya, and finally to investing in higher education. At the most basic level, the vast 
majority of children in Kakuma were guaranteed a primary school education, but their 
parents were required to cover the cost of materials associated with this education 
(Mendenhall et al. 2015). For refugees who received free education in the camp, their 
families needed to invest at least £20-40 GBP ($30-60 USD) per child per year on basic 
resources, thus acting as a significant barrier to their education (Lutheran World Federation 
Kenya-Djibouti Programme 2015). Depending on the level of support from family members 
abroad or from various non-profit organisations, refugee families often pursued advanced 
levels of education when the opportunity arose. 
 Betts et al. (2018b) suggest that education within Kakuma’s population was positively 
correlated with the ability to speak multiple languages, the development of skills, and the 
ability to translate these skills into income generating activities.53 During my time in 
Kakuma, refugees would often explain to me that they needed their children to receive an 
education so that they could learn to speak Swahili and English, so that they would be able to 
get a good job to support their family in the future, and ideally so that they would have the 
skills to enable their family to leave the refugee setting, whether it be back to South Sudan, to 
Uganda, or elsewhere in Kenya. In many ways, education was perceived to be the solution to 
their current liminal circumstances. 
 The cost of education for the children within these communities varied drastically 
between each participant. In general, many of the remittance recipients whose children went 
to school in Kakuma only received money from their transnational networks for food and 
medical emergencies. Since primary school was guaranteed for all refugee children in 
                                                     
53 According to Betts et al. (2018b), South Sudanese refugees in Kakuma had an average of 6.25 years 
of education comparable to Kenyan national average of 6.5 years, but significantly above South 
Sudan’s average of 4.9 years (UNDP Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical 
Update). 
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Kakuma, remittance recipients who were in failing or failed transnational relationships 
(discussed further in Chapter 5.3) struggled to communicate to their contacts overseas why 
money was needed for school supplies.54  
 One of the characteristics associated with Kakuma’s refugees who had tenuous or 
withdrawn relationships with their family abroad was their inability to communicate to 
remittance senders the conditions of life in the camp, in particular the choices a refugee was 
forced to make to ensure that their children go to school. Several men and women in this 
community suggested that their family members who sometimes sent remittances, 
particularly those who had never lived in Kakuma themselves, could not comprehend the 
deprivation of life in the camp. For the participants in this study whom I identified as having 
failing or failed transnational relationships, their family members abroad struggled to 
understand the cost of even the most basic education and, therefore, its inaccessibility. 
 In comparison, for the refugees in Kakuma who maintained the strongest 
transnational bonds, their family members abroad wanted them to become educated so that 
they could become valuable contributors to their community network. Within this population, 
education of the individual translated to the perception of economic and social stability for 
the community as a whole. One woman in Kakuma named Rosie stated that “our children’s 
education is the development of our future. If a child is educated, he will help his community. 
He can become a doctor or a teacher and help others. We are investing in the future of our 
community.” Virtually every man and woman in this study argued that education contributed 
to financial and social opportunities for the family as a whole, often directly contrasting the 
marginalised lifestyle of a refugee in Kakuma. 
                                                     
54 Education in Kakuma is funded and managed by the Lutheran World Federation (LWF). At the 
time of my stay in Kakuma, they operated 26 primary schools and 5 secondary schools. 
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 During my fieldwork in Kakuma, the financial barriers to children’s education 
escalated when the LWF announced that in the 2018 school year they would begin charging 
tuition for all students attending school inside the refugee camp. From February 2018, all 
primary school students would be required to pay 1000 KSH (£7.50 GBP) each term, and 
similarly all secondary school students would be charged 3000 KSH (£23 GBP) per term. In 
the months between November 2017 and January 2018, this was the most commonly 
discussed topic during my conversations among Kakuma’s South Sudanese community. 
Several people argued that they could barely afford to feed their families, could rarely afford 
adequate medical treatment when they were sick, and were now being presented with another 
barrier preventing them from escaping poverty and deprivation.55 
 I believe that the primary reason that the South Sudanese community of Kakuma was 
in such an uproar about the sudden rise in the cost of school tuition, was the fact that the 
education of their children was equated with the future advancement of their families. The 
men and women of this community mentioned to me that when their remittances would not 
cover the costs of education in Kakuma, they would often try to sell various goods on the 
street or exchange what little food rations they could for school supplies. One woman named 
Sarah said that she used to have a little kiosk in front of her house, the profits from which she 
would use to by school supplies for her children.  
I have five children who always need uniforms and school 
supplies. My brother [in the US] used to send money to make 
sure that my kiosk was fully stocked. But last year he said that 
he could not send money anymore. The last of the money was 
used for my children’s education. I had to shut the shop until I 
get more money. I struggle to help my children continue their 
studies. 
 
                                                     
55 As far as I am aware, the UNHCR and the LWF never implemented these tuition charges for the 
schools within Kakuma refugee camp. However, in the months leading up to these events, there were 
several protests within Kakuma’s secondary schools in which students attacked teachers, several of 
whom had to be hospitalised and evacuated by helicopter. 
 201 
Much like Sarah, several participants in this study suggested that they often struggled to meet 
the costs of education, even when tuition was free. Parents often had to choose between 
investing in other livelihood development opportunities, or even feeding their families, so 
that their children could learn to read, to speak English and Swahili, and to learn basic 
mathematics.  
 The aspirations for Kakuma’s South Sudanese children to become educated, and the 
struggles to fund them, meant that the men and women of this population traded other 
available resources, such as food, to pay for these costs when no other option seemed to be 
available. Several other men and women mentioned to me that in the weeks between the 
distribution of their monthly food rations and the beginning of each school term, they chose 
to sell some of their families’ food to a local shopkeeper in exchange for notebooks and pens 
for their children. For the parents who chose these methods to fund their children’s education, 
they traded their present security, although already marginal, as an investment towards their 
family’s future independence. 
 It is important to note that the actions undertaken by refugees to trade their food to 
buy their children an education were not made casually. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
the majority of the members of this population lived with very little food and other economic 
resources. By making the active decision to live without some days’ worth of food each 
month so that they and their children could have a chance at a better life was probably one of 
the most difficult decisions any member of this community was forced to make while living 
in Kakuma. Several men and women in this camp claimed that they were willing to suffer for 
the foreseeable future so that their children’s families would not have to suffer the same way. 
They were not just making an investment in their children’s lives, but the future lives of their 
entire family. 
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 For those fortunate enough to maintain strong transnational relationships, the 
education of each family’s children was the primary investment for which remittances were 
used. As suggested by several studies, remittances have a significant influence on the human 
capital of children by altering the cost-benefit relationship of investing in the education of 
children (Acosta et al. 2015; Adams 2006, Fransen 2015; Salas 2014). When a family no 
longer has to choose between feeding or educating their children due to an influx of financial 
capital, it becomes easier to invest in their children’s future through their education. In this 
context, education becomes what De Haas (2009) has argued to be a “multiplier effect” of 
remittances sent to developing communities, in which additional financial capital introduced 
to this population is used to promote the further economic and social stability of their 
communities. 
 These methods for paying for school supplies described above were the extreme 
examples of what Kakuma’s South Sudanese community would do when no other option was 
available. Refugees who were fortunate enough to receive remittances specifically to pay for 
the cost of education, rarely needed to resort to selling their already limited food supplies. In 
some cases, refugees were able to receive remittances from one or several sources to pay for 
these basic costs of schooling in Kakuma. In addition, approximately a third of my 
participants had the opportunity for either they or their children to attend a secondary school 
outside of Kakuma. In exceptional cases this education was funded by large non-profit 
organisations, however they were more commonly supported by family members living in 
Western nations or small faith-based organisations with whom these transnational family 
members were able to establish and maintain social networks with their family living in 
Kakuma.  
 For refugees who received limited remittances to send their children to a state or 
private school in which tuition needed to be paid, families often needed to choose which of 
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their children to support. Jok, a 19-year-old man who had recently completed his secondary 
education in Kitale (western Kenya), explained that his uncle in the US only had enough 
money to pay for the tuition of one child within his family at a time. Jok explained that he 
was chosen because he was the eldest male of all his siblings and cousins in the camp and 
that “every term my uncle would send my mother money to pay for my transportation to and 
from school, for my tuition, and for my food. He would always call me after each term and 
talk to me about my marks and try to motivate me to study more.” Jok argued that since he 
was chosen to receive an education, it was now his responsibility to financially support the 
younger children in his family. At the time of his interview, Jok was working as a teacher in a 
primary school in Kakuma, earning 7000 KSH (£50 GBP) per month.  
 One example of a small faith-based organisation utilised by the South Sudanese 
diaspora is HwSS, which specifically sought to fund the education of children from Kakuma 
by sending them to school throughout Kenya and Uganda. After working for this organisation 
in San Jose, California for several months, I discovered that it was originally established by 
resettled South Sudanese refugees living in California and their church. Members of this 
refugee community wanted to fund the education of their family members, but at the time 
lacked the financial security to do so. These transnational participants were able to gather 
enough social and financial support from their community in California to create this small 
organisation whose primary goal was to meet their family obligations of funding the 
education of their extended family members in Kakuma.  
 John, first introduced in Chapter 5, was one of the original beneficiaries of this 
programme. His sister Margaret, who also participated in this study, had arrived in California 
in early 2001, and was going to college to become a nurse while working a part-time retail 
job and caring for her five children. Due to the high cost of living in the San Francisco Bay 
Area, she advocated for her brother John’s education to be funded by her church and HwSS. 
 204 
This small organisation paid for his tuition at a boarding school in Kitale as well as the first 
two years of his university education at the University of Nairobi so that he could study to 
become a cyber security analyst. Most of the people that I met in Kakuma from this 
community who were fortunate enough to attend university had their tuition fees paid by 
similar organisations as a by-product of their transnational family member’s social networks 
developed in Western nations. 
 While in Kakuma, several of the young adults who participated in this study, ranging 
in age from 18 to 25, told me that their secondary education was funded by similar 
community organisations based in the US, Canada, the UK, and Australia. These 
organisations would raise money, whether it be from church parishioners or other members 
of the South Sudanese diaspora, to pay for tuition fees in Kenyan or Ugandan schools outside 
of the refugee system. One man named Sam told me that his secondary school was paid for 
by a South Sudanese couple in Australia to whom his uncle had suggested they sponsor his 
education. Sam told me that “they called me often, and asked how I was doing in school. It 
was like they became my family.” In this case, even though Sam’s uncle lacked the financial 
security to meet the expectations placed on him as a resettled refugee living in Australia, he 
had managed to use his social network to uphold his responsibility towards his family. 
 During my time in Kakuma, I met two men whose children had managed to excel 
through the Kenyan education system as refugees and who have since been given 
international opportunities to pursue a university education. One of these men, named Louis, 
discussed with nostalgia the education of his daughter: 
My daughter was in preschool while I was in primary school. I would 
get out and she would wait for me at the gate so we could walk home 
together. As she completed her education, she always got perfect 
grades. When she completed primary school, she tested 6th in the 
nation. She was given a scholarship for a good Kenyan boarding 
school in Lodwar and I went back [to South Sudan] to become a 
primary school teacher. My daughter now studies business at a 
university in Canada. 
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Louis’ experiences with his children’s education as refugees living in Kakuma was probably 
most people’s ideal situation. His daughter achieved very competitive scores, received 
scholarships, and was able to attend a university in a Western nation. His other children were 
fortunate enough to gain legal work permits and were working professionals in Nairobi and 
Kampala at the time of his interview. 
 Louis’ daughter was a beneficiary of the Windle Trust, a non-profit organisation that 
sought out high-achieving students living as refugees in Kakuma and offered them full 
scholarships to study at a university of their choice in Canada. Most of my participants in 
Kakuma who were under the age of 25 expressed both interest in this programme and 
frustration at their inability to access a scholarship to Canada like some of their peers. Due to, 
at least in part, their transnational relationships with family members living in the global 
north, education seemed like a piece of their future that they could control, and university in a 
Western nation was often perceived to be a gate pass out of Kakuma and for the success of 
their family. 
 During my time in Kakuma, I interviewed several young adults who discussed their 
transnational relationships and their perceived responsibility to receive an education for the 
advancement of their family as a whole. One woman named Evelyn stated that she was 
always told that “education is the key to life. If I am educated, then I can help my family.” 
Similarly, a man named Chris commented that “If you are helped by someone, and they 
believe in you then you have the motivation to continue. You can have goals for what you 
want to do when you are an adult. If I didn’t have that, then I don’t know where I would be 
mentally.” To these refugees, most of whom were born in and spent the majority of their lives 
in Kakuma, education represented an escape for them and their families. Education equated 
to economic advancement, livelihood development, and investment in community support 
networks. So many people in this community believed that the potential return for all their 
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sacrifices made towards the education of their community members directly contrasted the 
liminality of their and their parents’ current lifestyle. 
 The discussion above suggests that for refugees who maintained the strongest 
transnational relationships, discussed in Chapter 5, investing in the education of the children 
of this community was rarely questioned as the best course of action. For members who were 
committed to the welfare of the family as a whole, education equated to the economic and 
social advancement of the community rather than the individual. Both remittance senders and 
recipients represented in this study argued that investing in the education of the children in 
their family would contribute to their families' financial and physical security. 
 It can be argued that both transnational resources such as remittances and the 
distribution of foreign aid promote a sense of dependency. However, within the aid economy 
of Kakuma refugee camp, social and economic marginalisation and vulnerability were often 
perceived by South Sudanese refugees to be required traits for continued support in the form 
of food, healthcare, education, and security (Jansen 2008, 2013; Turner 2010).56 Despite the 
presence of these states of existence, in which marginalisation and vulnerability are standard, 
the amount of aid given to this community gradually decreases as their status as refugees 
becomes increasingly more protracted. In comparison, remittances sent to this community for 
the purpose of education were provided based on the assumption that the primary 
beneficiaries would become self-sufficient leaders within their community capable of 
emotionally and financially supporting other family members in a similar manner. So, while 
                                                     
56 During my time in Kakuma, there were various projects, by organisations like Don Bosco, 
Norwegian Refugee Council and the Jesuit Refugee Service, that provided livelihood development 
and skills training courses. These projects were designed to help refugees gradually become less 
dependent on the refugee system. However, since refugees in Kenya could not legally work, their 
ability to earn a living wage was marginal. Several aid workers claimed that these projects were 
designed to help refugees rebuild their lives once they were repatriated to their home nation. For the 
South Sudanese community, these prospects were unrealistic and did not help them achieve economic 
independence while they continued to be refugees. 
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the former operates on the assumption that the beneficiaries lack agency, the latter actually 
promotes their agency and eventual ability to gain self-sufficiency.  
 From a policy perspective, access to education in a refugee’s nation of residence and 
outside of the refugee system, as well as healthcare and social networking opportunities, is 
one of the ways that the UNHCR measures a refugee’s level of integration into their host 
community (Beversluis et al. 2016). Therefore, by enabling South Sudanese refugees in 
Kenya to receive a Kenyan education outside of a refugee camp, remittances aid in the ability 
of these communities to contribute to their host society with their “refugee resources” 
through their social, economic, and possibly political participation in Kenya (Jacobsen 2002). 
Therefore, it can be argued that education supported by remittances has the potential to break 
the liminal state of dependency that has come to define the refugee system through physical 
and conceptual isolation (Harrell-Bond 1986; Napier-Moore 2005).  
 For South Sudanese refugees, children represented hope and opportunity, a potential 
bridge between the limitations of their current marginalisation in the refugee system and their 
ability to achieve freedom and prosperity in the future. Investing in the education of their 
children, whether it was in a limited capacity in the refugee camp or by paying for tuition 
elsewhere in Kenya, gave refugees and their transnational family members hope that their 
circumstances would improve in the future. It gave them the chance to believe that they 
would not always be dependent on humanitarian aid for food or medicine, and that one day 
they could return home to South Sudan or begin their lives by being able to integrate into 
Kenya or by migrating elsewhere in the world. 
 This perception of the value of education and the ability of educated members of this 
community to uplift their family out of poverty was strongly influenced by the transnational 
relationships in which my participants in Kakuma engaged. The transnational family 
members who invested both emotional and financial support into the education of their 
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community were typically educated themselves, contributing to their ability to invest in the 
next generation. As discussed in section 8.2, although the members of this community acted 
upon the premise that education would lead to social and economic opportunities, the reality 
was far different between the members of this population who continued to live as refugees 
and those who were fortunate enough to become resettled refugees or economic migrants 
living in the global north and outside the refugee system. 
 
8.2 Entangled Values: Comparing Experiences of Education and Marginalisation 
 
 Many of my participants in Kakuma, particularly men who self-identified as Lost 
Boys and their children who were young adults during my time in the camp, strongly 
believed that education was the solution to their displacement and economic instability. As 
much as I believe in the strength of knowledge, I believe that the perception of education 
being the solution to their protracted situation is a simplification, influenced by their 
transnational relationships.  
 From my experience in Kakuma, members of this community actively strove to 
complete secondary school, and strongly desired to pursue university degrees. Even when I 
encountered members of this community who had achieved undergraduate degrees, and who 
could not find employment within the camp with a salary that could realistically support their 
families, their solution was to pursue further graduate degrees. There was also a strong 
assumption that their education would lead to well-paid employment opportunities, an 
assumption for which I found little evidence among those who continued to live in the camp. 
 As I suggested above, the prevalence of this belief that refugees should achieve the 
highest and best quality education available was significantly influenced by their 
transnational family members living in the global north. The majority of the remittance 
senders whom I interviewed in either the US or the UK had managed to work hard enough to 
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pay for a university education, and in several cases, had pursued a graduate degree. The 
members of this generation argued that education was extremely important, often meaning 
the difference between being able to financially support their family or not. Consequently, as 
emotional and financial sponsors for children within their families in Africa (discussed in 
Chapter 5), they believed that the ultimate path to success and freedom for their families was 
through their education.  
 Peter, first introduced at the very beginning of this thesis, represented these 
relationships perfectly. Peter lived in Texas, had been an American citizen for ten years, and 
usually tried to visit Kakuma for several months out of the year to reconnect with his wife, 
niece and nephews, and his infant son. During our many informal conversations while 
walking through the camp, Peter enjoyed discussing the various ways the adults within their 
communities could teach their teenagers to be future leaders. While painting a makeshift 
blackboard on to his family’s compound wall for tutoring their children, he explained to me 
the nature of his relationships with his niece and nephews. He claimed that “I must be a role 
model for our family. My good fortune to have a life in the US must be shared among all of 
us, otherwise what is the point?” Peter was adamant that the teenagers within his family 
pursue an education and a professional career to the best of their ability. He argued that the 
only way to change their circumstances within the refugee system was through an active 
development of an independent and prosperous future through education. Peter is emblematic 
of the assumption that the next generation could follow the same trajectory as the previous 
generation, that education would contribute to the financial and social security of their family 
as a whole. 
 All of the young adults who participated in this study dreamed of going to university. 
For some of them, small community faith-based organisations, facilitated by the social 
networks of their transnational counterparts, managed to pay for their tuition fees at 
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universities in Nairobi or Kampala. As mentioned previously, two parents told me about their 
children who were currently going to university in Canada as scholarship recipients. 
However, the majority of the young men and women in Kakuma who had finished their 
secondary education in private schools throughout Kenya, were forced to return to Kakuma 
and wait for their opportunity to attend university. In these cases, although their family living 
in Western nations pushed them to pursue higher education, they could rarely afford to pay 
for the tuition fees. 
 Peter held very strong feelings about motivating his niece and nephews to believe that 
they could create a career that could potentially help their community in Kakuma and 
eventually in South Sudan as the generation who will ideally rebuild their nation after 
decades of war and displacement. His nephew Tim had recently graduated from secondary 
school thanks to Peter’s financial support and dreamed of becoming a doctor and returning 
home to South Sudan. At the time of our interview, Tim was working as a teacher in one of 
the primary schools in Kakuma, earning barely enough money to feed his family. He 
remained hopeful that he would one day attend university and be able to give back to his 
community. Similarly, his sister Achienne, was in her final year of secondary school and 
dreamed of becoming a human rights lawyer protecting women who experienced sexual 
violence during wartime in South Sudan. Although neither Tim nor Achienne could afford 
university through either remittances or scholarships, they held on to their dreams that their 
education could make a difference for the people of their community and in their efforts to 
help rebuild their home nation.   
 The example of Peter and his family suggests that this perception that education was 
the solution to their problems as protracted refugees was significantly influenced by the 
members of the Lost Boy community who were resettled primarily to the US, Australia, and 
Canada in the early 2000s (Chanoff 2005; Luster et al. 2008, McKinnon 2008). In a study 
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conducted by Chanoff (2005:41), a member the Lost Boy community recounted his initial 
experiences in Kakuma and the connection that he made to education: 
When we came to Kenya, we saw a huge difference between the 
educated and the non-educated. We saw the hierarchy. Those 
people who had degrees were the uppermost, and those who had 
high school diplomas were in second place. And we saw the 
Turkana, the local people, who had their cattle and nothing else. 
We saw the huge gap, and we understood the real meaning of 
education in terms of living. 
 
Chanoff argues that the children of this population had their identities, their families, and 
their cultural values stripped from them, and attempted to reconstruct themselves through 
their education. Although they had to study much harder to attend university in the US, their 
university educations were perceived to be the gateway to their futures. This perception that 
education was the key to a successful and prosperous future independent from the refugee 
system was passed on to the next generation of their families in the camp as well as to the 
members of the Lost Boy community who were never given the opportunity to resettle with 
their counterparts. 
 Several of the men living in the US who participated in this study described what the 
first years after resettlement were like for them and other members of the Lost Boy 
community. David, first mentioned in Chapter 6, told me that: 
When we arrived, we all lived together and we have since worked 
as much as we could. Many of us have three or four jobs…In the 
fifteen years since we have been [in the US] we have become 
[American] citizens, we went to community college, and then 
university. We worked hard and studied so that we can support our 
families. 
 
All of the remittance senders who participated in this study, both in the US and UK, highly 
valued the role of education. Although education involved significant cost, to the members of 
these communities the eventual rewards were worth the immediate costs. Of the 21 
remittance senders discussed in this study, 12 had university degrees at the time of their 
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participation, and four of them also held graduate degrees. Their careers ranged in fields such 
as medicine, engineering, education, business, law, and international development. 
 In relation to their transnational familial connections, these careers and the education 
required to achieve them were pathways to security for their extended family members in 
South Sudan, Kenya, and Uganda that they chose to financially and socially support. As 
discussed above in Chapters 5 and 6, these relationships were developed on the cultural belief 
that they had the responsibility to support their family members, particularly those who were 
marginalised due to war and displacement, until they had the ability to support themselves. 
One of the primary interpretations of this responsibility was the need to invest in the 
education of the next generation of their family, enabling the beneficiaries to support other 
members of their family to the best of their ability. 
 The primary distinction between the remittance senders and recipients of this study, 
and the difference in the opportunities available to them presented through their education, 
was their ability/inability to pursue employment and other economic opportunities. For 
reasons that cannot be entirely answered by the data presented in this thesis, education did 
not automatically equate to employment opportunities either inside or outside of the refugee 
setting. Of the three men who I met in Kakuma who had undergraduate degrees at the time of 
their interview, two of whom were in the process of applying for graduate programmes, all 
were unable to secure employment in the camp that offered salaries more than 8,000 shillings 
(£60 GBP) per month, only slightly higher than their children made as teachers in the camp 
with only secondary school educations.  
 One of these men, James, an active community leader, struggled to find employment 
despite his experience, education, and social networking skills. James, an original member of 
the Lost Boy community, had lived between South Sudan, Ethiopia, Kakuma, and Nairobi as 
a refugee since he was nine years old. Between 2013 and 2016 he had been employed by 
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HwSS to facilitate the transportation of students from Kakuma to their boarding school 
throughout Kenya and Uganda in addition to ensuring the payment of their tuition and 
boarding fees. During this time period, James was an essential middleman between a small 
organisation based in California and his community in Kakuma receiving aid.  
 When I arrived in Kenya at the end of 2017, James was in Nairobi for his graduation 
ceremony at the Pan African Christian University, about to receive a degree in accounting. 
During our initial meeting over dinner in Nairobi, James explained to me that his degree was 
funded by an Australian Christian organisation due to his work as a minister in Kakuma. 
During my 10 months in Kakuma, I managed to meet up with James on many occasions. He 
often explained to me that he was struggling to find paid employment after his graduation, 
and that his primary source of income continued to be from family members and friends 
living in the US.  
 On one occasion while discussing job opportunities available to him, he told me that 
he wanted to go back to university, “I think I should get a Master’s degree. I would like to 
study theology or economics.” James was actually luckier than most of the people I met in 
Kakuma because he received a scholarship for his university education due to his active 
participation in his community and his well-established international social networks that he 
had managed to build over the previous decades. Despite not knowing where his next 
scholarship would come from, James remained optimistic that he would make friends with 
the right people, who would again offer to pay for his education, which would eventually lead 
to employment opportunities for him either in Kakuma’s non-profit sector or another position 
in Kenya that would entitle him to a work permit.  
 In Kakuma, the primary barrier preventing the translation of the education of its South 
Sudanese community to employment was the inability to receive a work permit. Of the 80 
participants interviewed in Kakuma, 42 men and women maintained some sort of 
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employment in the camp. These jobs ranged from teachers, nurses, research assistants, 
pastors, cooks, waiters, and boda boda (motorcycle taxi) drivers. However, the monthly 
salary that these refugees could earn only ranged from 5,000 KSH (£35 GBP) for unskilled 
labour to 8000 KSH (£60 GBP) for highly skilled work. These salaries were significantly less 
than a Kenyan national would make for the same job due to the inability for members of this 
refugee community to gain legal work permits. This system forces refugees in Kenya to 
volunteer for an “incentive” (rather than a salary) despite their educational qualifications or 
experience. 
 Simon, the quality control-manager for Kakuma’s school system originally introduced 
in Chapter 6, represented an interesting example of the barriers to a sustainable salary despite 
employment that was made possible through his education. Simon had continued his 
education on full scholarship at a branch of Kenya’s Masinde Muliro University that had 
recently opened up in Kakuma. At the time of his interview he had just completed his 
Bachelor’s degree in education. Simon began teaching nearly 15 years prior, shortly after 
finishing his secondary school education, and was currently hired to train teachers and 
manage the curriculum taught in the camp across the 26 primary schools and 5 secondary 
schools available to refugees and the local population. On one occasion Simon claimed that 
“it’s hard. I train teachers who I know make much more money. [My salary] is quite low and 
embarrassing for someone with a university degree.” Simon was hoping that completing his 
university degree would help him get a permit to work legally in Kenya, in which case he 
could earn 60,000 KSH  (£450 GBP) per month compared to the 8,000 KSH (£60 GBP) of 
his current salary; unfortunately, these aspirations were unmet and the receipt of his 
Bachelor’s degree did not influence his income. 
 Among the South Sudanese diaspora represented in this thesis, I found that success 
presented throughout livelihood development and facilitated through the pursuit of an 
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education was limited to the participants who benefited from opportunities to migrate to the 
US or UK. Although many of the refugees had completed their secondary education and 
sometimes their university education, their knowledge and qualifications did not translate 
into economic security or livelihood development for those who continued to live inside 
Kakuma. Based on the experiences of the men and women whom I interviewed, a secondary 
education entitled refugees to employment opportunities that offered 2000 to 3000 KSH 
(£15-20 GBP) more per month when compared to those without a degree.  
 I believe that the members of this population placed such a strong value on their and 
their children’s education because the success stories, however rare, were clearly visible. For 
the members of these transnational communities who lived in the US and the UK, pursuing 
higher education led to employment opportunities and higher salaries which contributed to 
their ability to sufficiently support their family members in Kakuma and elsewhere in Africa. 
In these cases, the education of the individual contributed to the economic and social stability 
of the family as a whole. Due to the nature of these transnational relationships, in which 
communication and social support are necessary for their maintenance (discussed further in 
Chapter 5), these values and aspirations were passed down from remittance sender to 
recipient under the assumption that education would further contribute to their community’s 
welfare and stability.  
 However, the primary difference between remittance senders and recipients, between 
those living independently outside of the refugee system and those inside it, was the ability to 
gain legal employment and to earn a liveable salary to support their family. None of the 
refugees in Kakuma who participated in this study had a work permit, despite their education, 
qualifications, or experience. Consequently, members of this population were forced to 
“volunteer” for an incentive rather than work for a salary, often for non-profit organisations 
like the LWF and Red Cross based in the refugee camp. Since these incentives were never 
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enough to adequately support their families based in the camp, these men and women 
remained dependent on both the refugee system and their family members living abroad. 
 Despite the evidence to suggest that education does not necessarily lead to livelihood 
development as a refugee in Kakuma, participants often suggested that they needed to pursue 
higher forms of education, aspiring towards both undergraduate and graduate degrees. It was 
clear that the strong will to achieve economic stability through education did not translate in 
Kakuma in the same way that it did for their familial counterparts living in Western nations. 
This raises the question as to whether the experiences and success of the South Sudanese 
diaspora is replicable for those who continue to live under the restrictive policies placed on 
them due to their refugee status in Kenya.  
 
8.3 Conclusion 
 This chapter has discussed the ways in which participants in transnational networks 
seek to challenge the dependency fostered by the refugee system and envisage a better future 
through investment in education. For members of these communities, education equated to 
the future advancement of the welfare and stability of the family as a whole.  
 For the remittance recipients, education symbolised hope and opportunity, directly 
contrasting their liminal lifestyle as protracted refugees in Kakuma. In an attempt to maintain 
this hope for a better future, refugees within this community would go to tremendous efforts 
to pay for their children’s education. For those who struggled to maintain their transnational 
family support networks, this often meant selling their already limited food supplies in 
exchange for school supplies such as uniforms, books, and pens.  
 Young men and women in Kakuma who were fortunate enough to be members of 
stronger transnational social relationships, were often beneficiaries of higher qualities of 
education in institutions throughout Kenya and Uganda. In cases in which their transnational 
family members abroad were unable to meet the demands of their responsibility to the 
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refugee community, participants developed international social networks through small 
community-based organisations which often paid for the children of their family’s education. 
Finally, in rare cases, refugees in Kakuma were able to pursue higher education. Sometimes 
they were funded by family members to go to university in Nairobi or Kampala, and 
sometimes they were funded by large organisations like the Windle Trust to attend university 
in a Western nation. 
 As I suggest in section 8.2 of this chapter, I believe that the strong perception that 
education was the solution to their displacement was in a large part produced by their 
relationships with family and friends living in Western nations, in particular those who used 
to live in Kakuma themselves. For the remittance senders within this population living in the 
US and the UK, education contributed significantly to their economic and social security. 
Due to the strength of these transnational relationships, this belief that the education of the 
individual contributed to the advancement and security of the family as a whole was passed 
on, particularly between participants who maintained mentor-mentee relationships. For the 
members of this community, education was relatively attainable and was perceived to be a 
reasonable solution to their displacement due to their community’s past experiences of 
success outside of the refugee system. 
 For the members of this population, education was a means to challenge their social 
and economic marginalisation within Kenya and the refugee system. As protracted refugees 
in Kenya, these South Sudanese men and women could not return to their home nation, they 
could not work legally in Kenya, or otherwise become integrated into Kenya’s general 
population, and, due to the lack of resettlement opportunities in addition to strict and costly 
visa processes, their chance of migrating to a Western nation was highly improbable. This 
population was trapped inside of Kakuma, waiting for help while simultaneously incapable of 
helping themselves due to strict refugee policies. Within these communities in which 
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education was considered the key to the success of their transnational family members living 
in the global north, South Sudanese refugees strongly believed that education was the 
solution for all community members despite their current experiences or restrictions placed 
on their lives. From the perspective of many of my participants in Kakuma, education was 
one of the few aspects of their lives over which they could maintain some sort of control.  
 I argue that both international aid and transnational remittances promote a sense of 
dependency among protracted refugee communities, particularly those living within camps. 
Both are forms of financial and social welfare that promise an end to their refugeeness, a 
solution for the future. However, the aid economy is completely dependent on 1) the 
generosity of the international community, and 2) the vulnerability, deprivation, 
marginalisation, and insecurity of the beneficiaries. The former is likely to decrease as a 
refugee population becomes protracted, and the latter, that is their vulnerability and 
marginalisation, ironically is likely to increase while the aid system operates under the 
assumption that it decreases with time. Essentially, as refugees become victims of policy and 
marginalisation rather than of war, they become increasingly dependent on a welfare system 
that punishes them for the vulnerability which it created. 
 In conclusion, I found that the strong transnational relationships which support the 
transfer of economic and social remittances into the refugee setting did create an economic 
dependency on behalf of the remittance recipients. The primary difference from the 
dependency developed within the humanitarian aid system, however, was that these 
transactions were not conditional on the poverty and insecurity of the remittance recipients. 
Remittances were sent due to a system based on reciprocal social support for both the senders 
and recipients. Furthermore, in the case of investing in education, remittances were sent as a 
social and economic investment in the family as a whole, under the assumption that 
beneficiaries would become self-sufficient leaders of their community in the future. In 
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summary, while the refugee system kept the South Sudanese community of Kakuma in a state 
of marginalisation and liminality, remittances sent to refugees for the purpose of education 
attempted to break this trend. In the case of the refugee population represented in this thesis, 
transnational activity symbolised hope and opportunity, directly contrasting the protracted 
state of deprivation in the camp. 
 However, while many of the members of Kakuma’s South Sudanese population were 
able to complete their secondary education, and in some cases university as well, none of my 
participants in the camp reported having a legal work permit and thus capable of earning a 
wage above 20% of what a Kenyan would make for the same job. While members of this 
population reported a wide range of qualities and levels of education, experience, and 
networking skills, none were capable of leaving the refugee camp in order to support both 
themselves and their family without international aid and remittances.  
 I argue that this perception that education was the solution to their and their families’ 
displacement and social and economic marginalisation was an oversimplification of the 
complex conditions in which they lived. Although the remittance recipients in this study were 
more fortunate than many others in their community in Kakuma because they received 
financial and social support that was not dependent on the refugee system, these transnational 
relationships had virtually no influence on the remittance recipients’ refugee status within 
Kakuma. Despite tremendous efforts to invest in the education of their refugee community 
members, they continued to lack freedom of movement, basic civil rights, and most 
importantly, the legal right to work in their nation of residence. In the case of this 
community, the barrier to their self-sufficiency was not simply their lack of education but 
rather the restrictive policies imposed on their lives due to their inescapable refugeeness. 
 Despite this reality of being incapable of achieving sustainable livelihoods through 
investing in education, almost every one of the 80 men and women in Kakuma who 
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participated in this study believed that education was highly valuable. This value placed on 
education arguably contributed to further insecurity and deprivation in the present under this 
community’s assumption that it would eventually lead to their economic and social security. 
These assumptions were in large part based on the exceptional experiences of the Lost Boy 
community who were resettled to Western nations in the early 2000s. Compared to other 
resettled refugee populations, the members of this community were highly successful in their 
pursuit to achieve university education and to gain enough financial security to become their 
transnational families’ “global breadwinners” (Johnson and Stoll 2008; McKinnon 2008). 
 A significant portion of Kakuma’s South Sudanese community believed that the 
experiences of the resettled Lost Boys were replicable to all members of the South Sudanese 
diaspora, especially with the economic and social support from those who have already 
achieved this success. This raises the question as to the problems that potentially arise when 
the majority of this population’s aspirations are directed towards advancing the education of 
their children. What was clear within the data collected for this study was that education was 
primarily pursued under the false assumption that it would contribute to their community’s 
livelihood development and capability of becoming independent from the refugee system. 
However, it is also important to question whether the South Sudanese population of 
Kakuma’s quest for education and the perception of its benefits, whether or not it is realistic, 
helped them to maintain their desire and motivation to break the cycle of their marginalised 
lifestyle.  
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Chapter 9: Conclusions, Insights, and Further Research Development 
 
 The population examined in this thesis is a case study of what Van Hear (2003) refers 
to as a refugee transnational diaspora. Strung across the globe, these multi-dimensional social 
relationships, bonded together by an attachment to a common homeland and traditional 
culture, represent various experiences of displacement and migration, both from the 
perspective of those who escaped the refugee system and those who did not. The 
transnational participants discussed in this thesis actively fought their family’s refugeeness, 
the constant struggle with issues of socio-economic marginalisation, dependency on the 
humanitarian aid system, deprivation of basic resources, and physical insecurity.  
 The refugee transnational participants currently living in Kakuma experienced a life 
of victimisation beyond the conflict that had originally displaced them. After decades of 
living in the refugee system, this population was suffering significantly less from the trauma 
of warfare, and considerably more from their inability to change their life circumstances 
despite their will and motivation to do so. After living in this state of isolation in Kakuma for 
almost three decades, in which their freedom of movement was limited, in which they had no 
ability to work legally to adequately support their families, and in which they were forced to 
continuously live hand-to-mouth on ever decreasing humanitarian aid, the South Sudanese 
population of Kakuma have survived through community solidarity, both locally and 
transnationally.  
 The transnational and local social networks examined in this thesis, when combined 
with the belief that the education of their community members would lead to their social and 
economic freedom, helped to facilitate a strong sense that their lives could be improved in the 
future. The transnational networks in particular, whether they were with a spouse, children, 
extended family, or an old friend, gave the South Sudanese community of Kakuma 
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reassurance that there was life beyond the walls of the camp, beyond the limitations of their 
refugee status.  
 Family members in the US and the UK represented hope and opportunity for refugees 
in the camp. They were often highly educated and had worked hard to develop a means 
through which they could provide for both their transnational and local family members. 
They had the ability to move as they pleased, the right to be employed, and the ability to 
make active choices for the betterment of their family as a whole. These two sides of the 
same diaspora, bonded by a mutual sense of responsibility to one another, represent two 
extremes of a population displaced by war for multiple generations: those who were able to 
move on from their traumatic past and those who continue to be identified as victims decades 
later.  
 As discussed in the introductory chapter, this ethnographic study aimed to address the 
following research questions in order to understand the nature and influence of these refugee 
transnational communities: 
1. Does the transfer of economic resources help separated South Sudanese family 
members build transnational communities?  
2. What do both remittance senders and recipients hope to achieve through the transfer 
of transnational remittances?  
3. Do remittances help refugee recipients and their surrounding community members 
challenge insecurity within the refugee camp? 
4. How do these transnational relationships influence research participants’ perception 
of future opportunities? 
  Regarding question 1, I found that although the exchange of financial remittances 
helped to facilitate and maintain these transnational family networks, communication and 
balanced reciprocity of social concern were key to their development and sustainability. 
Regarding question 2, a primary goal of these transnational communities, similar to those 
formed by economic migrants, was the exchange of financial resources aimed at the 
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livelihood development and increased welfare of the remittance recipients. However, due to 
the social and economic marginalisation experienced by the South Sudanese community of 
Kakuma, in which remittances were primarily needed for basic survival and in which 
livelihood development through education was nearly impossible to achieve, the long-term 
impact that remittances had on this community was marginal (question 3). Finally, the data 
presented showed that these transnational relationships had a profound influence on the 
aspirations of the South Sudanese community of Kakuma and their perception of future 
opportunities, despite the limited evidence to suggest that these opportunities were accessible 
for this population (question 4). 
9.1 Further Theoretical Development 
  Building on the findings presented above, this thesis makes an original contribution to 
knowledge through the development of four primary theoretical arguments outlined in the 
following four sections. 
9.1.1 Sustainability of Transnational Communities 
 As discussed in depth in Chapter 3 section 3.1, Thomas Faist (2000) argues that 
transnational communities are highly dependent on mutual obligation, reciprocity, and 
community solidarity with other community members. Both Faist (2000) and Johnston 
(2001) suggest that social ties that transcend the physical borders between nations are built 
and maintained on a living network of community membership and family solidarity in which 
all participants engage in the exchange of both financial and social capital for the mutual 
benefit of the transnational community as a whole. 
 Jørgen Carling (2014) furthers this argument by stating that the viability of these 
transnational community relationships is simultaneously and equally dependent on both 
remittance receivers and senders playing active roles. Therefore, remittances are “reactive,” 
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responding to both the desire/obligation to send financial resources and to periodic requests 
for financial support. In order for these transnational relationships to be sustainable, it is 
necessary that remittance recipients invest valuable time and economic resources to support 
these relationships. These investments range from buying phones, data, airtime, or 
transportation, but also include active communication with and caring about the welfare of 
their transnational counterparts. 
 Tsai and Dzorgbo (2012) argue that transnational relationships need to be based on a 
concept they identified as “balanced reciprocity” in which all participants of a transnational 
community are simultaneously receivers and donors to other members of their community. In 
balanced reciprocal relationships, financial remittance recipients are expected to give back to 
their donors to the best of their ability, typically in the form of social remittances or through a 
commitment to the development of their relationship beyond the need for, and exchange of, 
money.  
As explored in Chapter 5, the members of the South Sudanese communities 
represented in this thesis who had the strongest transnational bonds were those who spoke to 
their loved ones frequently and for extended periods of time. Under these circumstances, the 
primary topic of discussion was the general wellbeing of their family members, as well as 
issues of health, family relationships, and mental/emotional wellbeing.  
Consequently, knowing the health and wellbeing of transnational family members 
through active and meaningful communication in a reciprocal fashion was the cornerstone to 
the preservation of these relationships. Remittance senders needed to feel a sense of 
connection to their communities living in camps or elsewhere in East Africa, and 
transnational participation ensured that they were both aware of the issues that their family 
faced and motivated to help. 
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 Reciprocally, in order to maintain the balance of social and emotional reciprocity, it 
was crucial that remittance recipients were aware of the quality of life of their family 
members living in developed nations, and knew things like where they lived, what they did 
for employment, and the social issues that they were currently facing. The former 
transnational participants represented in this study, or those who maintained weak 
transnational ties, were those who failed to live up to these responsibilities, often both 
ignorant and uninterested in the lives of their current/former transnational counterparts. 
 As explored in Chapter 6, the notions of family and responsibility, or obligation as 
suggested by Faist (2000), were at the root of these transnational relationships, typically 
justifying continued dependence on one another despite prolonged physical absence. The 
remittance senders argued that it was their responsibility to financially support the less 
fortunate members of their family who were unable to support themselves, particularly the 
children and elders, because they had the ability to do so.  
 Various ways that the remittance senders undertook responsibility for one another 
beyond the provision of money were to act as mediators, sponsors or leaders within their 
family. Social guidance, particularly for the younger members of a family, was perceived to 
be essential for the future sustainability and survival of the family as a whole. This 
transnational sponsorship system, through the investment of both time and money into the 
development of caring and responsible adults, ensured that future generations would be 
similarly supported in the future.  
 As demonstrated above, the data presented on the tools needed for strong 
transnational relationships (mutual obligation, reciprocity, and community solidarity) support 
existing theories outlined by Faist (2000), Johnston (2001), Carling (2014) and Tsai and 
Dzorgbo (2012). However, my study contributes further to understanding why transnational 
relationships fail, specifically why the tools of mutual obligation, reciprocity, and community 
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solidarity might be unachievable. There is existing literature on resettled refugee 
transnational communities which suggests that these vulnerable populations face language, 
education, and employment barriers in their host nations (Al-Ali et al. 2001a; Mascini 2012). 
However, due to their perceived privileged status, especially compared to family members 
who continue to live inside refugee camps, they feel obligated to send significant financial 
remittances despite facing financial hardship themselves (Brees 2010; Carling et al. 2012; 
Hammond 2011; Johnson and Stoll 2008; Lim 2009; Patterson 2016; Shandy 2007). 
Contributing to these insights, as discussed in Chapter 5 section 5.3, my research 
suggests that the most significant barrier to the strength and sustainability of these 
transnational relationships was the inability of either side to comprehend the difficulties of 
life experienced by their transnational counterparts. From the perspective of refugees in 
Kakuma, their family members who were fortunate enough to live in a developed nation were 
living a life of luxury and were thus more than capable of providing enough financial support 
to help those in the refugee system to live a decent life. Similarly, remittance senders, 
particularly those who had never lived in Kakuma themselves, found it difficult to 
comprehend how refugees who were beneficiaries of food rations, healthcare, and education 
within the refugee system could constantly need financial support. 
The refugee participants in these circumstances were typically unaware of and 
uninterested in the welfare of their transnational counterparts, contributing significantly to 
their weak social bonds. Refugees who had stopped receiving remittances were often upset 
that their family members were failing in their duty to support them in their time of need. 
However, these participants also failed to recognise that they too had neglected their 
responsibilities to care for the emotional wellbeing of their family abroad. 
The desperate need for remittances, which significantly contributed to the 
deterioration of these transnational relationships, was influenced by both the inability of 
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remittance recipients to earn an income capable of supporting their family in Kenya and the 
fact that remittances were needed not only to supplement their livelihoods as refugees, but 
also to survive continuous crisis situations. In comparison, those in successful relationships 
understood the limited abilities of family members abroad to provide financial support 
because they actively nurtured these transnational bonds. 
 
9.1.2 Degree of Integration and Remittance Sending Patterns over Time 
 
 This thesis examines two primary theories on the correlation between the degree of 
integration that a migrant has achieved in their new nation of residence and the level of 
responsibility/obligation that they feel to financially support their family members in their 
home nation, or in this case, a nation of asylum. The Remittance Decay Hypothesis (Stark 
1978) suggests that the time pattern of remittance sending practices forms an inverted “U” 
shape. This theory argues that remittances gradually increase in amount as a migrant slowly 
integrates into their new society, and similarly decrease as their ties to their homeland 
become weaker over time (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2006; Grieco 2004; Stark 1978). 
Likewise, Brown (1998) argues that the longer a migrant is away from their nation of origin, 
their social ties and perception of need for their family are likely to decline. 
 In contrast, Carling and Hoelscher (2013: 244) claim that integration and 
transnational participation, specifically through the sending of financial remittances, are 
“complementary not competing.” These authors suggest that the sending of remittances is 
simultaneously influenced by both a migrant’s capacity and desire to do so. Integration into a 
new nation of residence implies higher rates of employment, higher incomes, and thus the 
capacity to send higher amounts of remittances to family members abroad. In comparison, 
difficulties in speaking the local language, understanding the local culture, and developing 
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social networks also implies difficulties in financially supporting their transnational social 
networks. 
 Interestingly, the data presented in this thesis indicate both of these theories to be true, 
dependent, however, on the nature of their transnational family relationships and their 
experiences within the refugee system. The remittance senders can be classified into two 
categories: 1) those having transnational relationships primarily with their nuclear family 
members, and 2) those whose only transnational relationships were with extended family.  
Those who maintained strong transnational ties with their nuclear family, also often 
with their extended family as well, primarily lived in the US, identified as members of the 
Lost Boy community, had previously lived in Kakuma, were given refugee resettlement 
status, and had actively tried to reconnect with the culture that they became detached from as 
children. However, participants who lived in the UK at the time of their interview were 
primarily supporting extended family members, had never actually lived in a refugee camp, 
and came to the UK predominantly as economic migrants. 
In both of these immigrant communities, the members of this South Sudanese 
diaspora stressed that family provides for one another within their culture, and to not do so 
when one has the ability means ignoring their culturally established bonds of kinship, 
responsibility, and trust. However, what was clear among the remittance senders was that 
those who were former refugees and maintained transnational relationships with nuclear 
family held a much stronger sense of responsibility to their family in Africa than those who 
did not. 
Under the circumstances of a decreased sense of responsibility and thus a progressive 
detachment from their transnational family members, the perception of duty had altered from 
just knowing when their family members needed help, argued to be culturally appropriate, to 
only sending remittances when specific requests were made. I argue that the motivation to 
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send financial remittances was only minimally influenced by their ability to send or their 
degree of integration into their host nation. Rather, the immigrants’ attachment to their 
culture, the type of transnational relationship which they developed and maintained, and their 
experiences of need and poverty within the refugee system were much stronger influences. 
Therefore, furthering both Stark’s (1978) and Carling and Hoelscher’s (2013) theories, 
degree of integration into a migrant’s host nation was virtually insignificant; the nature of 
their transnational relationships and their attachment to their traditional cultural values, and 
thus their “desire” to remit, were significantly stronger influences in remittance sending 
patterns over time.  
 
9.1.3 Influence of Transnational Remittances on Refugee Welfare 
 
A central theme throughout this thesis was the influence that the South Sudanese 
refugees’ transnational activity had on their protracted state of refugeeness in Kakuma, that is 
their social and economic marginalisation, policy-induced vulnerability, and dependence on 
the humanitarian aid system.  
Cindy Horst (2006) claims that Kenyan refugee camps in particular fail to provide 
refugees with economic and physical security and facilitate what she identifies as “refugee 
dependency syndrome” due to both their physical confinement and institutionalised need for 
humanitarian aid. In this case, refugee dependency is defined as “acceptance of handouts 
without taking any initiative to attain self-sufficiency, accompanied by symptoms of 
excessive and unreasonable demands, frequent complaints, passivity, and lethargy,” traits that 
become more pronounced the longer a refugee population remains in a state of exile (Horst 
2006: 92). 
Refugees are theoretically entitled to temporary protection, security, food, healthcare, 
and shelter until a solution to their displacement can be achieved. However, this is not always 
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provided in a sufficient manner. Firstly, as demonstrated in Chapter 7, access to these support 
systems was highly dependent on the availability of resources and funding within the refugee 
system, resources that many participants in this study and several authors have argued to have 
noticeably depleted and become inadequate for survival (Betts et al. 2018a; Gladden 2012; 
Napier-Moore 2005; Newhouse 2015; Pittaway and Bartolomei 2002; Rogers 2017; 
Verdirame 1999; World Food Programme 2017). Secondly, as many of these South Sudanese 
participants reached their 25th year in Kakuma during the time of their interview between 
2017 and 2018, a life beyond the confinement of Kakuma’s walls was difficult to imagine. 
During that time, the members of this population have become objects of policy, 
defined in convenient images, a system of labelling which portrays refugees as perpetual 
dependents, and often more stigmatising and alienating than helpful in designing effective 
policy solutions (Harrell-Bond 1986; Jansen 2013; Kaiser 2006; Zetter 1991). As suggested 
by Turner (2010), the refugee system’s policy of “contain and control” is primarily designed 
to keep refugees alive and has a deep impact on the identities and self-esteem of the refugees 
themselves. Turner argues that these strategies foster a sense of continued victimisation, 
dependency, personal inadequacy and a lack of political agency. 
So, the question remains, do transnational remittances increase the welfare of the 
socially and economically vulnerable population considered in this thesis and ultimately 
decrease their dependence on the refugee system? 
Within the data collected, I found that the need for remittances in Kakuma’s South 
Sudanese population was profound. All of my participants in Kakuma discussed in-depth the 
issues of insecurity which they and their community continuously faced. These forms of 
insecurity ranged from the constant, but relatively manageable, food insecurity to the less 
common but also dangerous and expensive harassment by the police, with the lack of 
medicine lying somewhere in between in terms of both degree of insecurity and costliness. 
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Although these forms of insecurity were always anticipated by this population, they could 
rarely be prepared for, due to their frequency, unpredictability, and the inability of refugees to 
earn a sustainable income in the camp. Consequently, the most common use for remittances 
sent to this population was to combat their continuous states of emergency rather than to 
significantly achieve an improved quality of life. 
What was particularly interesting was that a culture of resource-sharing was present in 
Kakuma under these extreme conditions, in which notions of kinship and responsibility had 
expanded to meet the needs of life in the camp, as similarly witnessed in other studies on 
African protracted refugee populations (Grabska 2005; Horst 2006; Omata 2012).  The 
members of this population argued that there was a social expectation to share material and 
financial resources when they had the ability to do so and when their friends and neighbours 
needed help the most. This communal sense of collective duty ensured the survival of the 
community as a whole to the best of the participants’ ability, a social system which was 
partially facilitated with the introduction of remittances.  
Consequently, due to this need to ensure the survival of their community, rather than 
just their immediate family, the effect that remittances had on improving the livelihood of 
this population was marginal. I suggest that the introduction of financial remittances into 
Kakuma’s South Sudanese population acted as a form of welfare stabiliser, distributed to the 
community members who needed it most, but rarely enabled the direct recipients to develop 
their livelihood in a sustainable manner.  
As suggested by several authors (Acosta et al. 2015; Adams and Page 2005; Adams 
2006; De Haas 2005), despite the assumption that remittances sent to developing nations 
contribute to livelihood development, their impacts are also highly dependent on the social, 
economic, and political constraints experienced by the remittance recipients. As 
demonstrated in the data which I have presented, this was proven true due to the policy 
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restrictions imposed on refugees as well as their community responsibility to share material 
and financial resources, contributing to their inability to significantly improve their 
livelihoods. 
 
9.1.4 Intersection between Transnational Participation and Refugeeness 
 
 As demonstrated in Chapter 8, the most significant influence that these transnational 
relationships had on the welfare of the South Sudanese population of Kakuma was actually 
psychological rather than physical or economic. Specifically, since investment in the 
education of the remittance senders had led to their economic development, it was believed 
by all parties that the same could be achieved for those who continued to be defined by their 
refugee status. While the current lifestyle of Kakuma’s South Sudanese population was 
perceived in terms of marginalisation, poverty, and the lack of agency, the development of 
their future opportunities through investment in education contributed to strong perceptions 
of future independence, economic sustainability, and a gate pass to a life beyond their refugee 
status. 
What was also interesting about the population which I surveyed was the vast 
differences in experiences with education between remittance senders, particularly those who 
were former refugees in Kakuma, and their family members who still reside inside the camp. 
According to Chanoff (2005), the experience that these remittance senders, members of the 
Lost Boy community who were resettled to the US in the early 2000s, had with education 
was originally presented to them throughout makeshift classrooms developed by Christian 
missionaries. During their time in Kakuma, the members of this population strove to 
“reconstruct themselves through education” (Chanoff 2005: 41).   
Finishing secondary school enabled these young men to become teachers in the 
refugee camp, and after their resettlement to Western nations like the US, their pursuit of 
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higher education led to employment opportunities. McKinnon (2008) asserts that these 
former child refugees have become part of one of the most successful refugee resettlement 
programmes in US history due to their high level of education and employment rates. 
While small businesses were largely uncommon among the participants in Kakuma in 
this study, education was the only significant investment in which the members of this 
population participated. The cost of education, which ranged widely, was the primary 
expenditure that financial remittances sent to Kakuma were used for the beyond simple 
mitigation of their continuous states of insecurity. For most of the men and women who 
participated in this study, both remittance senders and recipients, education was associated 
with both immediate costs, risking further insecurity in the present, but was also perceived to 
be an investment towards the future financial security of the family as a whole. 
For the refugee participants who maintained the strongest transnational bonds, their 
transnational counterparts wanted them to become educated so that they could eventually 
become valuable contributors towards their family network. Within this population it was 
emphasised that the education of the individual translated to the perception of greater 
economic and social security for the community as a whole. Even refugees who maintained 
weak or disconnected transnational ties went to tremendous efforts to pay for school supplies 
for their children, often selling food rations or spending money that would otherwise be used 
for medicine.  
Education was also regularly funded by small faith-based organisations, organised 
and sometimes run by members of the South Sudanese diaspora living in the developed 
world. These resettled refugees and economic migrants, both aware of their responsibility to 
their family in Africa, but who also faced significant financial hardship themselves, utilised 
their extended social networks in their new nation of residence to meet these commitments. 
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A fraction of the refugee community in Kakuma with excellent academic records 
were given university scholarships in Canada through an NGO called the Windle Trust. All 
of the young adults who participated in this study and who lived in Kakuma at the time of 
their interview expressed frustration at their inability to access similar scholarships. Due in 
large part to their transnational relationships with family abroad, education seemed like a 
piece of their future that they could control. Furthermore, an education at a Western 
university was perceived to be a ticket out of Kakuma, vital for the future success and 
sustainability of their family. 
These young adults argued that it was their responsibility as valuable members of 
their family to get the best education accessible for the advancement of their entire family 
network rather than for their individual success. Education represented an escape for both 
them and their families, often equated to economic advancement, livelihood development, 
and investment in community support networks. Therefore, from the perspective of this 
generation of South Sudanese refugees, education directly contrasted with their liminal 
lifestyle of socio-economic marginalisation, vulnerability within the refugee system, and the 
inescapable state of dependency in which they and their families are currently trapped. 
In Chapter 8, I suggested that even though both transnational resources and the 
distribution of foreign aid within the refugee system can be argued to promote a sense of 
dependency among their recipients, the aid system promotes their socio-economic 
marginalisation and vulnerability in order to justify continued dependence. In comparison, 
remittances sent to the South Sudanese population of Kakuma were justified based on the 
assumption that the recipients would become self-sufficient leaders capable of supporting 
other members of their community. The children within this population in particular 
represented hope and opportunity, a potential bridge between the limitations of their current 
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life as refugees in Kakuma and their ability to achieve freedom and prosperity for their entire 
families. 
There was a strong belief among Kakuma’s South Sudanese population that children 
should achieve the highest and best quality education accessible, a belief that I argue was 
strongly influenced by their transnational relationships. I found that a significant proportion 
of the remittance senders whom I talked to were highly educated, a fact which contributed to 
the attainment of professional careers and salaries capable of sustaining their transnational 
family network. However, the primary difference between the remittance senders and 
recipients in this study, and thus the opportunities available to them, was a difference in their 
freedom to pursue legal employment and other economic opportunities.  
During my time in Kakuma, I saw several limitations of this perception that education 
was the key to their future prosperity; the most significant of which was the inability of the 
refugees in Kakuma to gain legal work permits in Kenya despite their experience or level of 
education. This was the primary impediment preventing the members of this population from 
earning enough money to become financially sustainable beyond the need for humanitarian 
aid or remittances.  
The assumption that many participants in this study maintained that education was the 
solution to their problems was a vast oversimplification of their current situation, which was 
dictated by the policy-enforced restrictions placed on their lives due to their refugee status. 
For this reason, there was a significant difference in the opportunities accessible to the 
remittance senders and recipients, obstacles that could rarely be overcome through the pursuit 
of education. The primary barrier preventing self-sustainability of the South Sudanese 
population of Kakuma was their refugee status, a virtually inescapable label contributing to 
their continued dependence on both the humanitarian aid system as well as their transnational 
networks. 
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 As demonstrated in the data presented in the foregoing chapters, the value placed on 
education and the high level achieved by remittance senders in the South Sudanese diaspora, 
strongly influenced their ability to develop and maintain their transnational social networks, 
undertaking the role as global breadwinners within their families, and thus confirming the 
theories by Chanoff (2005), Johnson and Stoll (2008), and McKinnon (2008). However, this 
thesis also expands the work by these authors, demonstrating the exaggerated and distorted 
influence of the perception that education was the key to their livelihood development, and 
thus their freedom from the refugee system. While these transnational social networks, and 
the emphasis that they placed on the value of education, had a profound impact on the 
optimism and motivation of the remittance recipients in this study, they also showed limited, 
or even no influence on their livelihood development. 
 
9.2 Further Research 
 
The remittance recipients considered in this study were some of the poorest members 
of the South Sudanese diaspora. Other refugee remittance recipients live throughout Kenya 
and Uganda, often illegally, but in otherwise relatively comfortable, secure, and sustainable 
lifestyles. Therefore, it is likely that remittance recipients within this diaspora do show signs 
of livelihood development and increased security. However, due to the conditions of life in 
Kakuma and the refugee policies placed on those who live there, these resources were 
primarily used to combat insecurity rather than towards any significant investment other than 
education. An expanded exploration of this refugee diaspora would include transnational 
participants who live in these “illegal” communities throughout Kenya and Uganda, in 
addition to their families currently in South Sudan, refugees living in a Ugandan refugee 
camp, as well as former refugees living in Canada and Australia, countries which had 
significant refugee resettlement programmes targeting South Sudanese in the past.  
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 Similarly, in the attempt to study all variations of the global South Sudanese diaspora, 
it would also be helpful to examine remittance recipients who were never victims of war and 
have therefore never been defined by their refugee status nor experienced policy-induced 
social and economic marginalisation. Although it can be assumed that all members of this 
diaspora have been in some way influenced by war in South Sudan, whether directly or 
indirectly, due to this nation’s history of an almost constant state of war or civil unrest since 
the 1950s, their experiences with migration, integration, and transnational cultural 
participation could range widely. It is only through including all of these experiences that we 
can gain a truly accurate representation of the complexity of this transnational diaspora, a 
reflection of 21st century migration patterns and transnational activity.   
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